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ABSTRACT 
 
 
A number of theoretical explanations seek to describe the factors that have led to the 
position of the United States as the last industrialized Western nation without a universal 
health care program. Theories focus on institutional arrangement, historic precedent, and 
the influence of the private sector and market forces. This study explores another factor: 
the role of underlying social values. The research examines differences in values among 
ten European countries, the United States and Canada, and analyzes the associations 
between the values that have been seen to contribute the individualism-collectivism 
dynamic in the United States.  The hypothesis that equality and generalized trust are 
positively associated with universalism is only partially true. Equality is positively 
associated (β = .301, p < .001), while generalized trust is negatively associated with 
universalism (β = –.052, p < .001). Not only do Americans show lower levels of support 
for income equality and universalism than Europeans, but the effect of being American 
holds even after controlling for socio-demographic and religious variables (β =.044, p < 
.01).  When the model tests the association of equality and trust on universalism in each 
region, it explains approximately 17 percent of the variance of universalism for the 
United States, and approximately 13 percent in Europe and Canada. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
Since redistribution plays a greater role in the health care systems of other countries than it 
does in the United States, there is an implication that a more egalitarian ethos holds sway in 
Europe and Canada ... From de Tocqueville to the present, many observers have 
commented on the stronger role of individualism in the United States than elsewhere, but 
there is no consensus regarding its explanation. 
 
— Victor Fuchs, New England Journal of Medicine, December 1, 2010 
 
 
Rationale and Significance 
Why has the United States lacked a universal system of health care provision for 
all citizens? Even with the prospect of the Affordable Care Act continuing to take effect 
in 2014, this recurring question continues to engage and perplex scholars and 
policymakers alike. Different hypotheses have been used to explain the phenomenon of 
the United States as the only industrialized Western nation without a universal health 
system. Some scholars have focused on how the U.S. differs from other industrialized 
nations in its formal institutional arrangements (Hacker, 1998; Wilensky, 2002) or its 
historical roots which differ from those of Canada (Lipset, 1990). Others point to the 
pluralistic structure of American politics, which has led to the enormous control over the 
system by the private sector and historically powerful special interests (Broder and 
Johnson, 1996; Fuchs, 2010; Gordon, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Moran and Alexander, 1998; 
Quadagno, 2005; Skocpol, 1996).  While each of these theoretical explanations have their 
proponents, none addresses the question posed by Victor Fuchs at the outset: the extent to 
which a distinctively individualist culture has played a role in historically preventing the 
U.S. from adopting a system of universalism in its delivery of health care benefits.  
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This research explores the role of underlying social values by examining the 
degree to which equality and generalized trust at the aggregate national level can explain 
a nation’s support for universalist policies. The study also looks at the differences of 
support for universalist policy among Europeans, Americans and Canadians, and 
examines the effects demographic factors have in explaining these associations.  
Assessing relationships among different values quantitatively helps us better 
understand the assumptions we make about these values. For example, Fein and 
Richmond (2005) hypothesize that American support for universalist welfare policy is 
predicated on support for reducing inequality. This hypothesis can be tested by 
quantitatively assessing the relationship between the values of universalism and equality 
among Americans. Comparing these relationships across Europe, Canada and the United 
States would further expand the insights and be valuable to this dialogue. Similarly, Berg 
and Bjornskov’s hypothesis that “trust is high in universal welfare states, not because 
welfare state universality creates trust, but because trusting populations are more likely to 
create and sustain universal welfare states,” (p.1-2) can be substantiated by examining the 
associations between levels of generalized trust and support for universalism among 
nations. If levels of generalized trust bear no relationship to levels of support for 
universalism, generalized trust may thus not be a factor in support for welfare policies. 
However, if there is a strong connection, generalized trust may be a variable to consider 
in explaining a nation’s failure to adopt universalist policies.  
 As much as “values” are increasingly evoked in political discourse and the media, 
there remain relatively few cross-national empirical public opinion studies examining the 
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association between specific named values (i.e. generalized trust, equality) and support 
for universalism. As this dissertation argues, an empirical quantitative study examining 
the strength of these associations has implications about the extent to which a nation’s 
population is willing to embrace a universal health care system (Maioni, 1998; Moran, 
2000; Quagnagno, 2004).  
 
Research Objectives 
 
Objective One: Identify the strength of the relationships between values of equality 
and trust and support for universalism. 
The first objective of this research is to examine public opinion research data 
from the most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2007) to determine if there 
is a statistically significant relationship among twelve Western nations between support 
for greater income equality and support for universalism (measured by the statement that 
“the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for”) 
and also to determine if there is statistically significant relationship between generalized 
trust and support for universalism. 
 
Objective Two: Identify how the values under study, and the associations between 
them, differ between the United States, Canada and Europe. 
 This second objective of this research is to provide insight into how the U.S. may 
differ from Europe and Canada with respect to support for universalism and its 
4 
 
relationship with equality and trust. This research objective is particularly concerned with 
informing policy around universal health care in the United States, Canada and Europe. 
While discussions of individualistic values are not always central in the debate over 
health care policy, historical accounts have demonstrated that these values have had an 
effect in the United States on the ultimate outcome of health care reform proposals 
throughout the twentieth century — beginning with the rejection of the Progressive era 
health care reform attempt of 1916 and continuing through the defeat of the Clinton plan 
in 1996 (Hoffman, 2001; Nye, Zelikow, and King, 1996).  
 This study is thus intended to inform the debate on policies relating to 
universalism, and particularly around universal health care policy, which has become the 
cornerstone of universal welfare policy (Maioni 1998; Moran, 2000; Quadagno, 2004). 
The objective here is to examine the extent to which these levels of equality and 
universalism differ between Europe, Canada and the United States using statistical data 
about the relationship between equality, trust, and universalism. While there is a great 
deal of ethnic, religious and cultural commonality between Europe, Canada and the 
United States, this study seeks to provide a quantitative analysis for how these regions 
may differ in their attitudes toward universalism. 
 This dissertation is expected to provide insight to both academic scholars and 
public policy makers, particularly in the United States, by providing a deeper level of 
knowledge about universalism and other values that are associated with it, because of its 
implications on national health care policy. For example, the research conducted in this 
study may guide health care reform advocates in the United States to consider American 
5 
 
public opinion on fundamental values when seeking to develop a particular type of health 
care system for the United States. In other words, to what extent is the above introductory 
quotation by Victor Fuchs true? Providing statistical context to the individualism v. 
equality value may help policymakers better understand the public they are serving 
(compared to the “public” that is served in Europe and Canada) as American 
policymakers devise policy to appeal to serve a nationwide population in the United 
States. 
 In their book, The Health Care Mess: How we got into it and what it will take to 
get out (2005), Julius Richmond, M.D. and Rashi Fein, M.D. state that “we cannot expect 
to achieve universal health insurance without a collective decision that our value system 
calls for equity and that we are prepared to take the necessary redistributive steps to 
achieve it” (p.263). This dissertation seek to provide insight in determining how realistic 
this “collective decision” is by (1) measuring the American public’s value system of 
equality, and (2) determining the validity of the connection between the value of equality 
and that of universalism.  This process requires measuring these values at a national level, 
testing the relationships between them, and then comparing the strength of the 
relationships between the United States and other nations. In the final analysis, the study 
is constructed to be able to propose an empirical answer to the question, “how far is the 
United States from Richmond and Fein’s simple directive?”  
 Likewise, as generalized trust has been linked to more efficient economies 
(Putnam 1993, 2000) flourishing civil societies (Fukuyama, 1995), higher levels of 
population health (Kawachi and Berkman, 2000) and greater economic equality (Knack 
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and Keefer, 1997), it makes sense to ask if this value can be used to predict the level of 
support for universalism in a society. Perhaps it is trust, and not the collective decision of 
equality that is more closely connected with universalism. 
 
 
Control variables  
 This study will also identify specific independent demographic variables and 
control for the extraneous, and potentially confounding, impact of these variables on the 
relationship between the values of equality and universalism and between trust and 
universalism. The literature review documents the demographic variables that have been 
identified by previous research as worthy of examining to determine if they have a 
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable of universalism.  
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CHAPTER II:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter provides a review of the literature surveying how values have been studied 
and understood within various academic and policy domains; which values have been 
understood to connect to well-functioning democracies; and how these values vary 
among different Western nations. Focus is placed on universal health care policy. The 
review includes a discussion of how values have been understood to have affected efforts 
to enact universal health care policy in the United States. 
 
 
Values and Public Policy 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, values represent “one’s judgment of 
what is important in life” (OED Online, 2012). The American Heritage Dictionary 
defines values as “beliefs of a person or social group in which they have an emotional 
investment, either for or against something” (Pickett, 2000). In this dissertation, 
importance is placed on the phrase “for or against” as an important part of the definition. 
This element of having a choice between two opposing directions is also underscored in 
the definitions provided by other key scholars on the domain of human values research 
(Rokeach, 1973; Haidt, 2012; Hechter, 1993; Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004). 
 In Dictionary of Social Sciences (1964), Gould and Kolb write “Social scientists 
for the most part have confined their attention to values as empirical variables in social 
life whose scientific importance is not so much dependent on their validity and 
correctness as upon the fact that they are believed by those who hold them” (p.744). This 
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dissertation also confines its attention to the mere empirical assumption that values are 
believed by those who hold them, and does not broach a normative exploration of 
whether some values are more beneficial than others for a society to hold. 
The nature of conflict that emerges when comparing and contrasting values is 
essential to the idea that aggregated differences in individual values within a population 
yield to differences among populations (Inglehart 1977, 2000; Fancy, 2004).  Thus, 
studying values differences among populations is also a fundamental element of this 
research study, which examines how these aggregate differences among populations can 
help predict attitudes about public policy, and shed light on the examination of health 
care policy in Europe, Canada and the United States.  
The definition of values provided by Milton Rokeach (1972) reflects the often 
oppositional, “for or against,” nature of human values: “To say that a person has a value,” 
Rokeach writes, “is to say that he has an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct 
or end-state existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of 
conduct or end-states of existence” (p. 159). Likewise, Rokeach (1973), in what is 
considered to be a landmark in its comprehensive exploration into the nature of human 
values, defines a “values system” as “an enduring organization of beliefs concerning 
preferable modes of conduct or end states of existence along a continuum of relative 
importance” (p.5). 
This crucial aspect of the oppositional nature of human values can be contrasted 
with the notion of “universal values,” which hold the roughly equal worth for virtually all 
people (Schwartz, 1990). Universal values include the philosophical approach to 
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determining the nature of those universally intrinsic values that all of humanity is thought 
to embrace when it reaches its full potential, such as peace, love, and truth. The concept 
of universal values is a separate field from that explored by this research study.  
Hofstede (2001) reinforces this oppositional nature of values differences when he states 
“values are feelings with arrows to them. Each has a plus and minus pole” (p.6). 
According to Hofstede, values inform such conflicts as good versus evil, irrational versus 
rational, and moral versus immoral. Hofstede (1997) also demonstrates the rippling effect 
of these shared values through his “onion diagram,” which illustrates how a society’s 
shared values influence the positive attributions that may be used in government or 
commercial communications.  As the diagram indicates, it is through “practices” that 
values are infused into these other societal elements. Such practices may include public 
subsidies for sports teams and stadiums, which reinforce the value of sports teams and 
their stars. Another practice may be the fashion in which public parks are financed and 
used by the public. And finally, government-provided universal health care would fall 
into the category of practice, if the society valued the need for such a policy.  
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Figure 2.1.  
Hofstede’s “Onion Diagram” of Values Influence (1997) 
 
 
 
In his exploration of the psychology of human values, Mandler (1993) proposes the 
notion that a value is “some representation that shapes our likes, dislikes, preferences, 
prejudices, and social attitudes, and that informs (but does not constitute) our moral 
judgments” (p.233). The values that Mandler refers to here, as with the values analyzed 
in this research study, are not exclusively the likes, dislikes, and prejudices themselves, 
but those core beliefs of individuals that influence attitudes and opinions about 
supporting or opposing a policy or other social concept. 
 
Distinguishing Values from Attitudes and Beliefs 
Perhaps the first to argue for a distinction between values and attitudes was Smith 
(1969), who wrote about being “embarrassed with a proliferation of concepts akin to 
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values: attitudes and sentiments (for example),” (p.97-98). Rokeach (1973) also 
expressed frustration with those who convolute values with other terminology, 
specifically, citing Converse (1964) and Campbell (1963) as violators of his more 
disciplined approach. Rokeach argued that while a value is a standard which transcends 
objects and situations, an attitude refers to an organization of beliefs which focuses on a 
specific object or situation. An attitude, according to Rokeach, is more of a manifestation 
of belief or opinion, while a value guides actions, judgments and comparisons across 
specific objects and situations and “beyond immediate goals to more ultimate goals” 
(p.18). This will serve as the accepted distinction for the purposes of this dissertation; 
specifically, that values are more abstract manifestations of opinion, and attitudes include 
an orientation toward specific objects, such as opinions about specific policies, political 
issues, situations, or individuals.  
 Bergman’s (1998) analysis on this subject is informative, as he reviews literature 
on this question of the difference between a value and an attitude. He concludes that the 
difference lies principally in the condition of abstraction; an attitude is how one feels 
about something specific and a value transcends specific things, issues, or policies. 
Others have expanded on this understanding, where it is now commonly agreed among 
scholars of values in such fields as psychology, social psychology, and sociology, that 
values address more philosophical ideals, while attitudes are generally applied to more 
concrete objects or issues (Hitlin and Pliavin, 2004; Hechter, 1993; Williams, 1979). 
Consistent with the work of Rokeach (1973), Hofstede (1997), Bergman (1998) 
and others, this dissertation is also influenced by a hierarchical model originally proposed 
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by Lawrence (2006), which provides an illustration of the relationship between values, 
attitudes and specific public opinion issues: 
 
Figure 2.2.  A Values – Opinion Hierarchy (Lawrence, 2006) 
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 The hierarchical structure of the model places factors that have greater variability 
over time at the top of the pyramid. Factors toward the bottom are more enduring and less 
subject to change and outside influences. An opinion about a specific presidential 
candidate or policy position can change from day to day, depending on developments 
reported in the news, for example. However, these opinions are also influenced by the 
more longstanding foundational factors found toward the bottom of the pyramid that are 
less likely to change over time. 
 Values, in this model, represent the foundational core beliefs held by an 
individual or community toward basic philosophic questions such as the importance of 
equality, freedom, or the nature of the relationship between government and society. 
Willingness to generally trust others can legitimately be categorized as a value, or as a 
cognition; nevertheless, the case made in this study and underscored by previous 
literature is that generalized trust, equality and universalism are all deeply held beliefs 
that hold steady over time, and are all understood here to be considered values. 
Cognitions in this model refer to heuristics or assumptions taken from information 
we know (or think we know), and may include stereotypes, perceptions, schema, images 
and symbols (about terrorists, environmentalists, Republicans, immigrants, business 
executives, etc.)  
As discussed later in Chapter II, attitudes refer here to an orientation to specific 
objects or issues. While values are more abstract manifestations of opinion, attitudes 
focus on specifics such as specific public policies, political issues, or situations.  
Considerations in this model refer to cues representing experiences that can 
influence one’s opinion in different directions, such as recent personal events (i.e. 
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experiencing a theft or being treated for disease) or viewing a compelling news story. 
Considerations are often the ultimate influencing factor when people express an opinion 
and often interfere with the answer that would have been provided at another time and 
place (Bennett, 1985). 
Preferences related to values can manifest themselves powerfully, or relatively 
unassertively, depending on an individual’s personality traits, recent experiences, how 
strongly one holds each particular value, and how personally invested the individual may 
be in a particular issue. Indeed, realizing that individuals hold a “value system” is an 
important component to understanding how different values play against each other, and 
represents an important strand of scholarship on the nature of human values (Williams, 
1968; Rokeach, 1973; Mander, 1993). 
 Although the specific influence of human values on public policy is mediated by 
the additional factors within the public opinion hierarchical pyramid listed above, a strain 
of public policy literature has sought to establish the influence of values on public policy 
(Lipset 1963, 1996; King, 1973; Rokeach, 1973). The basic argument across this body of 
scholarship is simply that research has shown that policy patterns and aggregated core 
values have some degree of congruence. While Skocpol (1992) and Steinmo (1993) have 
indicated that the exact mechanisms through which values actually affect public policy 
remain implicit and even unclear, it nonetheless remains established that, in the words of 
Anglund (2000), “the alignments between values and public policy are highly suggestive 
of values influence” (p.28).  
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 The correlation between values and policy can also be understood in the way a 
society determines how a given policy area represents a “problem.” Core values are 
evoked and employed to translate conditions into problems that need to be addressed 
(Kingdon, 1995). If a community’s or society’s values are not aligned with an 
understanding of a particular issue as being a “problem,” the issue is unlikely to be dealt 
with. Thus, if a population of a particular political state has a strong cultural orientation 
toward individualism and free market economic policies, the society may be less likely to 
consider unequal health insurance distribution in the population as a concern compared 
with a society that places a comparably higher value on equality.  
An adverse condition becomes an identifiable “problem” once the public decides 
that something needs to be done about it, and it draws upon its core values to make this 
decision (Kingdon, 1995, Wildavsky, 1987). Kingdon argues that problems often come to 
the attention of policymakers through a “systematic indicator,” which, in the case of 
health care policy, for example, may be unacceptable rates of uninsured, disease rates, 
mortality rates or price inflation.  
The values held by an individual or group ultimately determine how to label or 
evaluate a given condition, and consequently, allow that individual or group to identify 
that condition as a “problem” that is required to be addressed (Wildavsky, 1987; Aaron, 
1994b; Daniels, 1994). 
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Studying and Reporting Values in the Social Sciences 
“Problems with values appear in all fields of the social sciences, and value elements are 
potentially important as variables to be analyzed in all major areas of investigation” (p. 
205).   
 
– Robin M. Williams (1968) 
 
Early conceptualizations of the nature of human values in the context of public 
policy emerged from the work of C. Kluckhohn (1951) and, subsequently F. Kluckhohn 
and Strodtbeck (1961). Research by these scholars in the field of cross-cultural 
psychology was instrumental in helping advance the understanding of the benefit to the 
social sciences of studying values using the group as the unit of analysis. These groups 
could be specific cultures living within a single region, such as a tribal organization, or 
they could be as vast as the population of an entire nation. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
(1961) also generated a theory, largely influential in the development of scholars who 
followed, including those who created the World Values Survey, that there were five 
basic types of problems that drew upon values to solve. These were time (past, present or 
future), the relationship between humans and their natural environment, the relationship 
of individuals with each other (e.g. hierarchical, equal, etc.), motivations for behavior 
(e.g. spiritual, physical), and the nature of “human nature” (e.g. good, evil, selfish, or a 
combination).  
Despite early work in the field of social and group psychology, much of the 
literature seeking to catalogue, define and measure values has, since 1951, proven to be 
somewhat incoherent (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). In fact, there remains a balkanized nature 
to the study of values, as the field has not been universally adopted into any one domain 
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of scholarship. Rather, it has been embraced by such fields as political science (Lipset, 
1996, 1990, 1979; Dobbin, 2001), psychology (Mandler, 1993), sociology (Hechter, 
1993; Inglehart & Baker, 2000), social psychology (Rokeach, 1972, 1973; Howard, 
2005), and cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 2004).  The study of values in the realm of 
political science has also been categorized as the study of “political culture” by Feldman 
& Zaller (1992); Hood (1990); Lipset (1996); Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky (1990); and 
Wildavsky (1987).  Research on the impact of values in the realm of political science has 
been conducted in the field of moral psychology by Haidt (2012) and Tetlock (1986).  
Values have also been studied within the field of biology (Cavalli-Sforza, 1993; 
Roccas et al., 2002); however the results of these studies demonstrate the divergence of 
opinions among scholars in this field. For example, while Rokeach (1973) concluded that 
humankind is the only animal that can meaningfully hold values, a later study performed 
on chimpanzees concluded that these animal subjects manifested differing social goals, 
which has been attributed to underlying value systems  (de Waal, 1993; Hitlin and 
Pilliavin, 2004). 
Although the term “value” has held different meanings in the field of economics, 
there have been scholars within this field who have engaged in the study of values as it is 
explored in this dissertation (Arrow, 1987; Etzioni, 1988; Scitovsky, 1993). Henry Aaron, 
an economist and health care policy scholar, stated that he reached his understanding and 
his definition of human values beginning with an exploration of the economic study of 
incentives (Aaron, 1994a). He argued that policymakers traditionally viewed incentives 
as the key variable in influencing public policy and public behavior. Aaron initially 
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believed that if behavior leads to undesirable policy outcomes, incentives should be 
changed. However, in time, he noticed a growing body of analysis suggesting the 
inadequacy of this approach, and began to develop an understanding that a different type 
of values and norms — shaped by experience, family, and community — condition the 
efficacy of public policies. In Values and Public Policy (1994a) Aaron argues that “the 
formation of preferences is as essential a subject of investigation for public policy 
analysts as incentives and behavioral responses” (p. viii).   
Schwartz (1993) attempted to develop a “science of values,” concluding, 
however, that developing coherent biology- or science-based theories of values is not an 
adequate method for understanding this field. Such understandings, Schwartz asserted, 
would only be possible if the study of science was to include a thorough contextual 
understanding of history and culture. According to Schwartz, “people are situated in 
particular times and places, are influenced by particular social norms and institutions and 
contribute to the development of new norms and institutions,” (p.183) thus asserting that 
values may have biological influences, but that social and environmental influences are 
too significant to discount in any meaningful study. 
Despite the apparent lack of coherence among disciplines within the study of 
human values, some common understandings, assumptions, and agreed upon areas of 
research and debate have emerged among scholars, many of which have helped to define 
the scope of study for this research project.  
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Terminal v. instrumental values 
Along with previous analyses between values and attitudes (Woodruff, 1942; 
Allport, 1961; Watson, 1966; Rokeach, 1973), a distinction has also been made between 
“instrumental” values on one hand and “terminal” (Rokeach, 1973; Wright 1971) or 
“immanent” (Hechter, 1993) values on the other.  According to Rokeach, equality 
represents one of the eighteen “end-state” or terminal values. Rokeach does not 
specifically list “trust” as a value, but being broadminded, forgiving and honest are all 
included in the “instrumental” category (see Table 2.1): 
 
20 
 
Table 2.1. The Rokeach Value System: Instrumental v. Terminal (1973) 
 
Instrumental Values Terminal Values 
Ambitious A comfortable life 
Broadminded An exciting life 
Capable A sense of accomplishment 
Cheerful A world at peace 
Clean A world of beauty 
Courageous Equality 
Forgiving Family security 
Helpful Freedom 
Honest Happiness 
Imaginative Inner harmony 
Independent Mature love 
Intellectual National security 
Logical Pleasure 
Loving Salvation 
Obedient Self-respect 
Polite Social recognition 
Respectable True friendship 
Self-controlled Wisdom 
 
Despite the differences of opinion and of categorization among values scholars, 
the distinction between universal and terminal values has not been determined in the 
literature to have significant implications for public policy. While Rokeach (1973) and 
Hechter (1993) sought to make this differentiation between instrumental and terminal 
values, their final conclusions did not rely on this distinction as a critical element of their 
research.  In reviewing the differences between instrumental and terminal values, 
Schwartz (1993) questioned the utility of differentiating between these two categories. 
Even though he explored it at length, Schwartz concluded that the same values can 
express motivations for means as well as ends.  For the purposes of this study, the values 
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of equality, trust and universalism will not be further defined into terminal or 
instrumental categories.  
Building upon the work of Rokeach, Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) presented a 
theory identifying ten motivationally distinct value orientations that people in all cultures 
recognize, specifying dynamics of conflict and congruence among these values. As with 
the work of Kluckhohn (1951), Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961), and Rokeach (1973), 
the theory proposed by Schwartz and Bilsky is an attempt at moving toward a unifying 
model for better understanding the nature of human motivation. While the intent of the 
research in this dissertation is not to advance any of the aforementioned theories of 
human values, it is hoped that the results provide elaboration on the work of these 
theorists who helped shape the understanding and conceptualization of human values and 
how they motivate individuals and groups. 
 
Measuring and Reporting Values 
Because values are not strictly observable, and partly because they rest in the 
domain of the social sciences, measurement of values remains challenging (Hitlin and 
Piliavin, 2004; Hechter, 1993). In past studies, values have been measured by asking 
people to describe their own values, or asking people to respond to questions where the 
answers are coded according to value definitions (Hitlin and Piliavin, 2004).  Values have 
also been coded based on observed behavior (Hechter, 1993). 
 The ranking approach developed by Rokeach (1973), named the “Rokeach Values 
Survey,” set a standard for measuring values that continues to be in use today (Hitlin and 
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Pilavin, 2004), particularly in the fashion in which it recognizes that different human 
values are often found to be in tension or competition with other values (e.g. income 
equality v. individual incentives, universalism v. individual responsibility, trust v. 
caution, privacy v. security, etc.) (Schwartz, 1992).  
The World Values Survey, which provides the dataset for this research study, also 
adheres to this model of values existing in a state of tension.  In seeking value rankings 
for equality, the World Values Survey instrument asks respondents to weigh their 
preference for income equality against the preference for maintaining income differences 
in the interest of creating incentives. Likewise, in the World Values Survey, the value of 
generalized trust (“in general, most people can be trusted”) is contrasted with the 
statement that one “cannot be too careful in dealing with people.” 
In addition, a distinction has been made in terms of the levels of analysis of values 
in explanations of social, political, and cultural phenomena. While empirical studies 
seeking to measure, document, and understand human values do so at the individual 
level, researchers, most notably Inglehart (1977, 2000) have produced studies which 
examine values survey data from individuals which has been aggregated into group 
categories by country, gender, and geographic region.  
This research examines values from the perspectives of both individual and 
aggregate levels of analysis, using the World Values Survey, which collects and reports 
data at the individual level and also aggregates the data by country. More on the World 
Values Survey sampling design is discussed in Methodology section in Chapter III. 
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Measuring Values through Public Opinion 
Because this research study analyzes values captured through a worldwide set of 
public opinion data, some discussion of the relevance of the relationship between public 
opinion and public policy is in order.  Public opinion is the study of how people form or 
share judgments about problems, goals, or issues, and changes across time and space 
(Bennett, 1980).  Despite his contention that public opinion can be quantified, Bennett 
also warns of the “state of consciousness fallacy.” This is the assumption that some 
common principle or logic underlies the opinions of different individuals in the public 
and informs or shapes expressions of public opinion. Indeed, important questions about 
public opinion have a tendency to remain “unanswered and muddled” (Jacobs & Shapiro, 
1994).  Furthermore, it has also been shown that public opinion toward government can 
also differ across different policy domains (Feldman & Zaller, 1992; Page & Shapiro, 
1983).  
Among the findings that have been concluded, however, is that public opinion 
across a number of domains, including policy around government provided health care, 
does shape politician behavior (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994). Opinion is also shaped by 
historical and institutional influences, such as the findings that Americans’ positive 
feelings about the universal Social Security program enacted in the late 1930s helped 
influence the passage of Medicare during the mid-1960s (Skocpol, 1994; Jacobs, 1993).  
Thus, public opinion can also be seen as a “feedback loop,” both influencing public 
policy, and also providing important information to politicians about existing policy. As 
such, public opinion can be seen as both an independent variable and a dependent 
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variable. In fact, it has been established that public opinion data is both an input to and an 
output of the American political system (Bennett, 1980). 
There is a great deal of evidence to confirm that policymaking involving 
universalism and welfare is influenced by public opinion — specifically by the particular 
results yielded from opinion polling (Page & Shapiro, 1983; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994; 
Skocpol, 1994). Public opinion research played a strong role in the development of the 
Clinton health plan (Johnson & Broder, 1996), beginning with the election to the Senate 
of Harris Wofford in 1993, who closely monitored poll results and even assembled focus 
groups specifically around health care policy (Skocpol, 1994). 
 
 
Universalism: A value and a policy choice  
A central component of this study is the examination of public support for 
“universalism” in Europe, Canada and the United States. Universalism serves as the 
response variable in the statistical analysis, which examines the extent that equality and 
trust are associated with universalism and how these associations differ among western 
nations. The universalism variable is operationalized by examining the extent to which 
people believe that “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for.” World Values Survey respondents are asked to state their level 
of support for this view as contrasted with the view that “people should take more 
responsibility to provide for themselves.” 
 This dissertation also includes an analysis of how values have influenced the 
politics of national health care throughout American history. The assertion that studying 
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the level to which universalism is embraced by the American public can provide 
informative insight into the study of health care policy in the United States will be further 
explored in Chapter V. 
 As a value, universalism can be understood in the context of the individualist-
collectivist tension that has existed throughout human history, and certainly throughout 
American political history.  As Henry David Thoreau wrote in “Civil Disobedience” 
(1849), “I heartily accept the motto, ‘That government is best which governs least’; and I 
should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically.” As Quadagno and 
Street (2005) observe with regard to Thoreau, “this thesis is that any power given to the 
government is subtracted from the liberty of the governed, a concept best captured by the 
term “anti-statism” (p.52).  
The term “universalism” has been employed in political science and political 
philosophy to define the policy of government providing for its citizens at an equal level 
of benefits for all. The nature of these “equal benefits” can be defined in different ways, 
from equality of opportunity, to equality of need, to equality in number, and can be 
measured in various ways as well. As Titmuss explained in 1968:  
In any discussion of the future of what is called “the Welfare 
State,” much of the argument revolves around the principles 
and objectives of universalist social services and selective 
social services. Consider, first, the nature of the broad 
principles which helped to shape substantial sections of the 
British welfare legislation in the past, and particularly the 
principle of universalism embodied in such postwar enactments 
as the National Health Service Act. One fundamental historical 
reason for the adoption of this principle was the aim of making 
services available and accessible to the whole population in 
such ways as would not involve users in any humiliating loss 
of status, dignity or self-respect. There should be so sense of 
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inferiority, pauperism, shame or stigma in the use of publicly 
provided service; no attribution that one was being or 
becoming a ‘public burden.’ Hence the emphasis on social 
rights of all citizens to use as responsible people the services 
available by the community in respect of certain needs which 
the private market and the family were unable or unwilling to 
provide universally (p.40).  
 
Universalism can thus be understood by what it is not as much as by 
understanding what it is. Universalism can be contrasted with a government’s policy of 
providing no public benefits at all, with individuals providing completely for themselves. 
And it can also be contrasted with a policy seeking to reduce poverty by “targeting” 
benefits or services to individuals at levels commensurate with “need,” or “means,” 
however those needs are measured (Skocpol, 1991). Additional analysis of the contrast 
between universalism and means-testing is explored by Esping-Andersen (1990), who 
developed a typology of welfare states, consisting of liberal, corporatist-statist, and social 
democratic models. Among the dimensions explored by this typology is “the degree to 
which individuals or families can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living 
independently of market participation” (p. 37), as well as the level of social stratification 
and inequality that result from social policies. Thus, the connection Esping-Andersen 
makes between policies of universalism and the goal of affecting social equality supports 
the objectives of this dissertation which seeks to explore the connection between the 
values of universalism and economic equality in Western nations.  
In 1949, T. H. Marshall wrote that the ideological foundation for universalism 
emerged from the evolution of civil rights into political rights, and then ultimately social 
rights, entitling individuals to “a certain standard of civilization which is conditioned 
27 
 
only on the discharge of the general duties of citizenship” (Marshall, 1964, p.24). 
According to Marshall, these social rights were largely economic investments such as 
minimum wage laws, public education funding, and national health care programs, which 
were designed, in part, to reduce drastic inequalities within the population. As Hasenfeld 
& Rafferty (1989) argue, a great deal of research has revealed that popular support for 
universalist programs has been shaped to a significant level by the interplay between 
economic individualism, or the work ethic, on the one hand, and social equality or 
collective responsibility, on the other (Hasenfeld and Rafferty, 1989; McCloskey & 
Zaller, 1984; Wilensky, 1975). 
Certain studies have attempted to isolate variables that most strongly correlate to 
support for the welfare state. For example, Rokeach (1973) concluded that these two 
values of equality and freedom alone significantly underlie similarities and differences in 
major ideological orientations. Furthermore, Rokeach argued that “if we know nothing 
more about a person than where he stands with respect to these two distinctively political 
values we should be able to predict his position with respect to all the major ideologies 
and toward the major reference persons and groups associated with the major ideologies” 
(p.190).  This research is supported by similar studies and intellectual explorations before 
and since about the nature of collectivism versus individualism (Tocqueville, 2001/1835; 
Lipset, 1979; McCloskey & Zaller, 1984; Bellah et al., 1985), all of which examine the 
tension between the decidedly individualistic nature of the American public and the 
culture’s longstanding emphasis on respecting and ensuring economic equality among its 
citizenry.  
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Research thus far on the correlation between specific individual values and 
support for universalism has essentially concluded that societies and individuals both 
hold a mix of values which operate together to inform the overall level of support one 
holds for social welfare programs (Feldman and Seenbergen, 2001; McClosky and Zaller, 
1984). However, the establishment of direct correlations between values and attitudes of 
support for the welfare state remains somewhat incomplete. Although some studies have 
shown relationships between the value of equality and attitudes for or against policies of 
universalism (Bobo, 1991; Lipset, 1990; Kuegel & Smith, 1986), other research has 
indicated a possible reinforcing effect of existing institutional arrangements and history 
on popular support for universalist welfare policies, with less of an influence coming 
from culture and values (Dobbin, 2001; Hacker, 1998). It is hoped that this study will 
contribute to this ongoing inquiry by examining the relationship between the equality, 
trust and universalism constructs, using the cross-national World Values Survey data set.  
Studies investigating how the values of United States residents compare with 
those of other Western nations have led to disparate conclusions.  Historical examinations 
of how the interplay of this mix of values operates within the United States often find that 
the individualist value preference overshadows America’s commitment to equality 
(Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2005; Lipset, 1996; Bellah et al., 1985; Hofstadter, 1944). 
However, this conclusion is certainly not unanimous. Other studies have concluded that 
the American tendency toward individualism may becoming less dominant than it has 
been in the past. Research has indicated that values such as humanitarianism and 
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egalitarianism may be more present than has previously been assumed or indicated from 
earlier research (Feldman & Steenbergen, 2001; Bobo, 1991; Mann, 1970). 
In addressing the issue of health policy, Rowley (2003) asserted that the health 
care system in the United States is in need of transformation, but further argued that the 
underlying problems will not be addressed until the American public develops a 
consensus on the values it desires in any new system that is intended to meet societal 
needs. Anttonen (2012) also states that declaring universalism to be a societal value is a 
precondition for achieving policies of equality and, ultimately, reaching total equality 
among citizens. While previous studies have concluded that the “values mix” in the 
United States may not permit this consensus to occur, there is still work to be done in 
understanding the values that predict support for social programs such as universal health 
care, and learning how to more effectively stimulate or encourage those values in 
Western society.  
 
Universalism: Implications for health care reform 
While the World Values Survey does not include a question specifically asking 
about support for universal health care, the literature confirms a close relationship 
between universalism generally and the policy of universal health care provision. As 
Antonia Maioni has written (1998), studies examining the universalism can be invaluable 
to the study of health policy in any given country or region. “Health insurance,” she 
writes, “represents a central pillar of the welfare state because it can be seen as a social 
right of citizenship and it is the largest social expenditure” (p. 2).  
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Moran (2000) has argued that health care policy should be considered the primary 
source of evidence related to the changing politics of the welfare state. Specifically, he 
also makes the case that health care should be the central element of any policy analyst’s 
understanding of a nation’s approach to universalism. Indeed, Moran argues, the 
experience of health care reflects, in every important way, the wider experience of the 
universal welfare state.  Jill Quadagno used the universal social welfare policy and 
national health care interchangeably in her research publication (2004) “Why the United 
States has no National Health Insurance: Stakeholder mobilization against the welfare 
state 1945-1996.”  
If it can be shown that the values of equality and/or trust can be associated with 
value of universalism, and that these values are statistically significantly stronger in 
Europe and Canada than the United States, these findings will contribute to an 
explanation of why, in 2014, the U.S. continues to resist the implementation of a single 
national health care system.  
 
Why the United States has lacked a universal health care system:  
Theoretical explanations 
The earliest universal welfare policies began in Imperial Germany during the 
1880s, when Kaiser Wilhelm and his chancellor Otto von Bismarck instituted programs 
such as health insurance, pensions and workplace regulations, to prevent the socialist 
party from winning majority power in Parliament (Hoffman, 2001). After the First World 
War, authors such as Thörnberg in Sweden and von Wiese in Germany began to argue 
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that every citizen could be the beneficiary of social policies (Anttonen and Stefansson, 
2012). This view became dominant after the Second World War when British 
policymakers, chief among them William Beveridge, began using a new language of 
universalism and social justice (Anttonen & Stefansson, 2012). In 1948, the United 
Kingdom implemented its universal National Health Service, followed by universal 
health care programs introduced in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland between 
1955 and 1965. Universal health insurance was implemented in Saskatchewan, Canada 
in 1962 followed by the rest of the nation during the late 1960s. Other European countries 
introduced universal health care mostly in the 1970s, with Switzerland adding its 
program in 1996.   
Currently, all European Union member states provide universal health care to 
their populations. Coverage is provided to 100 percent of the population, although in 
Germany and the Netherlands some people rely on private insurance or are required to 
cover some portion of the costs themselves (Gevers et al., 2000). 
Yet despite the adoption of universal health care policies throughout Western 
Europe and Canada, the United States of course never managed to adopt such a policy. 
While this has left a series of bitter and complex political battles in the wake of these 
failed efforts over the course of the 20th century, the failure to achieve universal health 
care in the United States. has also created an academic battlefield over the causes of this 
repeated breakdown in policy adoption. 
Within the varied scholarly attempts to explain why the United States has no 
single national health care system for all its citizens, perhaps the most cited factor is the 
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power of private interests, which is also associated with the American tendency toward 
pluralism (Quadagno, 2005; Gordon, 2003; Krugman, 2005; Hoffman, 2000; Skocpol, 
1996; Broder & Johnson, 1996; Marmor, 1994). As Beatrix Hoffman (2004) writes of 
Colin Gordon’s book Dead on Arrival: Why the U.S. has no Health Insurance (2003), 
“His book is the first to attempt to synthesize for the entire twentieth century the answer 
to the classic ‘Why no health insurance?’ question. The answer, according to Gordon, 
rests on the privileged status enjoyed by economic interests in American politics” 
(p.269). 
 Over the course of the twentieth century, those interests have been influential and 
diverse. During the Progressive effort to reform the U.S. health care system from 1915 to 
1920, commercial health insurers were extremely aggressive and ultimately successful, in 
opposing the plan (Hoffman, 2001).  
During the 1930s, the American Medical Association (AMA) represented a strong 
opposing force to national health insurance. Because of this opposition, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt refrained from considering the compulsory health insurance 
component of his social insurance package. His concern was that the presumed 
opposition of the AMA and their ideological allies would jeopardize the success of the 
bulk of his additional national programs, such as Social Security (Marmor, 1994).  
In 1948, President Truman also attempted to reform the health care system and 
introduce a single national program. However, as Monty Poen writes in Harry Truman 
Versus the Medical Lobby, along with political opposition to his health insurance 
proposal, “it didn’t help Truman’s reform campaign that the AMA launched a multi-
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million dollar lobbying blitz linking the president’s proposal to Cold War fears about 
socialism” (p.164). 
One of the 21st century’s leading critics of what it labeled “socialized medicine,” 
the AMA was particularly powerful in opposing the advent of Medicare in the 1960s. In 
1962, the AMA employed Ronald Reagan, four years prior to his election as governor of 
California, to make a recorded statement warning that the Medicare plan was “like telling 
a lie, and one leads to another. One day we will awake to find that we have socialism” 
(Woodward, 2010, p. 12). 
Perhaps the best chance for the United States to gain a single payer health care 
system came under Richard Nixon, who attempted to pass a bill in 1974 in order to gain 
popularity while under scrutiny for the Watergate affair.  The legislation itself was 
largely developed and brought forward by Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts. 
As Watergate placed increasing pressure on his administration, Nixon was forced to give 
up the health policy effort, and the Ford administration was ultimately unwilling to carry 
on with the goal of a national health care program (Starr, 1985).  
Under the Clinton Administration’s effort to reform the American health care 
system in 1993 and 1994, the Health Insurance Association of America ran the 
subsequently notorious advertisements featuring the fictitious characters “Harry and 
Louise,” which drove into American families’ psyches the fear of complexity, taxes and 
bureaucracy. By 1995, the insurance industry was joined by the managed care, 
pharmaceutical, for-profit hospital, outpatient surgery, and other health-related industries, 
along with the business lobby as a conglomerate in working to defeat the Clinton Plan 
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(Johnson & Broder, 1996).  While the AMA had come around to favoring health care 
reform under the Clinton Administration, physicians ultimately organized in opposition 
to the Clinton proposal due to its proposed reliance on managed care plans as a core 
element of policy (Skocpol, 1996).  
 Whether special interest opposition has or has not been the most instrumental 
factor in the defeat of health care reform proposals in the United States, it has been a 
consistently troublesome issue for universal care advocates throughout the twentieth 
century. Historically, business has not only exerted financial and political influence, but it 
has enjoyed comparatively high levels of respect among the American public (Smith, 
2000). Confidence in government, on the other hand, has been in a steady decline 
between the 1960s and 2000 (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2004; Brooks and Cheng, 
2001). Consequently, the anti-government message enjoyed sustained, or even growing, 
influence in terms of public opinion, while corporate interests grew more politically and 
financially powerful as well (Wills, 1999). 
According to several scholars, institutional structure (both government and 
private) and historical precedent represent the strongest historical rationale for the lack of 
adoption of universal health care in the United States (Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 
2001; Hacker, 1998; Nedelsky, 1999; Pierson, 2000). In fact, the argument that corporate 
and special interest power and influence is primarily responsible for the lack of national 
health care in the United States is an extension of the assertion that the unique evolution 
of America’s economic and political institutions is primarily responsible for the recurrent 
defeat of national health care proposals. 
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Certainly, the private sector influence over its political and economic institutions 
gives the United States a different political culture from Europe and Canada. The 
distinctive features of American political institutions result from specific events in United 
States history, as the nation’s emergence as a federation of independent territories leading 
to a federal structure that creates obstacles to centralized redistributive policies and 
governed by a constitution designed to protect property (Alesina, Glaeser, & Sacerdote, 
2001; Lipset, 1990; Nedelsky, 1990). 
Additionally, the United States does not have a parliamentary system’s 
proportional representation for its political parties, which in Europe, Alesina, Glaeser, & 
Sacerdote (2001) argue, “has played an important role in facilitating the growth of 
socialist parties” (p.4). Furthermore, the United States continues to be governed by a 
constitution that places a priority value on private property. This enduring legacy of the 
property-centered formation of the United States Constitution, it has been argued 
(Nedelsky, 1990), represents an institutional system of embedded weakness in the 
democratic tradition and an ongoing affirmation of limited government. 
Institutional structure has been cited as a factor in the defeat of a large scale 
progressive effort to enact national health insurance in 1920. Theda Skocpol (1992) has 
argued that the defeat of national health insurance at this time was related to the 
fragmentation of American political institutions, and the ongoing burden of pensions 
resulting from the Civil War which ended approximately fifty years earlier (Beland and 
Hacker, 2004).  
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Other theoretical arguments that attempt to explain the lack of national health 
insurance in the United States focus on timing and economic issues. During the economic 
expansion of the post–World War II “age of prosperity,” rapidly rising incomes generated 
revenue windfalls for governments, particularly those in post-reconstruction Europe. 
Those without existing national health plans began to provide them. With various 
impediments (political, corporate, cultural, institutional) preventing the adoption of 
universal health insurance in the United States during the second half of the 20th century, 
the country missed an opportunity that would prove to become more difficult to realize as 
the century progressed. As some scholars have argued, the conditions that would have 
permitted health insurance adoption during the period soon after World War II gradually 
degraded over the second half of the 20th century with such economic stressors as the 
Viet Nam war, the recession of the 1970s, an aging population, and the anti-government 
sentiments during the Reagan-Bush era of 1980-1992 (Callahan, 2006; Esping-Andersen, 
1990; Wilensky, 1975).  
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The Role of Values in United States Health Care Reform Efforts 
While special interests have been successful in delivering messages of opposition 
against universal health care over the 20th century, the values mix held by the American 
public is what has allowed these messages to resonate. In fact, these values may be just as 
important in explaining the lack of universal insurance in this country as the voices of the 
corporate and other interests that made the anti-government appeals throughout the 20th 
century. This is one of the key assertions of this dissertation – private interests have 
connected into a body of sentiment that was, and still is, suspicious of government and of 
attempts to help people who would be better off helping themselves.  
One important consequence of America’s revolutionary history and its subsequent 
institutional commitment to property is the enduring legacy of the popular attitude of 
individualism and government suspicion. Indeed, this sentiment has been appealed to 
during numerous efforts over the 20th century to enact universal health insurance. During 
the Progressive effort to reform the U.S. health care system between 1915 and 1920, 
commercial health insurers created a front for opposing the national health insurance 
proposal, calling itself the New York League for Americanism. This organization 
claimed to champion not insurance companies but patriotic values such as freedom, and 
contrasted itself with such “anti-American” ideologies as collectivism and socialism 
(Hoffman, 2001). 
During the Clinton Administration effort to enact health care legislation in the 
early 1990s, opponents also frequently labeled the plan “socialized medicine,” which 
they found to be an effective message with the public (Johnson & Broder, 1996). 
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Opponents to the Clinton plan also emphasized the Administration’s own use of the term 
“mandatory” to perpetuate the image of government intrusion into citizens’ private lives 
and the value that individuals should provide for themselves instead of relying on a 
government to provide for them (Skocpol, 1996; Johnson & Broder, 1996).  
Throughout the 20th century, Americans have held conflicted ideologies related 
to privatization and the provision of public benefits. Although American public opinion 
consistently shows strong support for Medicare, the public has also endorsed a market 
approach to health care, such as the popularity of commercial Medicare replacement and 
supplement programs that proliferated during the 1990s. Historians and political 
scientists have offered different views of these contradictions. Reporting during a popular 
peak of government liberalism soon after the passage of Great Society programs, Free 
and Cantrell (1968) noticed a “schizoid combination” of support among Americans for 
universal distribution of benefits compared to a belief in the free-market and individuals 
to carry out the wider society’s goals. Other scholars attribute the distinctly American 
coupling of the private and public sectors in benefit redistribution to the “clash of 
competing commitments in American political culture” (Feldman & Zaller, 1992). This 
clash has been variously articulated as a conflict between the value of “individual 
freedom” and the value of “equality” (Bobo, 1991; Lipset 1990, 1979; Katz & Hass, 
1988), freedom v. equality (Rokeach, 1973), equality v. efficiency (Okun, 1975), 
capitalism v. democracy (McClosky & Zaller, 1984), and individualism v. community 
(Bellah, et al., 1985), to name a few.  
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The American public’s historic ideology toward individualism is certainly not the 
only cause of the nation’s reliance on the private sector to provide public goods. Health 
care policymaking in the United Stated has also been highly influenced by the “politics of 
accommodation” (Starr, 1992). This view posits that, along with an ideological 
commitment to individual freedom and privatization, private interests in the United States 
have heavily participated in policy development by aggressively cultivating relationships 
with politicians and policymakers throughout the 20th century. These activities have 
included sophisticated lobbying efforts and complex public relations techniques. All 
these efforts have been conducted to ensure a strong role for the private sector in all 
aspects of health care delivery in the United States, and consequently a reduced role for 
government (Gordon, 2003; Hoffman, 2004; Starr, 1992). 
In his autobiography, The Audacity of Hope (2006), Barack Obama wrote “This is 
one of the things that makes me a Democrat, I suppose — this idea that our communal 
values, our sense of mutual responsibility and social solidarity, should express 
themselves not just in the church or the mosque or the synagogue, not just on the blocks 
where we live, in the places where we work, or within our own families; but also through 
our government” (p.86). 
In 2008, Obama won the American presidency after making health care reform a 
central pledge for his campaign. He promised to address rising costs, access, and 
insurance company abuse. He vowed to have a plan passed by the end of 2009, and called 
on Congress to enact the legislation. 
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However, a large portion of the American public, bolstered by Republican 
politicians, and the emerging Tea Party movement, began to protest the plan during the 
summer of 2009. Groups vocally opposed to reform confronted Democratic lawmakers at 
public meetings around the country, often denouncing the reform proposals as socialism. 
Referring to health care reform in the Wall Street Journal in August of that year, 
Dorothy Rabinowitz (2009) wrote, “despite a great election victory, Mr. Obama, it 
becomes ever clearer, knows little about Americans. He knows the crowds—he is at 
home with those. He is a stranger to the country's heart and character” (p. A15). 
On March 21, 2010, the United States House of Representatives approved a 
sweeping overhaul of the $2.5 trillion U.S. health care system and sent along for Senate 
approval a package of changes made to an earlier Senate bill. Republicans subsequently 
used individualist rhetoric to connect with Americans opposed to national health care in 
order to win 2010 midterm elections. The result was the successfully displacement of 
several Democrats who had been in support of the health care legislation. In January 
2011, the House of Representatives voted to repeal the national health care bill, despite 
little chance of the repeal making it through the Senate and the President’s threatened 
veto. 
Leading up to the 2012 presidential election, a great deal of policy dialogue 
consisted of candidates challenging the principles of universalism. Rather than portraying 
a government dedicated to serving the needs of a common populace, Republicans, in 
particular, often insinuated that there was a hierarchical arrangement between those who 
pay into the system and those who draw from it.  As Vice Presidential Candidate Paul 
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Ryan said, “before too long, we could become a society where the net majority of 
Americans are takers, not makers” (Carter, 2012).  In a 60 Minutes interview one month 
before the election, Mitt Romney was asked a question similar in wording to the World 
Values Survey variable examined in this study: “Does the government have a 
responsibility to provide health care to the fifty million Americans who don't have it 
today?” Romney’s response was that individuals should be responsible to take care of 
themselves, but that in extreme cases, hospital emergency departments provide a safety 
net for people who otherwise might die (Devine, 2012). 
As New York Times columnist David Brooks wrote during the 2012 campaign, 
“Republicans kept circling back to the spot where government expansion threatens 
personal initiative: you didn’t build that; makers versus takers; the supposed dependency 
of the 47 percent. Again and again, Republicans argued that the vital essence of the 
country is threatened by overweening government” (Brooks, 2012). 
In 2013, the National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine published 
U.S. Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health, produced by a 
panel convened to understand cross-national health differences among high-income 
countries (Woolf & Aron, 2013). Along with investigating the determinants of health 
disparities among countries, the panel considered the role of policies and social values in 
lack of universal health insurance and health outcomes. The authors asked, “Are there 
health implications to Americans’ dislike of outside (e.g. government) interference in 
personal lives and in business and marketing practices? Few quantitative data exist to 
answer these questions or to assert that these characteristics occur more commonly 
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among Americans than among people in other countries…For a variety of social or 
historical reasons, these values may have salience for a large segment of U.S. society and 
may be important in understanding the pervasiveness of the U.S. health disadvantage” (p. 
209). 
 
Income Equality: The value and its policy implications 
As Bellah, et al. (1985) point out, both biblical and republican historical traditions 
have measured their society by the extent to which it deals with the problem of economic 
inequality: “Classic republican theory from Aristotle to the American founders rested on 
the assumption that free institutions could survive in a society only if there were a rough 
equality of condition, that extremes of wealth and poverty are incompatible with a 
republic” (p.285). 
In recent years, the concern over rising levels of income inequality have even 
grown stronger as scholars point to the detrimental effects throughout a society of rising 
income inequality.  Studying 23 western nations, Wilkinson and Pickett (2010) revealed 
associations between income inequality and a long list of social problems, including 
obesity, mental illness, drug use, and incarceration, even controlling for ethnicity and 
education.  Economist Joseph Stiglitz (2012) similarly makes a case that economically 
unequal societies are not as economically effective or stable and that people along the 
entire economic spectrum, including the wealthiest pay more when economic inequality 
increases.  
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The 2011 “Occupy” demonstrations illustrated that the concerns of economic 
inequality had become a popular movement throughout the world. These concerns were 
underscored in the October 14, 2013 announcement by Robert Shiller, upon receiving the 
Nobel Prize in economics, that the most important problem society faces “is rising 
inequality in the United States and elsewhere in the world” (Christoffersen, 2013). 
 Okun (1975) theorized that the institutional arrangements in the United States 
represent “uneasy compromises” rather than fundamental inconsistencies. He wrote that 
“the contrasts among American families in living standards and in material wealth reflect 
a system of rewards and penalties that is intended to encourage effort and channel it into 
socially productive activity. To the extent that the system succeeds, it generates an 
efficient economy. But that pursuit of efficiency necessarily creates inequalities. And 
hence society faces a tradeoff between equality and efficiency” (p.1). This is the tradeoff 
measured, to an extent, by the World Values Survey question for income equality. 
Indeed, equality is often discussed in the context of “American exceptionalism,” 
as Americans have, in aggregate, always embraced a mix of values, perhaps the most 
recurring of which are the opposing concerns of equality and liberty (Bellah et al., 1985; 
Hartz, 1955; Lipset, 1996, and Rokeach 1973). These values have been integral to the 
American ethic since the founding of the nation. America’s exceptional policy 
circumstances, such as its lack of a universal health care system and its ongoing 
reluctance to accept socialism, have been connected to an exceptionally strong embrace 
of liberty above and beyond the commitment to equality. The notion of individual liberty, 
as explored as early as Tocqueville (1835/2001), was connected with a government 
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avoiding encroachment with individual freedom, the lack of an embrace of equality has 
been specifically connected to Americans’ reluctance to embrace the welfare state many 
times since — including by Sombart (1906), and Micklethwait & Wooldridge (2005).   
In the early research efforts on studying human values, equality was 
contextualized by Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1961) within the categorization of the five 
basic types of problems as the relationship of individuals with each other. If people felt 
individuals should relate to each other as equals, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck referred to this 
as valuing a “collateral” relationship. If people felt individuals should relate to others 
according to a hierarchy this was seen as placing a value on a “lineal” relationship. This 
conceptualization may underlie why an individual is more likely to hold the value of 
accept inequality in society and also, to accept a natural lineal hierarchy among humans. 
The conceptual definition of “equality” employed by the World Values Survey 
(WVS) provides us with an opportunity to examine the relationship between the values 
people place on equality and support for universalism. The more an individual, or a 
population, believes that “incomes should be made more equal” according to the WVS 
scale (1-10), the higher the value placed on “equality” as defined by this study. Among 
the goals of this research is to inform this theoretical discussion by comparing the value 
of equality held by Americans with the same articulated value held by Europeans and 
Canadians. The value of equality is entered into the model as an independent variable to 
predict public support for universalism.  
Reducing inequality has been cited as an end goal for instituting universalist 
policies by Western social reformers throughout the 20th century (Korpi & Palme, 1998). 
45 
 
Various studies have sought to make the connection between the values of equality and 
support for universalism. Research conducted by Feldman (1983), Kluegel & Smith 
(1983), and Hasenfeld & Rafferty (1989) all have revealed linkages between a strong 
commitment to social equality and support for universal health care. However, each of 
these studies was limited to various subsets of the American population, and none of 
them addressed the values of Europeans and Canadians.   To date, no study has examined 
the connection between equality and support for universalism on a multi-national level 
across the United States, Canada, and Europe.  
Thus, the initial research question of this dissertation is as follows: 
 
Research Question One: Equality 
Q1: Is there a positive association between support for greater income equality and 
support for universalism in the United States, Western Europe and Canada? 
 
Hypothesis One: Equality 
H1: Individuals and countries that place a relatively higher value on income 
equality will be more likely to support more universalsist social welfare policies than 
those individuals and countries placing a lower value on income equality (i.e. higher 
tolerance for maintaining income differences to create incentives). This study 
hypothesizes that these correlations will be statistically significant. 
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Generalized Trust: An introduction 
Generalized trust (defined as trust that one has in people, “generally speaking”) is 
an area of interest in the social sciences — in part because it is often found to correlate 
with other variables that are considered desirable in modern society, such as the “art of 
association” highlighted by Tocqueville (2001/1835). The question seeking to measure 
generalized trust employed by the World Values Survey was originally formulated by 
Morris Rosenberg: “Generally speaking, do you believe most people can be trusted or 
you need to be very careful in dealing with people,” (Rosenberg, 1956). Rosenberg was 
interested in the association between general political orientations and views on human 
nature, and composed survey items that raised questions about whether “most people” 
can be trusted or are out to take advantage, etc. The survey question continues to be used 
in the most widely cited instruments, such as the General Social Survey (GSS), 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP), Eurobarometer, and ZACAT social science 
surveys, and has been used in much of the research cited here, as well in a great deal of 
research studying the causes and effects of trust and social capital (Kinder and Burns, 
2000; Putnam 1993, 2000; Rahn, Brehm & Carlson 2000). 
This study introduces generalized trust as an independent variable. This category 
of social trust has been defined conceptually as a “standard estimate” of the 
trustworthiness of the average person – someone who is not a friend, not even an 
acquaintance (Paxton, 2007).  As Stolle (1998) writes, generalized trust extends beyond 
the boundaries of private or personalized trust, which “results from cooperation 
experiences and repeated interaction with the immediate circle of known people” (p.503). 
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Generalized trust acts as a “social lubricant that makes a variety of forms of social 
interaction and cooperation possible in a wider community or region, and can therefore 
be selected as one of the main indicators of social capital” (Stolle, p.503). 
As Rothstein & Uslaner (2005) explain, “people who believe that in general most 
other people in their society can be trusted are also more inclined to have a positive view 
of their democratic institutions, to participate more in politics, and to be more active in 
civic organizations” (p.41).  Thus, it stands to reason that a society where people are 
more inclined to trust each other would be more likely to support universalism.  
Is trust a “value”? Clearly there is a case to be made that it is more of a general 
outlook on the world. This is the view of Nannestad (2008), drawing on the field of social 
psychology. Nannestad suggests that the constituents of trust include optimism as well as 
religious values that are most strongly embodied in egalitarianism. These values and 
norms are learned early in life and are largely stable. Generalized trust is determined by 
these cultural norms which are transmitted through socialization. This deterministic 
understanding of generalized trust arguably allows it to be categorized as a value.  Eric 
Uslaner’s book The Moral Foundations of Trust (2002) and its corresponding article 
“Trust as a Moral Value” (2001), further make the case that trust should be considered a 
value. Uslaner writes “The roots and consequences of trust are precisely what we would 
expect of a moral value. Values should be stable over time–and not dependent upon day-
to-day experiences. This is precisely what I find for trust. Trust matters for the sorts of 
things that bond us to others without expectations of reciprocity–giving to charity, 
48 
 
volunteering time, tolerance of minorities, and promoting policies that redistribute 
resources from the rich to the poor” (p.1-2). 
Thus, for the purposes of this research, trust will be considered to be a “value.” 
While it is recognized that a logical case can be made for categorizing trust as an attitude, 
influenced in large part on previous life experiences, it is not the purpose of this 
dissertation to form a conclusion on the question of whether trust is a “value” as values 
have been studied in the social sciences. This study treats it as a value, recognizing that 
there are opportunities to explore this issue by future scholars. 
 
Generalized Trust: Policy implications 
In Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), Francis 
Fukuyama argues that liberal political institutions depend on a healthy and dynamic civil 
society in order for them to flourish, and that civil society becomes healthy and dynamic 
to the extent that it is built upon trust among individuals, associations, and within 
families. Fukuyama further contends that “a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to 
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust 
inherent in the society” (1995, p.7). 
 Following the work of Fukuyama, as well as Putnam (1993), who revealed 
important linkages between levels of social trust and well-functioning regional 
governments in Italy, researchers began to identify correlations between social trust and 
societal factors such as population health (Kawachi & Berkman, 2000; Islam et al., 2006; 
Subramanian, Kim & Kawachi, 2003, and Pearce and Davey Smith 2003) and social and 
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economic equality (Knack & Keefer, 1997). Using World Values Survey data from 1995-
1997, Carlson (2004) concluded that levels of interpersonal trust play a role in differences 
in self-rated health, although economic factors unrelated to trust were found to be more 
important contributors to health differences.   
The connection between generalized trust and universalism is articulated by 
Rothstein & Uslaner (2005), who argue that “the roots of generalized trust lie in a more 
equitable distribution of resources and opportunities in a society. Countries with histories 
of greater equality such as the Nordic nations also had histories of less repressive and 
more honest governments. Greater equality leads to more universalistic social welfare 
programs and to greater generalized trust” (p.47). Yet while these associations have been 
made by comparing societies with each other, the relationship of the values held by those 
in Western societies has not, as of yet, been conducted to determine the strength of the 
relationship between the values of a population.  It is well understood that northern 
European nations have high levels of trust as well as low levels of inequality; however, 
these statistics alone do not reliably demonstrate that there is a connection between these 
values as held by populations. This association between values within and among 
populations is what this dissertation investigates. 
Knack & Keefer (1997) used World Values Survey data to explore the connection 
between trust and population health in 29 market economies and concluded that 
generalized trust was stronger in nations with higher and more equal incomes. 
Generalized trust was also higher in better-educated and ethnically homogenous 
populations.  A Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper (Lynch, Davey Smith et al., 
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2001), examined both trust and income inequality as predictors of health indicators in 
wealthier countries, and found, among its conclusions that higher income inequality was 
strongly associated with greater infant mortality for females and for males. In the same 
study, greater distrust was associated with lower CHD mortality among both females and 
males. 
Yet, the selection of dependent variables can yield different relationships with the 
generalized trust, and some indications have demonstrated a negative relationship 
between trust and support for universalism.  For example, using World Values Survey 
data, Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, & Shleifer (2010) looked at a cross-section of nations and 
concluded that support for increased government benefit programs is negatively 
associated with generalized trust. The authors conclude in their analysis of the study that 
distrust among individuals can create increased public demand for government programs 
because of a need for regulation of the challenges of interpersonal relations in a 
distrusting society. The study by Aghion et. al. (2010) provides an indication that perhaps 
higher levels of generalized trust may actually be associated with lower levels of support 
for universalism. Analyzing World Values Survey data for a dissertation on the political 
culture of individualism and collectivism, Yoon (2010) concludes that the individualistic 
culture seems to “encourage trust and tolerance while collectivistic culture seems to 
discourage these important social capital values. Moreover, individualism is positively linked 
with rather difficult forms of political engagement such as signing a petition, joining a 
boycott and attending peaceful demonstrations, in addition to membership” (p.167). 
As Nannestad (2008) states, “because the universal welfare states are also high-
trust countries, it is tempting to hypothesize that it is their high level of generalized trust 
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that has enabled them to solve the collective action dilemma created by their welfare 
systems.” (p.430). Nevertheless, he concludes that “so far, there is not much systematic 
empirical research in this field” (p.431).  
Bergh & Bjørnskov (2011) argue that trust is high in universal welfare states 
because trusting populations are more likely to create and sustain universal welfare states, 
and connect the generalized trust variable to a set of established indices of regulatory 
freedom obtained from the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World, 
concluding that there may be a positive relationship between trust levels and welfare state 
size and functionality.  In the most relevant of these types of studies to this proposal, 
Svallfors (2002) identified a positive relationship between a seven-indicator index of trust 
and support for welfare state activities in Sweden; however, as the author writes, “it is 
unclear whether this applies to countries other than Sweden” (p188).  
While Larsen (2007) theorizes that “the extremely high level of social trust in the 
social democratic welfare regimes can be attributed to the universal policy that 
encompasses all citizens in a broad national system of benefits and services rather than 
divides them between the majority and the bottom,” he provides no empirical analysis to 
support this contention. In light of the contrasting, and even contradictory conclusions in 
past studies, this research question is ever more vital today, as opinion is mixed in this 
field. The question of whether generalized trust can predict support for universalism 
serves as one of the key research questions for this study. 
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Research Question: Generalized Trust: 
Q2. Is generalized trust positively associated with support for universalism in the United 
States, Western Europe, and Canada?  
 
Hypothesis: Generalized Trust: 
H1. In an examination of Western European countries, United States, and Canada, 
individuals / countries / regions with higher levels of generalized trust will be more likely 
to have greater support for a policy of universalism. 
 
Independent Control Variables: Regional, Demographic, and Religious  
In addition to exploring the aggregated relationships between citizen values of 
trust and equality with attitudes of social welfare policy, this study controls for the impact 
of separate individual predictor variables on the independent variable of universalism 
support. The model controls for demographic variables of sex, age, income, social class, 
education, town size and religion.  
   
Socio-Demographic and Religious Characteristics 
 
Social Class 
A great deal of interest among sociologists studying the nature of values involves 
identifying patterns of values held by different demographic and cultural groups 
occupying varying social structural positions (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). The various 
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demographic variables to be examined in this study are “social class” as a self-reported 
variable in the World Values Survey, age, gender, level of education, income level, and 
town size of residence. Social class embodies a powerful and persistent predictor of 
accessibility to resources, potential for longevity and success as well as self-esteem, and 
has been a variable of interest to values scholars in various disciplines over the years 
(Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Scott, 2000; Kohn, 1976; Rokeach, 1973).  While social class 
has been determined to be a significant determinant of individual decisions and social 
actions among adults as (Allen, 2004; Levine, 1998), it has also been found to have a 
powerful influence on children’s values as well (Kohn, 1976). The development of the 
universalist welfare states has been described in terms of class politics (Papadakis, 1993), 
and the issue of self-interest by middle and lower socio-economic classes has been 
explored extensively (Baldwin, 1990; Casles, 1985; Fry & Winters, 1970).  
 Rokeach (1973) identified mild differences in values based on education level and 
social class. The values discovered by Rokeach that changed most with changes in 
education and income were the value of “cleanliness” (the value of cleanliness in one’s 
life decreases as income increases) and the value of “a comfortable life” (also decreases 
as income rises). Rokeach did not identify variables that had major associative 
relationships with the value of equality; however, equality did increase modestly (less 
than one rank order unit difference of seventeen total instrumental values) as education 
level increased. 
 The World Values Survey begins its social class question with the statement 
“People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle 
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class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to (list five 
categories)?” An example of the use of this 5-level subjective measure, treated as a 
continuous measure across the five categories, is a recent analysis assessing public 
support for trade liberalization (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2013). 
Because social class is based on individual self-evaluation in the World Values 
Survey, issues of measurement validity may be a concern with this variable. It has been 
claimed, for example, that, compared with residents of other nations, more Americans 
tend to place themselves in a higher social class bracket than they actually are 
(Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2005; Bénabour & Ok, 2001). Nonetheless, analysis of this 
variable will help inform the discussion of the relationship between social class and 
equality and trust, and to a lesser degree, the moderating role of this value on the central 
correlations between trust, equality and support for the welfare state.  
 
Income Level 
Research conducted so far has indicated that individuals with greater income in 
the are more likely to oppose redistribution programs (i.e. Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). 
The inclusion of “income level” as a control variable is expected to provide some 
additional perspective in determining patterns across economic lines. As with social 
class, income level in the World Values Survey, is self-reported. 
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Sex 
Hitlin & Piliavin (2004) concluded that “links between gender, values, and social 
structure are surprisingly understudied” (p.369), and they also noted that the work 
conducted by Rokeach (1973) concluded that males and females ranked most values at 
similar levels to each other. In Rokeach’s study, equality was nearly identically ranked 
between men and women, with men placing a slightly higher ranking of this value than 
women. Prince-Gibson & Schwartz (1998) also found no significant differences in the 
area of values priorities between men and women.  
Gender has been studied extensively as a factor correlating to all three of the 
variables examined in this study. In terms of universalism, Quadagno & Myles write that 
“for feminist theorists the question is not only one of how welfare states transform class 
relations but also whether and to what extent welfare states reproduce, alter, or transform 
gender relations. As Helga Hernes asks, can welfare states be women-friendly?” 
(Quadagno and Myles, 2002, p.14).  As Quadagno & Myles point out, early formulations 
of the relationship between gender issues and universal welfare development were 
influential in stimulating a subsequent round of more nuanced historical and comparative 
case studies that highlight both the dramatically different ways in which welfare states 
are gendered and in the role of women in influencing these outcomes (Jenson 1986; 
Skocpol 1992; Pedersen 1993).  
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Urban-Rural 
Within the general category of cultural demographic data that have been of 
interest in the study of values, some research has included variables that help illustrate 
trends from “traditional” cultures to cultures that are more associated with “modernity” 
(Fancy, 2004; Inglehart & Baker, 1997; Inglehart, 1997). Along with implications on the 
issue of modernity, differences among urban and rural residents have been studied within 
the areas of trust and social capital (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005; Putnam, 2000), 
universalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990), and inequality and health (Pearce and Davey-
Smith, 2003). 
This study includes urban compared to non-urban communities in which survey 
respondents live in order to ascertain if urbanization plays a role in the relationships 
between the independent variables and universalism. This variable may be particularly 
relevant in relation to trust. While Putnam (2000) argues that trust is greater in small 
towns because such residents are more likely to get to know each other, small-town 
residents may be more likely to trust those in their own town, but less likely to trust 
outsiders (Uslaner, 2002; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2002). This research seeks to inform this 
question by investigating the moderating effect urbanization may play on the association 
between equality and trust and universalism. 
   
Religious Variables 
In an analysis of three waves of World Values Survey data covering 
approximately 75 percent of the world’s population, Inglehart & Baker (2000) concluded 
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that the “broad cultural heritage of a society — Protestant, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, 
Confucian, or Communist — leaves an imprint on values that endures despite 
modernization” (p.19). This conclusion has evolved in part, from previous research by 
Huntington (1993, 1996) and Weber (1904), both of whom demonstrated that traditional 
religious values have an enduring influence on the institutions created by society 
(Inglehart & Baker, 2000). With this in mind, examining factors of religiosity — from 
simple survey declaration that “I am a religious person” to the specific religious 
identification of Catholicism, is an element of this research project. 
 Religion has been shown, overall, to have somewhat contradictory linkages with 
trust and equality. For example, while more religious people have been found to 
participate to a higher level in volunteer and civic activities (Uslaner, 2002; Rokeach, 
1973; Tocqueville, 2001/1835), highly religious people have also been found to insulate 
themselves from those outside of their own communities and their own religions 
(Uslaner, 2002; Putnam, 1993).  
 In a study of 65 nations, Inglehart & Baker (2000) concluded that “a protestant 
cultural heritage is associated with the syndrome of high levels of trust, tolerance, well-
being, and post-materialism that constitutes self-expression values” (p.39). Similarly, 
Fukoyama (1995) found that, within Europe, low trust societies largely coincide with 
Catholic countries. Different measurement techniques have been associated with 
determining measures of religiosity. For example, number of days attending church as a 
unit of measurement, has been more strongly associated with values differences than 
denominational differences (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Alwin, 1984).  
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This study examines two elements related to religion: the first asks if one is a 
religious person, while the other specifically examines the effect of being a Catholic, 
which includes both non-practicing Catholics as well as those currently practicing. While 
the World Values Survey includes Muslim, Jewish, Evangelical, and Protestant as 
categories, Catholicism was the only denomination that was represented in each of the 
twelve countries included in this study.  
 
The Region Variable: Comparing Europe, Canada, and the United States 
As the European Union continues to progress toward a greater degree of common 
policies, laws and institutions, it becomes more relevant to make the comparison between 
the United States and Europe as a single geopolitical region. Additionally, because 
Canada shares a common border with the United States, and shares its policy of a 
universal health care system with European nations, it holds a unique position as a 
separate geopolitical regional variable that can be contrasted against both Europe and the 
United States in this research. There have been other studies using World Values Survey 
data which have heeded Inglehart’s (1999) caution that because different levels of 
economic development and religion can have a major influence on different nations’ 
values that it makes sense on a number of levels to limit studies of universalism to 
wealthy capitalist nations that share a religious and cultural background (see, for 
example, Larsen, 2007). 
 Several studies have compared health-related or values-related data between the 
United States and various consolidated groupings of European nations. Additional studies 
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have included Canada as a regional variable compared with Europe and the United States.  
For example, Jordan (2010) used World Values Survey data to compare values and 
attitudes about environmental protection between the United States, Canada and Europe.  
 Theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted which examine differences 
in values between Europeans, Americans and Canadians and how these differences may 
have contributed to differences in health care policy. Lipset (1991, 1996) has argued that, 
based on historical and institutional developments, values differences between the United 
States Canada, and Europe have contributed to the resulting differences in political 
commitment to health care provision in these three regions. Adams (2003) has used 
public opinion data to make his case that the United States and Canada are not at all 
converging into a single culture with a single set of values.  Buoyed by Lipset’s theories 
that strong differences in values exist between the two nations, Adams has argued that the 
United States and Canada are culturally different in significant ways. Furthermore, 
according to Adams, differences in culture and values have led to the important North-
South “continental divide” in health care policy that we see today. 
 Maioni (1998) has also examined the history of the U.S. and Canadian health care 
systems, and her conviction is that the demand for health reform in each country has been 
conditioned primarily by the political institutions that shape the party system in each 
nation. Maioni rejects the “cultural” explanation for the differences in health policy 
outcomes that permeates the work of Lipset and Adams. Maioni outlines an argument 
that cultural differences are not so significant to have had an effect on public policy.  This 
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research seeks to inform this debate over the relative role of cultural as contrasted with 
institutional influences over universal health care. 
 Others have compared Western Europe to the United States and Canada in an 
effort to explain differences in health care policy (see Callahan, 2006; Myles & 
Quadagno, 2002).  Examining the United States, Canada, and Europe, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) has identified three different types of Europe-North America welfare state 
regimes: the “market-oriented welfare state model,” into which he includes Canada, the 
U.S. and Great Britain; the “southern continental Europe model,” and the “Nordic social 
democratic policy model.” According to Esping-Andersen’s research, in market-oriented 
regimes, citizens are constituted primarily as individual market actors.  Under the second 
type of regime social rights are extensive, and there is only a marginal role for private, 
market-based welfare arrangements.  Social democratic welfare states, which include all 
Scandinavian nations, are also characterized by an extensive system of universalist social 
rights, with a marginal role for private welfare provision.  
  Studies examining Canada, Europe and the United States as regional comparative 
units of measurement can be found in various fields. For example, in clinical health 
research, cardiovascular disease treatment was compared among the three regions, 
allowing researchers to draw conclusions about how different levels of treatment are 
pursued more aggressively in North America than in Europe (Wolf-Maier, Cooper, and 
Banegas, 2003). 
Kaplan, et al. (2004) compared national spending with self-reported health in 
Europe, Canada and the United States. In the resulting article, “Spending More Feeling 
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Worse,” the authors confirmed earlier research indicating that the more expensive and 
technologically advanced American system does not yield population health outcomes 
comparable to Europe and Canada, and concluded that “unequal and uncoordinated 
provision of care along with other inefficiencies in the US health system may explain 
why Americans spend more but feel worse” (p. 530). This dissertation builds upon that 
and other studies by examining the extent to which factors other than these efficiencies 
may influence why the United States is willing to “spend more” than European countries 
and Canada. 
In a study comparing espoused values among charitable foundations in the United 
States, Canada and Europe, Whitman (2009) discussed the rationale for this comparative 
analysis, pointing out that the European Union has “enumerated a set of specific common 
values shared by its members throughout Europe,” as has the United States and Canada 
across their respective states and provinces. “Given commonalities and differences in 
social values across regions,” he writes, “we may learn more about the philanthropic 
enterprise by employing an inclusive, comparative approach rather than one 
concentrating only on a single region (p.308).” In his study, Whitman refers to the United 
States, Canada, and Europe as geopolitical “regions,” as is done in this study. 
 
In Summary: Demographic, religious and regional values 
Each of these individual variables, and each of these categories (nation/region, 
demographic, religious), have been explored here in the context of the value of 
universalism, specifically as it relates to universal health care policy. However, as of yet, 
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there has not been a research effort that has examined the effect these demographic 
variables may have in influencing the relationship between the values of trust, equality 
and universalism. This study examines these demographic variables in the context of the 
main effects by controlling for the potentially confounding impact of these variables on 
the relationship between equality, trust and universalism. 
 
Research Question Three and Four: Demographic, Religious and Regional Variables 
 Q3. How is the association between equality and universalism, and between trust 
and universalism, affected after controlling for potentially confounding socio-
demographic and religious variables? 
 
 Q4. How do the associations between trust and equality differ between the United 
States, Canada and Europe? 
 
Hypothesis Three and Four: Demographic, Religious and Regional Variables 
H3. After controlling for the socio-demographic variables, specifically age, sex, 
income, social class, size of town and religion, there will remain positive statistical 
associations between equality and universalism and trust and universalism. Socio-
demographic variables within regions will play a more significant explanatory role in 
some regions than those same variables will play in other regions.  
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H4. After controlling for socio-demographic variables, a statistically significant 
“region” variable will indicate that there is a regional affect above and beyond the socio-
demographic differences that will partially explain how the trust-universalism and 
equality-universalism associations differ between the United States, Canada, and Europe.  
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CHAPTER III: STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Conceptual Model of Research 
Support for equality and generalized trust were analyzed as independent variables 
with support for universalism entered as the dependent variable. Demographic and 
religious variables were included in the model in order to rule these variables as potential 
confounders in the relationships between the independent variables (trust and equality) 
and the dependent variable (universalism). The basic conceptual model is seen in Figure 
3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. Conceptual Model: Trust, Equality and Universalism 
 
 
 
Equality 
Universalism 
Trust 
 (Test for multicollinearity) 
β, p 
β, p 
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 As seen in Figure 3.2, levels of trust and equality were examined by region to 
determine how these relationships were different between the United States, Canada and 
Europe. Again, the model controlled for demographic and religious variables in order to 
rule these variables as potential confounders in explaining how regions differed from 
each other in their levels of support for universalism and the extent to which there was an 
association between trust, equality and universalism within each region. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Model by Each Region (United States, Canada, and Europe) 
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Figure 3.3 shows the how the model further examined the specific effect of region on 
the associations between trust, equality and universalism to determine the magnitude 
and statistical significance of this relationship after controlling for demographic and 
religious variables.  
 
Figure 3.3. Examining the Effect of Region Entered as a Control Variable 
 
 
 
The equation for the model is as follows: 
 
Universalism Y = β0  + β1X1 + β2 X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + e 
Y = Support for universalism 
X1 = Support for greater income equality 
X2 = Generalized trust 
 
Control Variables: 
X3 = Demographic variables (sex, age, income, education) 
X4 = Religion variables 
X5 = Region variables 
 
e = level of error unexplained by model 
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Research Strategy 
Following previous research studying secondary World Values Survey data (e.g. 
Bruni and Stanca, 2006; Inglehart and Baker, 2000) and specifically, research employing 
the variables examined in this study (e.g. Nannestad, 2008; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005), 
this project analyzed 2005-2007 World Values Survey data using a hierarchical ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression model.  The OLS regression procedure was used here to 
estimate the effects of generalized trust and support for equality on support for 
universalism across the three “regions” of United States, Canada, and Europe after 
controlling for demographic and religious variables.   
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The Data Source: World Values Survey 
The World Values Survey is the largest investigation ever conducted studying 
attitudes, values and beliefs around the world, and covers 65 countries on all inhabited 
continents, thus addressing approximately 75 percent of the world’s population (Inglehart 
& Baker, 2000). 
The governing body responsible for the survey, the World Values Survey 
Association, describes the project as “a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and 
political change, conducted by a network of social scientists at leading universities all 
around world” (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Data from interview subjects feature a 
representative national sample of at least 1,000 people in each of the 65 nations.  The 
project is guided by a steering committee representing countries from each continent of 
the world.  
World Values Survey data have been used in hundreds of publications in more 
than twenty languages, and data have been used extensively in published scholarly works, 
dissertations, and for instructional purposes throughout the world (Inglehart & Basàñez, 
2004; Norris, 2007).  
The World Values Surveys grew out of a study launched by the European Values 
Survey group in 1981.  Since 1981, the group has conducted additional waves of research 
every five years through the 2005-7 wave. This study employs cross-sectional data from 
the 2005-7 wave, which includes surveys conducted in 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
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Sampling Design 
In the case of the European and North American countries examined in this study, 
the World Values Survey used stratified multistage random sampling to obtain 
representative national samples. In the first stages, a random selection of sampling points 
was made based on the nation’s statistical regions, districts, census units, election 
sections, electoral registers, or voting stations, and central population registers. The 
population size and/or degree of urbanization of these Primary Sampling Units (PSU’s) 
was taken into account using sampling methodology that varied from country to country 
(See Appendix A for sampling methodology for each of the 12 countries). Various 
methods were used to select respondents within a household, such as the Kish selection 
grid (determining interviewees based on randomly assigned numbers within a 
household), the Troldahl and Carter-method (similar to Kish, also using a randomization 
instrument), last or next birthday method, quota sampling on the basis of gender and age, 
and sometimes also on education or profession (World Values Survey Group, 2008). 
Samples were drawn from the entire population of 18 years and older and no upper age 
limit was imposed. Response rates varied by country and depending on the sampling 
methodology, but generally ranged from 70 to 90 percent.   
 
Weighting 
Weighting was used to adjust for oversampling and differences in the size of the 
sample of each country. First a weight was created based on the gender-age, rural-urban, 
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and educational attainment distributions. This weight was also normalized to preserve the 
original sample size and avoid over-inflation of the standard error. Next, it was adjusted 
for to equalize the sample size of for each county to N=1000. The weighting 
methodology for each country is determined by the chief investigators for each 
participant country (Díez Medrano, 2013). 
The procedure to compute weighting factors is similar from country to country. 
Principle investigators for each country define the estimated proportion of each 
combination of categories that the sample should present. This estimation may come 
from census, country statistics, etc., and this is considered the target distribution. 
Subsequently, the distribution of the combination of categories is calculated for the 
fielded sample within each country.  S018 is a weighting factor derived from S017 whose 
goal is to transform the sample’s N to 1000, making all sample Ns equal and making each 
nation count the same in the combined analyses (Díez-Medrano, 2013). Documentation is 
not available for the methodology the World Values Survey uses to make this calculation. 
An example of World Values Survey weighting procedure is the development of 
weights within several countries to compensate for the deliberate oversampling of 
minority populations, such as Asian and white residents in South Africa, or French and 
Italian speakers in Switzerland, and those who identify as African-Americans, and these 
have been indicated to improve the representativeness of these samples (Dowley & 
Silver, 2000). 
According to Jaime Díez-Medrano, director of the World Values Survey Data 
Archive and member of the World Values Survey Executive Committee, weights in each 
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country wave are intended to compensate for complex sampling differences, and that 
weights are measured, calculated, and double-checked. In some cases, samples are 
documented prior to fieldwork and sent to the World Values Survey for validation. In 
these examples, corrections are applied only exceptionally if the resulting data does not 
comply with available census data (J. Díez Medrano, personal communication, March 4, 
2014).  
More discussion on weighting and sampling issues is included in Chapter VII of 
this dissertation. 
  
Measures 
 
Universalism 
The universalism variable was assessed by asking people to select any integer 
response on a ten-point scale where 1 means “you agree completely” that “people should 
take more responsibility to provide for themselves,” and 10 means “you agree 
completely” that  “the government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for.” 
 
Equality 
Following previous studies, income equality is used to measure a population’s 
level of value for equality (Fancy, 2004; Kenney, 2001; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; 
Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005). The equality variable was assessed by asking people to 
select any integer response on a ten-point scale where 1 means “you agree completely” 
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that “we need larger income differences as incentives.” and 10 means “you agree 
completely” that “incomes should be made more equal.” 
Measures of equality reflect reverse coding to maintain consistency with the trust 
and universalism indicators where higher values correspond to greater equality. 
 
Generalized Trust 
The measure from the World Values Survey related to trusting others was 
originally formulated by Morris Rosenberg, and has been used in a variety studies 
examining social capital (Kinder & Burns, 2000; Putnam 1993, 2000; Rahn, Brehm & 
Carlson 2000). The question is used in the most widely cited survey instruments, such as 
the General Social Survey (GSS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP), and the 
Eurobarometer social science survey.  
Respondents were asked the following: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Trust was recoded so the higher value (1) corresponds to “most people can be 
trusted,” with (0) coded as “you need to be very careful in dealing with people.  
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Coding Demographic, Religious and Regional Control Variables 
 
Demographic and religious variables are described below: 
 
Sex: Coded 0=male, 1=female 
 
Age: Categorized into six groups (18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65+) and treated as 
a continuous variable. 
 
Education: Following Norris (2007), Education is treated as a continuous variable in six 
ascending groups: 
 
1 = Did not complete elementary education  
2 = Completed elementary education only 
3 = Incomplete secondary / high school 
4 = Complete secondary / high school 
5 = Some university without degree 
6 = University with degree and above 
 
 
Religious Person: Yes = 1; No = 0. 
 
Region: Canada = 1, Else = 0 (Canada) 
Europe = 1, Else = 0 (Europe) 
United States = Reference. 
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Missing Variables 
For the “Urban” and “Social Class” variables, the survey questions were not asked in 
Spain, Finland, Netherlands, or Switzerland (Town Size) and France, Netherlands and 
Great Britain (Social Class). To retain these countries in the analysis, a “missing” dummy 
was added in order to compensate for the fact that data for these countries were not 
included in the survey. Previous studies employing this practice include Kaplan, 
McFarland, Huguet, et al. (2008) and Ross, Garner, Bernier, et al. (2012).  
 
Size of Town:  
Using the United States Census Bureau definition of “urbanization” as 50,000 residents: 
Residential areas with 50,000 residents or more = 1, Else = 0 (1st dummy: “Urban”)  
Missing = 1, Else = 0 (2nd dummy: “Missing”) 
Less than 50,000 residents = Reference. 
 
Social class:  
Categorical variables were coded as follows:  
Higher / Middle = 1, Else = 0 (1st dummy: “Higher”) 
Middle = 1, Else = 0 (2nd dummy: “Middle”) 
Missing =1, Else = 0 (3rd dummy: “Missing”) 
Lower Social Class = Reference 
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Level of Income:  
A dummy variable was created from the 10-point scale provided by each different 
country: 
Higher (6-10) = 1, Else = 0 (1st dummy: “Higher”)  
Missing, = 1, Else = 0 (2nd dummy: “Missing”) 
Lower (1-5) = Reference 
 
Catholic:  
With approximately 38% missing from this category, categorical variables were coded as 
follows: 
Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Non-practicing Catholic = 1, Else = 0 (1st dummy: 
“Catholic”) 
Missing = 1, Else = 0 (2nd dummy: “Missing”) 
Non-Catholic = Reference  
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Procedures 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistical procedures were conducted to assess frequency, mean 
values and distributions of the trust, equality, and universalism variables as well as the 
socio-demographic and religious variables included in the study. Mean scores and 
standard deviations for ordinal/continuous variables and percentages (i.e. percentage of 
people who are “generally trusting of others”) for categorical variables were assessed in 
aggregate, as well as for each nation, and for Europe as a region. Distributions of the 
equality, trust and universalism variables were compared between Europe, Canada and 
the United States. Missing values were identified and assessed to ensure that, primarily, 
data was available to assess the main effects of the associations between equality, trust 
and universalism.  
Means, frequency and percentage scores for trust, equality, and universalism were 
also examined to identify similarities and differences among individual countries. For 
example, within Europe, higher levels of trust in Scandinavian countries were observed 
as supporting previous research.  
Skewedness and kurtosis calculations were conducted to assess whether the 
distribution of the equality and universalism variables was normal. Bivariate correlations 
were also conducted to examine the relationships between trust, equality, universalism 
and each of the socio-demographic and religious variables included in the study.  
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Mutivariate Procedures 
The study used hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) linear regression to 
determine the strength and direction of the associations between trust and equality and 
universalism.  
The first area of analysis examined the main effect associations between the 
independent variables, trust and equality, and the dependent variable, universalism. 
Following previous research examining the variables employed in this study (e.g. Bergh 
& Bjørnskov, 2011; Norris & Inglehart, 2009), standardized beta coefficients were 
calculated and reported. Standardized measurements were the primary statistic for 
reporting regression coefficients because the measurement of the variables of 
universalism and equality on a 1-10 scale are not readily intuitive among those unfamiliar 
with the World Values Survey instrument. 
The second model introduced the demographic variables (age, sex, income, social 
class, education, and size of town) to control for their potentially confounding effect on 
the associations between trust, equality and universalism across all twelve countries. In 
order to isolate the potentially confounding effect of religious control variables 
specifically, the third model introduced religious survey questions (Catholicism and 
whether one is self-described as a religious person) as control variables. Finally, the 
fourth model examined the effect of region (United States, Canada and Europe) to 
determine if a regional effect persists after controlling for the demographic and religious 
variables. 
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 Separate OLS regression analyses were conducted for each region to determine 
standardized regression coefficients and p-values for the associations between trust, 
equality and universalism after controlling for the socio-demographics and religious 
variables. The same analysis was conducted separately for all twelve countries included 
in the study.  
Interaction terms were introduced to further investigate whether the relationships 
between equality and universalism and between trust and universalism are moderated by 
the effect of United States, Canada, or Europe as regions. While the four hierarchical 
OLS linear regression models were designed to reveal the magnitude and significance of 
the effect of trust and equality on universalism by region, the interaction terms were 
introduced to determine if, and the extent to which, the relationships between the trust, 
equality and universalism varied depending on whether individuals lived in the United 
States, Canada or Europe, after controlling for demographic and religious variables. 
R-square and R-square change statistics were calculated in order to assess the 
extent to which the model explains the variation among the variables, and to determine 
the confounding effect of the control variables.  
While specific p-values are reported in the bivariate correlational and regression 
tables, the alpha level was set at the more conservative p < .01 throughout the Results and 
Discussion narrative in order to compensate for any variance that may have resulted from 
possible design effect errors (as outlined in Chapter VII). 
 All analyses were conducted using SPSS© (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences), Version 21.  
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
 
Univariate (Descriptive) Statistics 
The total sample size for the 12 countries, after applying the S018 weighting, was 
11,989.  Among the variables treated in the analysis as continuous (universalism, 
equality, age, and education), skewness scores, all within -1 and 1, and kurtosis scores, all 
between -2 and 2, indicate normal distributions.  As shown in Table 4.1, aggregate 
universalism and equality scores for the entire sample both converge at around the mean 
of 5.5, and both universalism and equality have identical standard error statistics (SE = 
2.55).  
 
Table 4.1. Universalism and Equality Distributions 
 
 N Mean  SE Skewness Kurtosis 
Universalism (1-10) 11,821 5.45 2.55 .116 –.877 
Equality (1-10) 11,772 5.68 2.55 .094 –.931 
 
Among the 11,617 individuals from the 12 countries who answered the trust 
question, 43.1% reported being generally trusting of others (Table 4.2). As a point of 
comparison, the set of these twelve nations is far more likely to have trust in others than 
the entire World Values sample of 65 countries. Among the world-wide sample, only 
26% of individuals are reported as having trust in other people. 
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Table 4.2. Distribution of Trust Responses 
 
Response N Percent 
“People can be trusted” 5,006 43.0 
“Need to be careful” 6,611 55.3 
Missing 372 2.7 
Total 11,989 100.0 
 
 
As seen in Table 4.3, the sample is distributed evenly by sex, with females 
representing 51.5% of the sample. Age is also distributed evenly across the six categories 
with more than 10% of the sample falling into each of the six age categories. The World 
Values Survey imposes no upper age limit on its survey respondents. 
As noted in Chapter III, the survey question for self-reported social class was not 
asked in France, the Netherlands and Great Britain, resulting in 30% missing from the 
total sample for this question. Categorical variables were created for three levels of social 
class shown in Table 4.3, with a dummy variable created to capture the “missing” data.  
Distribution of the levels of income variable includes the 13.7% missing from this 
question due to non-response.  The town size variable has approximately 34.2% missing 
data as the question for town size was not asked in Spain, Finland, Netherlands, or 
Switzerland.  The distribution for 50,000 + residents and under 50,000 residents was 
distributed evenly after missing values were taken into account.   
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Table 4.3. Distribution of Demographic Control Variables 
Variable N Percent 
Sex   
 Male 5,817 51.5 
 Female 6,172 49.5 
Age   
 18-24 1,297 10.8 
 25-34 1969 16.4 
 35-44 2496 20.8 
 45-54 2065 17.2 
 55-64 1925 16.1 
 65 + 2227 18.6 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
Education   
 Incomplete Elementary 625 5.3 
 Elementary Only 1,699 14.3 
 Incomplete High School 1,880 15.8 
 Complete High School 4,396 37.0 
 Incomplete University 1,106 9.3 
 University Degree + 2,193 18.4 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
Self-Reported Social Class   
 Upper / Upper Middle 2,476 20.6 
 Lower Middle 3,358 28.0 
 Lower / Working 2,601 21.7 
 Missing 3,554 29.6 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
Income Level   
 Higher (6-10) 6,342 52.9 
 Lower (1-5) 4,010 33.4 
 Missing 1,637 13.7 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
Town Size   
 50,000+ 3,950 32.9 
 Less than 50,000 3,934 32.8 
 Missing 4,105 34.2 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
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Approximately 49.5% of respondents stated that they were religious, while 48.5% 
responded that they were not. Among those who answered the religious denomination 
question, approximately 44.3% of those respondents identified as Catholic compared to 
65.7% who answered no. People identifying as Catholic represented 30.2% of the total 
sample population (Table 4.4). The Catholic category included people who identify as 
Catholic even if they don’t attend church regularly or follow all the rules that they view 
as prescribed by Catholicism.  
 
Table 4.4. Distribution of Religion Control Variables 
 
Variable N Percent 
Religious Person   
 Yes 5,564 49.5 
 No 6,172 48.5 
 Missing 253 2.0 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
Catholic   
 Yes 3,624 30.2 
 No 4,564 38.1 
 Missing 3,802 31.7 
 Total 11,989 100.0 
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Trust, Equality and Universalism by Region 
As shown in Table 4.5, the percentage of Canadians who tend to trust people 
(42.8%) is relatively similar to the percentage of people who trust others in Europe 
(43.5%). By contrast, the level of generalized trust in others in the United States is only 
39.3%.  
 
Table 4.5. Percent Trusting by Region 
 
Response Europe Canada United States 
“People can be trusted” 43.5% 42.8% 39.3% 
“Need to be careful” 56.5% 57.2% 60.7% 
N 9,646 977 995 
 
 
The reported mean for universalism support for Canada (M = 5.0), the United 
States (M = 5.1) and Europe (M = 5.5), all fall within a small range relative to the 1-10 
point scale measuring the variable.  
  
Table 4.6. Universalism and Equality by Region 
 
 Europe Canada United States 
 N Mean SE N Mean SE N Mean SE 
Universalism 9,866 5.5 2.54 985 5.0 2.49 969 5.1 2.67 
Equality 9,829 5.8 2.58 980 5.2 2.42 963 4.9 2.26 
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Generalized Trust by Country 
Northern European nations, and in particular Scandinavian countries, have the 
highest levels of generalized trust among the twelve nations included in this study, with 
Norway having the highest percentage of trusting people at 74 percent. The three nations 
with the lowest levels of generalized trust were the southern European nations of Italy, 
Spain and France (Figure 4.1).   
 
Figure 4.1. Generalized Trust by Nation 
Percentage within each nation, responding “Generally speaking, people can be trusted” 
(N = 11,617) 
 
 
Income Equality by Country 
Across all countries included in the study, the mean values for support for greater income 
equality ranged from a high of 7.4 for Switzerland to a low of 4.9 for both the United 
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States and Sweden (Figure 4.2).  Scandinavian countries do not cluster around the 
relatively high equality scores as they do around the higher levels of generalized trust. 
Nevertheless, the four highest equality-supporting nations are all from Northern Europe, 
with Canada and the United States falling in the bottom third among the twelve countries 
represented. 
 
Figure 4.2. Mean Values of Equality by Country 
Based on a ten-point scale: 10 = “Completely agree that incomes should be made more 
equal.” 1 = “Completely agree that we need larger income differences as incentives.”  
(N = 9,829) 
 
 
 
 
 
Universalism by Country 
As shown in Figure 4.3, support for universalism by country ranges from a mean 
of 6.58 for Spain to a low of 4.55 for Sweden. Unlike the range of levels of trust by 
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country, where the most trusting countries are found in Northern Europe, the five 
countries with the highest levels of universalism — Spain (M = 6.58), Germany (M = 
6.50), Italy (M = 6.23), Norway (M = 5.91) and Netherlands (M = 5.71) — are widely 
distributed geographically. Five countries — Great Britain, France, the United States, 
Finland, and Canada — all have similar average scores for universalism, from 5.00 to 
5.07. This group of five countries is also widely distributed geographically, with two 
from North America and three from Northern and Southern Europe.  
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Figure 4.3. Mean Values of Universalism by Country 
Based on a ten-point scale: 10 = “the government should take more responsibility to 
ensure that everyone is provided for.” 1 = “people should take more responsibility to 
provide for themselves.” (N = 9,866) 
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Bivariate Associations 
As hypothesized, Table 4.7 shows that there is a positive correlation between 
equality and universalism (r = .301, p<.001). There is, however, a significant inverse 
relationship between trust and universalism (r = -.052, p<.001). 
 While universalism has a statistically significant correlation with each 
independent variable included in the study, its strongest association is with income 
equality. Among all the variables, two of the strongest relationships is the negative 
correlation between universalism and higher self-reported social class (r = -.103, p<.001), 
supporting previous findings (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990, Papadakis, 1992) that people 
in higher self-reported social classes consistently believe more strongly in individual 
responsibility and are less likely to support universalist welfare policies. Universalism is 
also negatively associated with higher income levels (r = -.129, p < .001), as wealthier 
people report that they are less likely to support government policies compared to people 
at the lower ends of the income spectrum. As with universalism, support for greater 
income equality is also negatively associated with social class (r = -.081, p<.001) and 
with income (r = -.108, p<.001). 
Although the association between universalism and trust is relatively small, the 
negative association found here supports the suggestion posed in earlier research (Aghion 
et al., 2010; Larsen, 2007), that generalized distrust in others can create the need for a 
strong welfare state.  The logic here is that a widespread general distrust in people may 
require a government to solve issues that individuals cannot solve themselves. 
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While this study has shown that trusting people are slightly more likely to identify 
as religious (r = .048, p < .001), generalized trust is shown here to have an even larger, 
and negative, association with Catholicism (r = -.162, p < .001), confirming Fukayama’s 
(1995) finding that in Europe, Catholic people, and Catholic societies, have both been 
found to be less trusting than Protestant people and their associated societies. 
Even though education has a small, negative relationship with both universalism 
(r = -.088, p < .001) and equality (r = -.061, p < .001), the relationship between education 
and trust is much stronger (r = .242, p < .001), indicating that more highly educated 
people are also more trusting, echoing a wide body of previous research on education, 
trust and social capital (e.g. Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 2000; Uslaner, 2002). 
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Multivariate Analysis: OLS Regression  
As trust and equality are treated as the key predictor variables for this study, 
testing for multicollinearity was conducted to determine if these two explanatory 
variables are highly correlated, to ensure that the two predictors measure different 
concepts. 
Bivariate correlations indicate a non-significant relationship (p = .582) between 
the two independent variables of trust and equality. In addition to the bivariate 
association test, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was included in the regression model 
to determine the level of variance each coefficient is increased due to collinearity. The 
VIF score for trust and equality in the model are both 1.001, indicating virtually no effect 
of multicollinearity between the two variables. Furthermore, VIF and tolerance scores 
were examined for every regression calculation conducted in this study, and none showed 
signs that there should be a concern for multicollinearity among any of control variables 
entered into the regression. 
The ordinary least squares regression model (Table 4.8) shows that when trust 
was held constant, a strong association remained between equality and universalism (β = 
.296, p < .001). After controlling for socio-demographic variables such as age, sex, 
education, income and social class, generalized trust is no longer a significant predictor 
of universalism. However, when religion is incorporated into the model, it has a 
statistically significant negative association, albeit a weak one, with universalism (β = -
.022, p < .05). This association holds when region is incorporated into the analysis (β = -
.025, p < .01).
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The explained variance from model to model in Table 4.8 is relatively small, 
indicating that controlling for socio-demographic factors does not cause major changes in 
the main effects between equality and trust and universalism. With the addition of the 
socio-demographic variables, the model explains 12.1% of the variation for predicting 
support for universalism (R-square change = .01). 
Introducing the U.S.-Canada-Europe region variables also added little to the 
explained variance of the model (R-square change = .01). In the fourth model, when the 
United States-Canada-Europe region variable was entered along with the demographic 
and religious variables, the effect of being European compared to American was 
significant (β = .044, p<.01). Thus, even when controlling for demographics, there is 
significant, albeit relatively small, effect whereby Europeans are more likely to support 
universalism than Americans or Canadians. This indicates that these does seem to be an 
American cultural factor that helps explain the larger levels of support for universalism 
that is seen Europe compared to the United States. Furthermore, the regional effect that 
exists between Europe and the United States and universalism is not found with the effect 
of urbanization within the three regions. In other words Europeans have more in common 
with each other compared with Americans in their support for universalism than people 
who live in cities do across the three regions.  
While the larger commitment to universalism among Europeans compared to 
Americans persisted even after controlling for demographic factors, the opposite effect 
was seen in Canada compared to the United States (β = -.025, p<.05). In other words, 
while the effect is small, and the significance is seen at the <.05 level, Canadians are less 
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likely to support the concepts of universalism than Americans, and this effect remains 
after potentially confounding demographic variables.  
Age, social class and income showed stronger associations with universalism than 
generalized trust when these variables were entered into the regression model together. 
When all demographic variables were controlled for, the effect of age on universalism 
remained negative (β = -.97, p<.01), indicating that older people are less likely to be 
supportive of universalist policies than younger people even when controlling for income, 
education, class, etc.  While the bivariate correlations in Table 4.7 indicate that females 
are slightly more likely to support universalism (r = .029, p < .001), sex was no longer 
observed to be a significant predictor for universalism once other demographic variables 
were taken into account.  
When the relationship between trust and universalism is examined within each 
country (Table 4.9), the relationships diverge from country to country, with some 
countries showing positive associations and others indicating negative associations. 
Within each country, the associations between trust and universalism were not 
statistically significant at the P < .01 level.  Even in the three Scandinavian countries 
where the world’s most universalist policies are in place, and where trust levels are high, 
there was no significant relationship between trust and universalism. For example, in 
Finland the relationship appears to be positive, but is non-significant (β = .023, p = .117); 
while in the Netherlands, the relationship appears to be negative but the association is 
also non-significant (β = -.112, p = .258).  
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Table 4.9. OLS Standardized Regression Coefficients by Country 
Dependent variable: Universalism 
 Equality Trust R-Square 
Canada .229*** .072* .120 
Finland .342*** .023 .117 
France .333*** .032 .145 
Germany .295*** –.215* .231 
Great Britain .371*** –.008 .170 
Italy .334*** .037 .109 
Netherlands .447*** –.112 .258 
Norway .206*** .014 .056 
Spain .424*** –.041 .213 
Sweden .375*** .112 .181 
Switzerland .168  **   –.120 .068 
United States .284*** –.054 .189 
Note: Results are shown after controlling for demographic and religious variables. 
*p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
OLS Regression Models by Region 
As the introduction of regional dummy variables in the Table 4.10 shows, the 
influence of demographic and religious differences between the U.S., Canada and Europe 
alone cannot explain the difference in support for universalism between Europeans and 
Americans. As illustrated in Table 4.10, there are several additional differences in 
multivariate relationships that exist among the three regions.  
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The positive association between equality and universalism is statistically 
significant when controlling for demographic and religious variables in Europe (β = .288, 
p < .01), the United States (β = .284, p < .01) and in Canada (β = .229, p < .01).  Socio-
demographic factors such as high education (β = -.031, p<.01) and being Catholic (β = 
.118, p < .01) have minor, but statistically significant effects on support for universalism 
in Europe. In the United States, by contrast, the control variables with a significant effect 
include middle social class (β = -.112, p < .01) and high income (β = -.100, p < .01). 
While Catholics in Europe are more likely to support universalism than non-Catholics, in 
Canada, they are less likely to do so (β = -.121, p < .01). 
While the bivariate correlations shown in Table 4.7 and the independent variables 
previously shown in Table 4.8 indicate that social class is negatively correlated to 
universalism across the entire sample, this effect only held with a statistical significance  
in Europe (β = -.076, p<.01), where individuals identifying as part of a higher social class 
were less likely to support universalism.  
Age had significant associations with universalism in Europe (β = -.089, p<.01), 
Canada (β = -.131, p<.01) and the United States (β = -.129, p < .01); older people 
everywhere are less likely to support the idea that government should take more 
responsibility in caring for its people.  
Urbanization played opposite roles in the relationship with universalism in Europe 
compared to Canada and the United States. In Europe people living in larger urban areas 
were less likely to support universalism (β = -.039, p < .01), while in Canada (β = .110, p 
< .01), urban dwellers were less likely to support universalism than those living in less-
populated areas. This demographic statistic may be worth noting in future waves of the 
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World Values Survey, as Europeans continue to flee the countryside for larger urban 
areas. Finally, less educated people in Europe are slightly likely to be supportive of 
universalism (β = -.031, p<.01), whereas in North America the relationship between 
education and universalism is non-significant. 
After controlling for the potentially confounding effect of demographic and 
religious variables, the relationship between equality, trust and universalism remained. 
The levels of variance explained by the model were, for the United States: (R-squared = 
.171; R-squared change = .06), Europe: (R-squared = .129; R-squared change = .07), and 
Canada (R-squared = .127; R-squared change = .07).  
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Interaction Effects 
Interaction terms were created in order to further analyze the relationship between 
equality, trust and universalism by assessing the combined effect, if any, of the two 
independent variables (trust and equality) on universalism. To rule out an equality x trust 
interaction term, the moderating effect (universalism = trust + equality + trust x equality) 
was tested to see if either of the coefficients for trust and equality changed from 
unconditional (no interaction term included) to conditional. As seen in Table 4.11, the 
interaction was not significant. (β = .018, p = .72). 
 
Table 4.11. OLS Regression: Universalism with Trust x Equality Interaction 
  
Equality and Trust 
Equality, Trust, and  
Equality x Trust Interaction 
Variable       β p β p  
Equality  .296 <.01 .293 <.01  
Trust  -.058 <.01 -.051 <.01  
Equality x Trust    .018  .72  
       
R2  .092  .092   
F for change in R2   577.17(2)2)  .132(1)   
   
Note: Results are presented after controlling for socio-economic and religious variables.   
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Next, the equality x trust interaction was explored by region to determine if an 
interaction is present within the populations of Europe, Canada or the United States. As 
seen in Table 4.12, there was seen to be a significant interaction between trust and 
equality in the United States (β = .377, p < .01), providing evidence that, within the 
United States, the relationship between equality and universalism was moderated by 
whether or not people are trusting. While this effect did not hold true in Europe or 
Canada, among Americans, the positive relationship between equality and universalism 
became even stronger among trusting people even though the relationship between trust 
and universalism was negative. In fact, when controlling for the interaction, trusting 
people in the United States were seen to be less likely to support universalism than they 
were when the interaction term is not introduced into the model (β = -.376, p < .01). 
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Table 4.12. OLS Regression: Support for Universalism (Standardized) by Region  
with Equality x Trust Interactions 
 
 Europe  
(N = 9,091) 
Canada 
(N = 913) 
United States 
(N = 939) 
Variable β p  β P  β p 
        
Equality  .301 <.01  .186 <.01 .154 <.01 
Trust .012 .11  –.050 .51 –.376 <.01 
Equality x Trust  –.040 .12  .138 .07 .377 <.01 
R2 .091 .065 .126 
 
 
Note: Results are presented after controlling for socio-economic and religious variables.   
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Finally, in order to further explore the regional effect seen in Table 4.12 (Model 4), 
where significant effects of being European (β = .044, p < .01) and Canadian (β = -.025, p 
< .05) compared to being American was observed, interaction terms were introduced for 
trust x region and equality x region. The result of this regression is seen in Table 4.13. 
When controlling for the trust x region and equality x region interactions, the relationship 
between equality and universalism became stronger (β = .345, p<.01). When region x 
trust interactions were controlled for, distrust became an even stronger predictor for 
universalism, although the result was not significant at the p < .01 level  (β = -.094, 
p<.05).  
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Table 4.13. OLS Regression:  
Support for Universalism with Region Interaction Terms 
 Equality, Trust, Demographic  
Religion and Region 
Equality, Trust, Demographic, 
Religion and Interactions 
Variable       β p β p  
Equality  .285 <.01 .345 <.01  
Trust  –.025 <.01 –.056 <.05  
Region       
 Canada    -025 <.05  
 Europe    .044 <.01  
Interactions:       
Canada x Equality    –.027 <.05  
Europe x Equality    –.058 .05  
Canada x Trust    .042 <.01  
Europe x Trust    .026 .37  
R2 .125 
515.09 (15)  
.126 
421.19 (4)  F for change in R2 (df) 
Note: Results are after controlling for socio-economic and religious variables. F(sig) is <.01 for each 
model. 
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The interactions between region and the two main independent variables showed 
a statistically significant effect with the Canada x Trust interaction (β = .042, p < .01), 
while the Canada x Equality interaction (β = -.027, p < .05) was minor and not significant 
at the p < .01 level. These results reinforce the findings presented earlier that the 
relationship between trust and universalism is stronger among Canadians than it is among 
those who are from the United States. This again indicates that differences in associations 
between trust, equality and universalism exist by region, and those differences cannot be 
explained by demographic factors alone. It is hoped that these regional differences can be 
further explored in order to gain a better understanding of the relationship between trust, 
equality and universalism across Europe, Canada, and the United States. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
 
This study has contributed to the thesis put forth by Schwartz (2006) that research into 
the relationships between human values “makes it possible to study how whole systems 
of values, rather than single values, relate to each other and to other variables” (p. 3).  As 
discussed in Chapter II, Schwartz and others (Haidt, 2012; Hofstede, 1990; Rokeach, 
1973) have argued that studying the interrelationships among values and variables such 
as demographic traits and public policy attitudes and can help us better understand how 
humans understand morality and politics. Among the key findings from this research are 
insights into the relationships between equality, trust and universalism, and the regional 
differences that exist between Europe, Canada and the United States concerning the 
associations between these values. 
 
On the Association between Equality and Universalism  
Advocates for universal health care should take note that one of the hypotheses of 
this study is supported — a meaningful relationship exists across Europe, Canada and the 
United States between support for income equality and support for universalism. This 
finding should relevant to anyone interested in the fields of health policy, welfare state 
policy, and economic policy in Europe and North America.  
For example, this research has implications for those developing communications 
and other public awareness campaigns, as well those who are involved in coalition-
building around issues such as health care and economic reform. The finding that the two 
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values reinforce each other can help enhance public messaging around the fact that the 
two policies of universal health care and economic equality have a positive and 
reinforcing effect on each other (Korpi and Palme, 1998).   
The association between universalism and equality is especially relevant in 2014 
as the movement for greater awareness of income inequality grows stronger in the United 
States. This was made clear by the emergence of the “Occupy” movement in 2011, and 
by the nationwide release in 2013 of the film Inequality for All, narrated by former 
United States Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich. In that film, Reich argues that the 
approach to the problem of widening income inequality must come from several different 
directions.  This dissertation shows that the “different directions” of the universal health 
care movement and the economic inequality movements share common value-based 
underpinnings.  While Reich, and others (Christoffersen, 2013, Rothstein and Uslaner, 
2005; Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010) have concluded that growing income 
inequalities are detrimental to a nation’s health and its economic growth, this study has 
connected that large body of research with public opinion around values and beliefs. 
Those concerned with the social and economic devastation caused by rising income 
inequalities now have new research to support the premise that work to combat these 
inequalities and advocacy for universalism can reinforce each other. 
 
On The Association between Trust and Universalism 
Although the association between universalism and trust in this study has been 
shown to be relatively small, the direction of the association is surprising, given the wide 
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body of research discussed in Chapter II, showing statistically significant and often 
strong positive associations between generalized trust and universalism in Western 
nations.  
Nevertheless, the negative, albeit weak connection found in this study between 
generalized trust and universalism has been suggested in some earlier research (i.e. 
Larsen, 2007), where findings have indicated that general distrust in others in a society 
can promote the need for a government that takes responsibility for the welfare of its 
citizens. Previous studies, although not plentiful, have shown signs that a widespread 
general distrust in people can be associated with calls for a government to solve issues 
that individuals cannot solve themselves. For example, in a cross-sectional study of 
nations around the world, Aghion et al. (2010) concluded that support for increased 
government programs is negatively associated with generalized trust. These researchers 
found that distrust creates public demand for regulation, and regulation in turn 
discourages formation of trust. The authors further noted that individuals in low-trust 
countries demand more government intervention even if they are aware that their 
governments are corrupt. While the authors demonstrated that that distrust among 
individuals can lead to increased public demand for government programs, that study 
included non-western nations, with extremely high levels of generalized distrust, along 
with European and North American nations.  The bivariate correlations from this 
dissertation indicate that this negative association may hold for Western nations when 
they are dis-aggregated from other countries around the world. However, because the link 
between universalism and distrust is counterintuitive and contradictory to so many 
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previous studies, more research will need to be conducted using different sources of data 
in order to explore a possible association between generalized distrust and support for 
more government programs in Western nations.  
Previous research has also indicated that an individualistic culture can be found to 
encourage trust and tolerance while collectivistic culture can discourage these values 
(Yoon, 2010). The results of this dissertation may support Yoon’s finding that low levels 
of generalized trust within a society can be connected to increased public demand for 
government programs. After all, it was theoretically out of a distrust of their own 
population’s loyalty that Kaiser Wilhelm and his chancellor Otto von Bismarck created 
the world’s first national health care system, in Germany, in 1883 (Hoffman, 2001). 
 These findings on the association between generalized trust and support for 
universalism are indeed a departure from previous research specifically seeking to find a 
causal link between the two values (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Bergh and Bjørnskov, 
2011). This study has found that a positive, predictive relationship between trust and 
universalism does not emerge when aggregating World Values Survey data across the 
twelve nations, nor when looking separately at the three regions of the United States, 
Canada and Europe. At the individual nation level, the association between trust and 
universalism is seen to be weak, with only Germany and the United States showing a 
statistically significant relationship between trust and universalism (after controlling for 
demographic and religious variables). In those two nations, the relationship is negative, 
i.e. generally trusting people are less supportive of universalism. Again, these results 
contradict much previous research demonstrating that high trusting societies generally 
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have strong universalist policies in place, and are somewhat counterintuitive when one 
considers that trust has long been considered a foundational element in a satisfying and 
well-functioning society. 
Nevertheless, the results of this study may support Nannestad’s (2008) warning 
that “because the universal welfare states are also high-trust countries, it is tempting to 
hypothesize that it is their high level of generalized trust that has enabled them to solve 
the collective action dilemma created by their welfare systems,” and yet “so far, there is 
not much systematic empirical research in this field” (p. 427). Indeed, the weak and 
negative relationship between trust and universalism presented in this study, while far 
from conclusive, may indicate that more and different types of research will be necessary 
to better ascertain how trust in people relates to functioning welfare states.  
The high rates of generalized trust among Northern European nations and the 
relatively low rate among the Southern European nations of Italy, Spain and France is 
consistent with previous research showing that Northern European countries, particularly 
Scandinavian nations, have consistently reported higher levels of interpersonal trust than 
their Southern European neighbors (Bergh & Bjørnskov, 2011; Edlund, 1999; Fukoyama, 
1995). 
Among the scholars who have dedicated a great deal of their professional lives to 
the study of trust — such as Putnam, Uslaner, Rothstein, and Fukuyama — all have 
argued that higher levels of generalized trust is associated with a well-functioning society 
associated with tolerance, confidence and happiness.  These researchers have also found 
that a society with high levels of social trust tends to have strong markers for many other 
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social attributes, such as better education and lower crime. Nevertheless, trust is, even 
among these academic champions, a difficult concept to define and de-construct. Is it a 
value? The response to this question is somewhat scattered, even among the experts. Is it 
a dependent or independent variable? Putnam (2000) said that this is an impossible 
question, comparing the causal arrows of trust with “well-tossed spaghetti.” 
In light of this study, trust seems to have a valid place in research models as either 
a dependent or independent variable. Generalized trust will certainly continue to be 
studied as the effect of other societal qualities, such as education and voluntary 
associations (Lock et al., 1999; Nannestad, 2008; Stolle, 1998). In addition, generalized 
trust will continue to be examined as a cause of many other desirable social outcomes 
such as approval levels of local government and well-functioning local economies 
(Paxton, 2007; Putnam, 1993; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005).  
The bivariate findings from this research between generalized trust and education 
validate previous studies which have also shown positive relationships between these two 
positive features of a healthy society (Nannestad, 2008; Putnam, 1993; Stolle, 1998).  
The fact that education increases exposure to different cultures and perspectives, which 
leads to higher tolerance and less suspicion of difference, has also been studied in the 
context of generalized trust (Putnam, 2000). Positive linkages have also been discovered 
between the levels of public investment in education and generalized trust (Uslaner, 
2002). 
The positive correlation found in this study between generalized trust and level of 
education can help support advocacy for more investment into the public education 
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system, for example, by validating message framing that emphasizes the connection 
between education and social cohesion. Because this study shows that educated people 
are more trusting across the entire sample population, education advocates can investigate 
ways to work with “generally trusting” people in seeking greater public investments in 
education. Neighborhood associations and other community-based organizations are 
examples of institutions found to have high levels of generalized and interpersonal trust 
(Putnam, 2000).  Ultimately, finding opportunities to reinforce the connection between 
trust and education may help gain support, in the United States and in other Western 
nations, for greater public investments in the education system.  
In a December 2013 speech on reduced economic mobility in the United States, 
President Barack used the positive association people have for trust to emphasize the 
importance of reducing inequalities.  “Rising inequality and declining mobility are also 
bad for our families and social cohesion — not just because we tend to trust our 
institutions less, but studies show we actually tend to trust each other less when there’s 
greater inequality” (The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). Despite the 
President’s contention, this study did not find an association between generalized trust 
and support for reducing income equality among Americans, Canadians or Europeans. 
That finding does not, however, contradict previous research showing that high trusting 
societies correlate with lower levels of inequality because the research presented here 
examined values at the individual level. Thus, while connections between higher rates of 
generalized trust and lower levels of income inequality have been found across many 
societies, with inequality measured by the Gini Index (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Zak & 
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Knack, 2001), this study examined these issues in the context of a worldwide public 
opinion survey. As a result, this dissertation may provide a caution that making the case 
for income equality to high trusting individuals may not resonate as powerfully as one 
might otherwise assume.  
Despite the variety of positive qualities that generalized trust offers a society, the 
finding from this research that trust and universalism are negatively (if weakly) 
correlated, may serve to remind us that distrust and suspicion have been important 
elements of evolutionary human survival (Haidt, 2012; Kahneman, 2011). Just as it has 
played an important role in the construction of American political institutions (Storing, 
1981), distrust may play a positive, if still undefined, role in the relationships between 
values and attitudes toward government. 
Nevertheless, given the positive correlations that have been found between 
generalized trust and universalism at the individual and the country level in previous 
research, the question must be asked if there are flaws in the World Values Survey data. 
Because of the findings revealed here can be seen as contradictory to previous studies, 
further research should be conducted, particularly using future waves of World Values 
Survey data, to investigate the negative relationship found in this research between 
generalized trust and support for universalism.  
 
On the Differences between Americans, Europeans, and Canadians 
This study has shown that there is a significant and negative effect of being an 
American, compared to being a European, in support for universalism. While the research 
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presented here indicates that the average American is less likely to support universalism 
than the average European, this effect persisted even after the model controlled for 
demographic and religious variables. This unaccounted-for difference between the two 
regions suggests that cultural factors not explained by demographic and religious 
indicators alone may explain the difference between the levels of values between Europe 
and the United States. This finding supports the contention that the effect of “American 
Exceptionalism” may have been a factor in the repeated failure of the United States from 
adopting a European-style universal health care policy throughout the 20th century, and 
will continue to play a role in health policy development in the future. 
Of course, this study is only the latest research supporting observations made as 
long ago as Tocqueville (2001/1835), and as recently as Skocpol & Williamson (2012), 
that there is a cultural effect of being an American on the values of equality and 
universalism. While this difference between the United States and Europe may never be 
perfectly quantifiable, scholarly attempts continue to uncover additional factors that play 
a role in these differences, such as racism and prejudice (Alesina et al., 2001), and the 
distinctive “echo chamber effect” of American media structure (Jamieson and Cappella, 
2008; Skocpol & Williamson, 2012).  
This study has shown that Americans are less likely to support government 
programs or efforts to reduce economic inequalities than Europeans are, and this effect 
cannot be explained by demographic or religious differences alone. One implication of 
these findings is that the United States may need to systematically address this difference 
in developing future government programs, particularly regarding health care policy. This 
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issue is particularly relevant in 2014, as health care remains a highly politicized and 
embattled topic. 
In the past, there have been efforts made in the United States to better understand 
the values that underlie effective health care reform and bring this understanding to the 
development of a government-run health care system. For example, this occurred in 
Oregon in the 1990s, when representatives from State government convened community 
meetings and focus groups to explicitly seek out and articulate the values that may be 
used to create a new state-run health care system. One of the values researchers 
uncovered through this process was “prevention,” which ultimately led to policies 
regarding the prioritization of some treatments over others among the Medicaid 
population (Jacobs, Marmor and Oberlander, 1999).  
Today, however, a respectful dialogue that acknowledges the values of both 
individualism and suspicion of government on one hand, and universalism and social 
justice on the other, is lacking in American health care policy development. What has 
mostly been seen throughout the Obama administration is a polarized political 
environment that remains strongly entrenched in party politics and, as a result, deeply 
partisan. While both sides are often consistent and clear about the values driving their 
policy positions, it is much less common to see the values of both sides of the debate 
presented fairly and respectfully in a shared forum. 
One hypothesis of this research, illustrated in part by the quotation by Victor 
Fuchs on page 1 of this dissertation, was that a regional effect would also be shown 
between the United States and Canada, where Canadians would be revealed in this 
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research as being more supportive of universalism after controlling for the effect of 
demographic and religious differences. However, this effect was not affirmed in this 
study. In fact, the results here indicate a small, but significant opposite effect (β = -.025, 
p< .05); in other words, Canadians, despite their nationwide universal health care system, 
are slightly less likely to believe that the government should be responsible to take care 
of its citizens.  These findings reinforce the contention that differences between the 
American and Canadian health care systems are more attributable to federal and 
parliamentary institutional structure than they are to differences in culture between the 
two nations (Maioni, 1998; Maioni, 2003). The findings of this research also support the 
theories of path-dependence (Hacker, 1998; Starr, 1982), which indicate that democracies 
find it much more difficult to dismantle policies than to continue with existing policies. 
In the case of Canada, despite the highly individualistic culture compared to Europe that 
is indicated in this research, there is no political movement in that country demanding the 
elimination of universal health insurance. Likewise, path dependence theory applied to 
health care in the United States implies that the health care system in this country has also 
been difficult to reform due to historical precedents establishing an entrenched and 
politically powerful private sector. Reinforcing previous research by Maioni (1998), the 
findings presented in this dissertation provide evidence to reject the argument by Fuchs 
(2010) and Lipset (1990) that a values difference between Canadians and Americans is a 
critical explanation for the discrepancy between the health care systems in place in the 
two bordering North American nations.  
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On Universalism and Equality in the United States 
As the univariate statistics in Chapter IV indicate, the United has the lowest mean 
result for supporting income equality (M = 4.8) and the second-lowest mean result for 
supporting universalism (M = 4.9) among all countries included in this study. The fact 
that Americans are on average, more suspicious of government and more tolerant of 
inequality than nearly every nation included in the study may indicate the effect of 
extreme conservatism in the media in the United States, from television to talk radio to 
the Internet. The proliferation of conservative voices across these American news media 
has been cited as a factor that has given rise to the recent Tea Party movement in the 
United States (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012), as well as the aggressive attack on the 
new national health care system that was seen in the U.S. Congress from its inception 
through the winter of 2013.  
The low mean values for both equality and universalism validate previous 
research that individualism in the United States is stronger, and more extreme than it is in 
Europe. Determining how to address the difference between strongly held opinions and 
mere leanings within a population may help future public opinion researchers understand 
the extent to which extreme messaging and policymaking is effective within the United 
States compared to Canada and Europe. 
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CHAPTER VI:  
FURTHER IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 
 
In March 30, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, the first successful passage of a comprehensive national health care 
plan in the United States. Amended and passed back and forth several times between the 
United States House of Representatives and the Senate, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
was politically partisan from the beginning. When the ACA came to a vote in March 
2010, Republicans in both chambers opposed it unanimously. All but 34 Democrats voted 
to pass it in the House, and all but 3 Democrats voted for it in the Senate (Nivola, 2010).  
Although the Affordable Care Act is now law, there remain three important 
reasons that public opinion data, such as the research presented in this study, has 
important implications on health policy in both North America and Europe. First, despite 
the landmark passage of the ACA, the system as it is currently planned does not have the 
same universal features as those that exist in Europe or Canada.  Rather than being a 
single system serving an entire population, the ACA largely relies on the present 
American system of private insurance companies to cover most people, with mandates 
and regulations used to increase the number of Americans protected by health insurance 
over time. Thus, as advocates for a more equitable American health system seek to 
incorporate greater universalism into the model, it will continue to be important to bear in 
mind how any new system reflects American values. 
Second, the ACA is still opposed by many Americans – and for different reasons. 
Public opinion polls show a widely divergent country in its reactions to the current 
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system: A CBS poll conducted in October 2013 found that 29 percent of Americans 
believe the ACA is acceptable, 22 percent think it is not strong enough, and 43 percent 
think it “goes too far” (Mitchell, 2013). Thus, as changes are made to the ACA over the 
next several years, what these features are, and how they are communicated to the 
American people, will affect the success of its implementation. Furthermore the success 
or failure of the ACA’s implementation will also have an effect on the presidential 
election of 2016, which, in turn will influence the future prospects of the ACA. 
Third, even in Europe, health care systems continue to undergo adjustments and 
transformations. Between 2009 and 2012, Britain, France and Germany have all waged 
debates and made changes to their system in reaction to rising costs and aging 
populations (Flintoff, 2012). Whether this involves concrete policy changes or public 
awareness campaigns around prospective policy, European countries too will be well-
served by better understanding how their populations stand in terms of basic values of 
support for government, equality, and universalism. 
In the end, this study supports the contention by Fein and Richmond (2005) that 
“we cannot expect to achieve universal health insurance without a collective decision that 
our value system calls for equity and that we are prepared to take the necessary 
redistributive steps to achieve it (p.263).” However, the sobering news for universal 
health care advocates in the United States is that, according to this research and recent 
public opinion polling, Americans do not seem ready to make this collective decision that 
our value system calls for equity. 
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What Fein and Richmond neglect to explore is how feasible it is for an entire 
nation to change its “collective decision” about its values.  The literature on values 
suggests that this cultural shift is not as easily achievable as these authors propose 
(Anglund, 2000; Alvarez & Brehm, 2002; Williams, 1979). As other reports from the 
World Values Survey suggest, values tend to change very slowly over time, often taking 
decades to see measurable evolutions in society’s values (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). 
In addition, there seems to be little indication that the United State is collectively 
ready to make such a change. Rather than developing a system that works best for 
everyone – by determining how to make most efficient use of resources to ensure the best 
health for the most people and to treat disease most effectively – the current health policy 
debate in the United States is caught in a clash of values and ideologies. This can be seen 
as the conflict between social justice (“ensure that everyone is provided for”) and market 
justice (“people should take responsibility to provide for themselves”).  Compounding the 
issue is the fact that this ideological battle around health care is occurring during what is, 
by many measures, one of the most partisan eras ever seen in American politics (Haidt, 
2012; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2008). 
Strong evidence suggests that with the migration of more religiously inclined 
voters to the Republican Party, and of more secular voters to the Democratic Party, the 
voting public will continue to become even polarized, further widening the gulf between 
the parties on issues such as health care policy (Nivola, 2010). Moreover, the growth of 
overly partisan forms of media, including talk radio, cable television and social media has 
further nurtured partisan audiences. More than any time in history, Americans are more 
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likely now to get their information about the world from sources that echo and amplify 
their existing ideological positions (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008; Mitchell, 2013; Skocpol 
& Williamson, 2012). 
While values of equity and fairness continue to be brought forward into the 
national dialogue by academics, social justice advocates and politicians alike, they have 
not yet been shown to eclipse the values of freedom and individualism that have set the 
United States apart from other nations around the world. And as this research project 
demonstrates, Canada itself may even be witnessing a slight tilt away from an 
overwhelming value of supporting equity, even if its health care system is not in 
jeopardy. 
 With regard to health care policy in the United States, this study has demonstrated 
that, while institutional arrangements and corporate opposition may have played a role in 
defeating national health care in the past, one cannot dismiss the effect of public values. 
This research supports the contention that these values have played, and continue to play, 
a role in this nation’s stubborn refusal to establish a national health care system. 
Compounding the values information is the historical reality (Hacker, 1998) that, through 
historical precedent, America’s existing institutional structures are organized to prevent 
major progressive social change from occurring. This reality, combined with the current 
levels of power enjoyed by special interests in the U.S. (Quadagno, 2005), only serve to 
further bolster the claim that establishing fair, equal and universal government-provided 
health care is an extremely difficult task in the United States today. 
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While it is clear from this and other research that the level of individualism within 
the United States has likely been a factor in the failure of this country to enact a national 
health care system, it does not mean that such a system cannot being successfully 
implemented. After all, as of this writing, the Accountable Care Act is now law in the 
United States. But in light of the contentious political environment in the country today, 
and given the administrative troubles experienced in the law’s implementation, it is 
possible that conservatives, elected in 2014 and 2016, could dismantle the currently 
fragile system altogether.  
So what can be done? Scholars of human values and moral psychology (Haidt, 
2012; Lakoff, 1996; Sandel, 2009; Schwartz, 2012) argue that seeking a better 
understanding of differences in values is a more effective way to acknowledge policy 
differences than the combative manner currently employed in American politics. This 
does not mean that politicians and policymakers must learn how to agree; on the contrary, 
differences in values will usually lead to strong differences in opinion. In the chapter of 
his book The Righteous Mind (2012), titled “Can’t we all disagree more constructively?” 
Jonathan Haidt asks “Does it have to be this nasty? … nowadays, when the fiscal and 
political situations are so much worse, many Americans feel that they’re on a ship that’s 
sinking, and the crew is too busy fighting with each other to bother plugging the leaks” 
(pp. 275-276). Haidt and others argue that recognizing differences of opinions related to 
basic values (such as those studied in this dissertation) is a helpful way to get to more 
constructive policy discussions than by starting with contention, accusation and, 
ultimately, horse-trading. 
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 As mentioned earlier, an example of attempting to begin a policy effort with a 
discussion of values can be found in the work conducted on the Oregon Health Plan in 
the early 1990s. A deliberate process to learn about values differences, and identify areas 
of consensus was the discovery that the value of “prevention” resonated among 
Oregonians across political party lines (Jacobs, Marmor, Oberlander, 1999). Seeking to 
gravitate policy around this value of prevention helped Oregon developed innovative 
policies, even though it ultimately can be seen as a compromise between those who 
wanted a more generous health system for all and those who argued for more fiscally 
responsible, less expensive public health plan for low-income Oregonians. 
Bringing values into the policy process would likely lead to a consensus for 
system that could more likely work for a large majority of Americans. One result of such 
a process might a health system, similar to the nation’s education system, which features 
a public option as an alternative to the private insurance market. This model, which 
would feature both private and public systems to appeal to people leaning toward either 
collectivist or individualist values, was proposed during the early stages of the first 
Obama presidential campaign and during the early dialogues that led to the Affordable 
Care Act. While originally criticized by conservatives, such a system could actually be 
seen as being more satisfying to both conservatives and liberals if it includes a private 
option for those with a strong suspicion of government, similar to the nation’s current 
education system.  
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CHAPTER VII:  
LIMITATIONS AND STRENGTHS 
 
This study has several strengths that will help provide insights to previous studies 
on values, moral psychology, and political ideology related to universalism and health 
care policy in the United States. The large sample size of approximately 12,000 cases and 
the high response rate of 99% for the two independent variables of trust and equality and 
the dependent variable of universalism contribute statistical power to these findings.  
The fact that this study was able to control for the potential confounding effects of 
a number of socio-demographic and religious variables on the association between trust, 
equality and universalism enabled a more thorough investigation of these relationships. 
Finally, the availability of approximately 1,000 cases for each of 12 Western nations 
enabled a robust comparison of effects differences between the United States, Canada 
and Europe.  
The World Values Survey provides a dataset with a 25-year record of delivering 
survey information to academic institutions and governments in a variety of contexts. All 
World Values Survey investigators subscribe to a code of conduct committing to care in 
developing research designs and survey instruments and in collecting, processing, and 
analyzing data, taking all reasonable steps to assure the reliability and validity of results.  
Investigators pledge to immediately disclose any signs of distortions in the research, and 
make such information available to the media and appropriate regulatory agencies.  In a 
systematic review of the globalization of comparative public opinion research, Norris 
(2007) stated that “the World Values Study remains the only academic global public 
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opinion survey with a standard instrument administered in countries in all world regions” 
(p.7).  Nevertheless, this research must also be viewed in light of some limitations, which 
are listed here.  
 
Complex Sampling Design 
Standard statistical methods were developed based on the assumption of simple 
random sampling, where each individual in a survey has the same probability of being 
chosen as any other, and each subset has the same probability of being chosen as any 
other any subset. However, most large scale research conducted by cross-national 
instruments such as the World Values Survey is conducted through complex sample 
design, where clustered sampling and stratification methods are used to reduce data 
collection costs and increase the efficiency of the sample. Stratification and clustering 
may result in relative homogeneities within clusters that negate the assumption of the 
independence of sample elements. This can reduce the precision that would otherwise be 
available from a simple random sample. (Kish and Frankel, 1974).   
Complex sample design can involve unequal probabilities of selection, 
stratification of sampling units, and multistage selection. While software programs are 
able to adjust for errors resulting from complex sample design during the analysis stage, 
these adjustments require sample design information about primary sample units (PSU’s), 
clusters, and strata (Lepkowski & Bowles, 1996). Because of ethical concerns about 
disclosure, it is becoming increasingly rare for international datasets released to 
investigators to identify the cluster information (Heath, Fisher, & Smith, 2005). 
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Currently, the World Values Survey does not make this information available. As a 
result, it is not possible to make adjustments to compensate for any variance that may 
result from the use of complex sampling design employed by the World Values Survey.  
The variance between a variable collected through complex sampling and one that 
would have been obtained under simple random sampling is referred to as the “design 
effect” (Kish and Frankel, 1974). If such design effects are not accounted for, the most 
common risks include making Type I errors from violation of traditional assumptions of 
independence of observations and underestimating standard errors (Osborne, 2011). 
Heath, Fisher, & Smith (2005) report that design effects tend to be relatively low 
in Western nations. These authors conclude that global public opinion survey researchers 
“tend to ignore the sampling error due to clustering, either because it is small or because 
they do not have the information to do so” (p.317). This is the case with the World 
Values Survey, which does not provide strata or clustering information within its 
documentation.   
At the World Values Survey, principal investigators for each country determine 
the dimensions to compare with census data, and, because documentation of sampling 
variables was not made mandatory in the official specification given to the investigators, 
this sampling information is not available with the World Values Survey.  While 
investigators are asked to provide sample procedure and stratification levels, the World 
Values Survey does not require an enumeration of their composition. This is much the 
same as is found in similar studies, such as barometers and the International Social 
Science Program (ISSP). Occasionally, samples are documented prior to fieldwork and 
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sent to the World Values Survey for validation. In this case, corrections are applied only 
exceptionally if the resulting data does not comply with available census data (J. Díez 
Medrano, personal communication, March 4, 2014). 
Ariane Langsfeld, of the Foundation for the Analysis and Diffusion of Social 
Research, which processes the World Values Survey, states that World Values Survey 
samples are representative for the population at large.  “While there might be small 
deviations in some socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, age or educational 
level, the WVS weight variable compensates for these possible variations. This is a 
common procedure in surveys of this type. Any other adjustments or corrections are not 
necessary (A. Langsfeld, personal communication, June 10, 2010). 
In all countries, samples were drawn from the entire population of 18 years and 
older. After the fieldwork, data cleaning was carried out by the principal investigators. 
Cleaning for the European surveys was performed at Tilburg University and the 
Zentralarchiv in Cologne and by the Foundation for the Analysis and Diffusion of Social 
Research in Madrid. 
Although representatives from the World Values Survey attest that the weighting 
function effectively increases the representativeness of the sample, the fact that strata 
information is not available makes it impossible to determine the true effectiveness of the 
weighting function.  
See Appendix A for the available sampling information for each country.  
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Missing Data 
As previously discussed, this study benefitted from a near complete sample of 
data for the main effect variables of equality (.2% missing), trust (.3% missing) and 
universalism (.01% missing). While most demographic and religious control variables 
consisted of less than 5% missing data, the exceptions included the size of town and self-
reported social class variables. These two variables had 30% of the data missing at 
random at the country level. Because these questions were not included in the survey for 
four countries, it can be assumed that there are no systemic factors accounting for the 
difference between the missing values and the observed values (Heitjan & Basu, 1996).  
 Data considered missing at random were the Catholic variable (31% missing) and 
the income level variable (13.7% missing). Because the missing data for these questions 
occurred despite the fact that these questions were included in the survey, it is possible 
that there may be systemic factors that explain the missing-ness and may have caused 
some bias in the final analysis. For example, embarrassment about income level may 
arise if family income is particularly low, or particularly high, relative to the community 
average. Similarly, the characteristics of people who choose not to answer the “Are you 
Catholoc?” question may also bias the overall results (Sterne, White, and Carlin, 2009).  
However, the inclusion of control variables that correlate to the missing variables in the 
analysis (such as the correlation between education and social class or between “religious 
person” and Catholic, for example) may help to reduce the bias associated with the 
missing data for these control variables (Sterne, White, and Carlin, 2009).  
A regression analysis and an examination of bivariate correlations using listwise 
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deletion were compared to the model employed in this study using missing data as a 
category. The results were comparable in terms of effect magnitudes and directions, and 
statistical significance.  
 
Endogeneity Affecting Within-Country Responses 
One issue which may impede an accurate country-by-country comparative 
analysis is that of endogeneity.  This is the potential for a “loop of causality” that can 
result between specific events in a country (such as newly enacted public policy) and how 
people in that country react to public opinion questions (Banaszak & Ondercin, 2009).  
The media can play a role in this phenomenon as well, particularly in smaller countries, 
as the amount of media attention devoted to particular issues can also affect public 
concern for these issues (Gabel & Scheve, 2007).  
In the case of the questions used for this research, it is possible that the use of the 
word “more” in the question “incomes should be made more equal” may have influenced 
people in a particular country to react differently depending on policies or events specific 
to that country. For example, Sweden, a nation with some of the lowest rates of income 
inequality and highest levels of universalism in the world, scores lower than most of the 
other countries in this study in both equality and universalism. Is it possible that 
Sweden’s survey results are related to policies recently enacted in that country at the time 
of the survey? In 2005, the Swedish government instituted a guarantee that no patient 
should have to wait for more than three months to receive care within the national health 
care system once a diagnosis was determined. Because this new policy presented 
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financial challenges to the country, it received a great deal of coverage in the national 
media. Controversy ensued in Sweden, launching debates about the generosity of the 
country’s health system (Anell, 2005). All this was occurring around the time that the 
World Values Survey was fielding questions for the 2006 wave. 
Thus it may be asked whether recently-enacted policies can affect how people 
respond to a question about whether “the government should take more responsibility,” 
or “incomes should be more equal.”  While it is well documented that values tend to be 
stable over time, they certainly can have the propensity to fluctuate, and drastic changes 
in national policy related to universalism may influence public opinion about 
universalism, equality, and even trust (Bjørnskov, 2006). 
Fortunately, this study benefits from the inclusion of ten different European 
nations, which reduces the possible effect from recent events in any one country on 
Europe as a whole. Nevertheless, it remains possible that public opinion in a single 
country, including Canada and the United States, can be influenced by events or media 
attention within that country.  While this study examined cross-sectional data from a 
single wave of research, longitudinal studies may be helpful to examine how values can 
fluctuate within specific countries over time. 
 
Lack of Generalizability to Non-Western Countries 
Because this study was limited to twelve Western countries, the generalizability 
of applying this research to other countries is limited. For example, the people living in 
these twelve nations are far more trusting of others (43% believe “most people can be 
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trusted”) than the entire World Values dataset of 82 countries (Where only 26% believe 
“most people can be trusted”).  Meta-analyses and studies from various disciplines have 
documented that Americans, Canadians and western Europeans share a number of 
characteristics that are much less common with other societies around the world. These 
differences have been found to include ways of seeing the world such as fairness, 
cooperation, visual perception, and analytic reasoning (Haidt, 2012; Henrich, 2010) as 
well as values related to individualism, collectivism and community (Bellah, et al, 1985; 
Hofstede, 2001; Lipset, 1996). As countries outside North America and Western Europe 
consider expanding welfare policies and adopting universal health care, a replication of 
this study may have value. However, because this study was limited to Western, 
industrial, democratic countries, the results may have little applicability to the majority of 
people in the world who live in non-Western societies. 
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CHAPTER VIII: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Explore New Methods to Examine the Relationship between Trust and Universalism 
Because past research seeking to connect trust with universalism has produced 
quite divergent results regarding the magnitude and the direction of the relationship, it is 
recommended that subsequent researchers seek to better understand the subtle differences 
in either variable that can lead to associations between trust and universalism. Are there 
different, more effective ways to measure trust beyond the generalized trust question 
employed by the World Values Survey? Are there different constructions for the 
dependent variable of universalism? Along with determining trust levels through different 
types of questions, specific elements of universalist policies may be articulated to reach a 
better understanding of how trust and universalism may be connected. Examples of this 
might include developing survey questions about universal health care, a public option in 
a national health care system, or economic equality.  
 
Seek to Minimize Endogeneity 
Given the limitation related to endogeneity discussed above, it is worth 
considering how questions can be asked differently to remove the effect that “issues of 
the day” could have on survey responses. If the researcher’s goal is to gain a better 
understanding of values that tend to be relatively stable over time, the use of the word 
“more,” as in “incomes should be made more equal” should be avoided. Thus, rather than 
asking if incomes should be made more equal, a question can ask: “Which comes closer 
132 
 
to what you believe: “I favor a society where incomes are relatively equal,” or “I favor a 
society where extreme income differences are allowed as incentives.”  
 
Conduct Similar Research Specifically Focused on Health Care Policy 
In order to gain a better understanding of how values of trust and equality connect 
to a nation’s willingness to embrace universal health care reform, it will be helpful to 
continue to collect data that specifically addresses the issue of health care. One example 
of such a question might include a continuous 1-10 scale which asks to respondents select 
between “health care is a right and government should provide it for all citizens” v. 
“health care is a responsibility best distributed through the free market.” Another 
example might ask to choose between a) “I believe the health system should be controlled 
outside the government by the private interests of patients, doctors, hospitals and 
insurance companies,” and b) “The government should be in charge of the health care 
system.” 
A variety of questions specifically focused on health care policy would provide 
the additional insight which is needed today for citizens throughout Western nations, both 
those already providing universal health care, as well as those still grappling with the 
government’s role in providing this benefit. Currently some European survey instruments 
ask questions about health care policy, but these do not include Canada and the United 
States in the sample. The World Values Survey has not included a question about health 
care specifically since it was launched in 1981. 
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Revisit Values Mapping for the United States and Europe 
Much of the World Values Survey work involves the inclusion of “traditional” 
and “modern” societies, and comparing cultural and values trends across countries 
throughout the world (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart and Baker, 2000).  After reviewing the 
literature of values and conducting this research, there seems to be a vast opportunity to 
conduct more robust and expansive values mapping within the United States, Canada and 
Europe, along with other modern nations. Which countries in Europe are more closely 
aligned with the United States? What differences in values exist within the United States 
among individual states? New and updated survey questions can be used to update and 
challenge the existing heuristics cited in this dissertation, such as those developed by 
Rokeach (1973), Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky (1990) and Schwartz (2012). For 
example, along with the “traditional-modern” maps developed by Inglehart and Baker 
(2000), maps can be developed related to trust/distrust, universalism/individualism, and 
such emerging issues as security/privacy. With the increasing interest we are seeing in 
understanding values and values differences as a part of deliberative democracy, it makes 
sense that there would be greater investment in the models and structures that help us 
better understand underlying values and values differences between people living 
together in the same country or region. For example, greater collaboration between 
survey instruments such as the World Values Survey, and public opinion research firms 
in the United States such as Gallop, should be encouraged, where questions could be 
identically worded, and research could be fielded simultaneously.  
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Expand Values Survey Research to Better Incorporate Race and Ethnicity 
Currently, the World Values Survey includes a limited number of demographic 
questions related to race and ethnicity, but only 25% of the countries include such 
questions and the response rate to these questions is approximately 65%. In addition, 
racial questions tend to focus on immigration, and therefore country of origin, rather than 
ethnic origin. For example, “African” is included as a category, while a category relating 
to African or Hispanic ancestry (i.e. applicable to the African American population) is 
not. 
Despite differences found in this study between the twelve countries, it is 
important to bear in mind that common values can sometimes be seen more closely by 
ethnic groups within a country than by the aggregate population of a country. In fact, for 
a large number of people throughout the world, ethnic identities come before their 
national identities  (Barber, 2001; Dowley & Silver, 2000; Geertz, 1973).   
Recognizing how people within different ethnic and cultural groups agree on 
basic human and political values will become even more important in the future as 
nations seek to develop more responsive democratic institutions. With racial and ethnic 
migration continuing to play an important role in democracy in the 21st century, gaining 
an understanding of the values patterns associated with these migrations will be critical in 
order to for governments to completely understand their populations.  
More and more, contemporary democratic politics is becoming more engaged in 
multicultural politics. As Europe, Canada and the United States change with new patterns 
of international migration, new political pressures and policy issues will include more 
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fairness questions about who has rights to programs and how equitably services are being 
distributed to those with access (Soroka, Banting, & Johnson, 2002). 
One example of this can be found in the United States, where, over the past 
several years, numerous studies indicate that significant disparities exist in health status 
and health care access by race and ethnicity in the United States. These racial and ethnic 
disparities persist even when controlling for demographic factors such as income, 
education, and social class (Smedley, Stith & Nelson, 2002).  As a result, political will, 
albeit gradual, is building to raise awareness and political accountability within the 
United States. 
 As survey instruments within the United States and other countries begin to 
address racial and ethnic disparities by developing more sophisticated methods for 
collecting this type of data, the World Values Survey should also consider improving the 
scope of these types of questions. While a number of such race and ethnicity survey 
questions may be most applicable to one or a few countries (such as identifying as 
American Indian or African American), gaining a deeper level of knowledge in this area 
will ultimately serve populations and their governments more effectively.  
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CHAPTER IX: FINAL THOUGHTS: 
 
RECONCILING “DIFFERENCE” IN PUBLIC POLICY 
 
Ever since I began forming the ideas for a dissertation that explores fundamental 
political values, how they might differ between Europe, Canada and the United States, 
and how they have underpinned the struggles of our nation to develop a national health 
care system, friends and colleagues have commented on its timeliness. The idea was 
apropos six years ago, when, under the presidency of George W. Bush, Americans 
valuing limited government had a champion in the White House to resist the attempts to 
create a national health system. It has remained a pertinent issue since then, growing to 
even greater heights when the Obama administration passed the Affordable Care Act in 
2010.  The dissertation continues to be relevant today in 2014 when conservatives in 
Congress, on the airwaves, and in state government legislatures, threaten to sabotage, 
derail, and defund what they see as a policy disaster that conflicts with American values 
of individual liberty, personal responsibility, and suspicion of an over-reaching 
government. 
The past five years have also seen a greater recognition of the causes and 
consequences of rising inequalities, especially those related to income, health, and 
education.  In one example, the documentary Unnatural Causes, released in 2008, 
featured a longtime champion in the fight against inequalities, Dr. Michael Marmot, 
arguing that economic inequalities have severe effects throughout society, both on those 
at the lower ends of the economic spectrum, as well as those at the top.  More mass media 
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and high profile examples followed in subsequent years, from the “Occupy” movements 
in cities throughout the United States, to new films, articles, and books.  
But despite the fact that American life expectancy and infant and maternal 
mortality are now the worst among advanced nations, substantial proportions of 
Americans remain unconvinced that income inequalities present an important societal 
problem. The specific fact that many Americans still believe that “we need larger income 
differences as incentives,” inspired columnist Charles Blow, in 2011, to ask if income 
inequality is the becoming the new global warming, “as deniers attempt to reduce them to 
partisan opinions.” Regardless of one’s position on the issue, it has clearly received 
increasing attention in recent years, lending even more relevance to this research project 
than existed when the project was first conceptualized. 
However, what may be most important to me in terms of the relevance of this 
dissertation is the acknowledgement by many political scientists and scholars that a better 
understanding of the deeper values that underlie our opinions is critical to moving 
forward as a democratic and pluralistic nation. Related to this is the increasing 
recognition that incorporating difference, both cultural and political, into our policies is 
essential to reach a more perfect union. 
This recognition seems to have struck a chord in many, as witnessed by the 
popularity of the “Justice” course taught by Michael Sandel at Harvard University, and 
made available online in 2009. In one of his lectures, entitled “The Lost Art of 
Democratic Debate,” Sandel said “Today most of the political debates we see are 
shouting matches on cable TV or ideological food fights on the floor of Congress… 
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however, underneath our arguments over health care, lying just beneath the surface, with 
passions raging on all sides, are big questions of moral philosophy and justice. But we 
too rarely articulate and argue about those big moral questions in our politics (Chen, 
2011)”. If there is one editorial statement to be found in this dissertation, it is that we as a 
nation must articulate and respectfully debate these “big moral questions in our politics.” 
In his 2012 book The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and 
Religion, Jonathan Haidt similarly writes that his hope for the book is to “make 
conversations about morality, politics, and religion more common, more civil, and more 
fun, even in mixed company” (p.2). 
So why has it been so difficult to do this?  Or as Haidt asks in paraphrasing 
Rodney King, “Why can’t we get along?” Haidt makes the case that America’s obsession 
with “righteousness” is the normal human condition and a feature of our evolutionary 
design. Yet while the human’s righteous mind has allowed human beings to produce 
large cooperative groups, it has also guaranteed that our groups will always be cursed by 
moralistic strife.  Haidt’s research seeks, by better understanding of the roots of 
ideological difference, to help reach a place where “competing ideologies are kept in 
balance, systems of accountability keep us all from getting away with too much, and 
fewer people believe that righteous ends justify violent means” (p.6). Although this 
dissertation was begun long before The Righteous Mind was published, it too has been an 
effort to help citizens and policymakers reach a place where competing ideologies are 
kept in balance, and where conversations about politics are more civil, more fun, and 
most importantly, more productive.  
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Along with the indication that this “righteousness” is hardwired within us, 
perhaps one reason we rarely articulate those moral questions is that we don’t have 
enough of the tools to do so in a cooperative manner. Among my hopes for this 
dissertation is that it may, in its small way, help us get to that place where we recognize 
that difference is not only acceptable, but should be celebrated as a feature that can, as 
diversity does in nature, help us as survive and thrive.  In any society, it may be 
impossible to accommodate every political philosophy. Furthermore, racism, sexism, and 
other forms of intolerance are never desirable. However, tolerance must to include the 
acceptance of differences in political values. This way, we are more likely to reach an 
accommodating solution to issues such as a productive health care policy than we would 
if we merely wait until “my party gets elected and we get rid of the other side.” 
There are signs of this basic idea in other fields, and in other countries. In 2012, 
the nation of Iceland completely re-wrote its constitution beginning with a process of 
cooperatively defining the nation’s most important values and building a new constitution 
based on these discovered values. The effort randomly selected 1,200 citizens, and 
deliberately chose 300 more individuals from political institutions and relevant 
associations. The identification of nine significant “themes” including education, 
economy, equal rights, and family, led to the identification of the nation’s four key values 
of integrity, equal rights, justice, and respect. As Paul Blokker of the University of Trento 
in Italy wrote, “while these outcomes might seem abstract and general, and contain a 
highly universalistic flavor, the importance of the event lay much more in the deliberative 
and civic-participatory nature of the session” (Blokker, 2012, p.5). 
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 In education, programs such as the Chicago-based Collaborative for Academic, 
Social, and Emotional Learning seeks to elevate emotional intelligence to a higher place 
in education and teach students how to incorporate the different perspectives of others 
into classroom activities. This movement is being studied at universities throughout the 
nation, including the Greater Good Science Center at the University of California in 
Berkeley, Yale University, and Rutgers University. 
I also believe these are some of the same issues I saw gaining prominence while I 
served as public affairs director for Northwest Health Foundation. During this time, I 
learned that attaining health equity among different racial, ethnic, and other marginalized 
populations does not mean “treating everyone the same.” Just as America painfully 
learned that “separate but equal” was not going to work in the long run, we now seem to 
be in the process of understanding that “equity” does not equal “sameness.” The golden 
rule of treating others the way you would want to be treated doesn’t necessarily apply to 
cultural competence in health care, education, or social services, or even criminal justice. 
Public Health professionals seeking interventions aimed at the greater good, also find that 
these efforts can run counter to community values, which can include cultural dietary 
traditions or community transportation preferences. Conflicts around forced assimilation 
and the recognition of multiculturalism are related issues that arise when seeking to 
recognize and incorporate values differences in policy choices.  
Ultimately, it is in recognizing, understanding, and then accommodating different 
perspectives, different cultures, and different ways of viewing the world, that all of us — 
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individually and as a nation — will benefit, whether it be through more effectively 
incorporating diversity into our political philosophy or into our culture.  
As this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, recognizing, acknowledging, 
and celebrating difference may ultimately make all the difference.  
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APPENDIX  
 
World Values Survey sampling information  
for countries included in this study 
 
Accessed from WVS Website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org) 
 
Canada [2006] 
 
Title: Canada [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Neil Nevitte 
Dept of Political Science 
University of Toronto 
100 St. George St. 
Toronto, Ontario M5S 1A1 
Canada 
Tel: 416-978-7170 
E-mail: nnevitte@chass.utoronto.ca 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
Canadian Facts, Toronto 
 
 
Survey Period: 14-02-2006-08-04-2006 
 
Sample:  
 
In constructing a probability sample of this universe, the following conditions are met: 
1. Each household in the universe has some known probability of selection. 
2. No arbitrary judgment is exercised in determining which households are included, or which 
individual in each household is interviewed. 
A total of 2164 households were selected from 346 primary sampling units (EAs) widely spread 
throughout Canada. The sampling operation was performed at four distinct stages: 
1. Determination of the numbers of primary sampling units (EAs) to be selected in each stratum. 
2. Selection of EAs. 
3. Selection of households. 
4. Selection of one individual per household. 
 
1. Selection Of Primary Sampling Points Cumulative EA household counts are computed within 
each community and the required number of PSUs are systematically selected. A random start and 
fixed interval method allows each EA a chance of selection proportionate to the number of 
households therein. 
2. Selection Of Households 
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Households are given an equal chance of selection in each EA. Statistics Canada EA maps are 
reproduced. Boundaries are clearly marked, start points, skip intervals and travel direction 
designated. Start points and start households are randomly chosen in each 
case. 
3. Selection Of One Individual Per Household 
The final stage involves the selection of the one individual in each household to be interviewed. 
The procedure involves listing all individuals 18 years of age and over in each household. 
Individuals were not specifically screened for Canadian citizenship. The 
random selection of one respondent is controlled by a selection grid. 
 
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION 
One of the general features of the sample design is the expectation that an equal number of 
completions will be achieved in each selected EA irrespective of its location in Canada. However, 
it is recognized that completion rates vary significantly across the 
country given a constant level of effort. 
Prior to establishing the required number of EA’s in total, decisions regarding anticipated 
completion rates for a specified level of effort are made. The total number of EA’s drawn, the 
interval for household selection and the call back requirements are fashioned 
in anticipation of the sampling and interviewing effort required to maximize response rates and to 
ensure overall efficiency in the sampling and interviewing process.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Call-back procedures were designed to optimize expenditures of field resources for this study. The 
number of call-backs was initiated at different times of the day and on different days of the week 
to maximize completion rates. 
 
Completed questionnaires were always reviewed by supervisors prior to their return to head 
office. Incomplete or improperly conducted interviews were returned to the field for completion 
by either the same or, if necessary, a different interviewer. 
Interviewers were required to complete report forms for each assigned location. 
On-going tallies provided supervisory staff with the information necessary to re-assign work or 
address particular problems. 
 
Sample size: 2164 
 
Response rate:  
 
A total of 2,164 personal in-home interviews was completed. Based on total contacts of 8,192, a 
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response rate of 26.4% percent was achieved. All interviewing for the study was conducted 
between August 3 and September 24, 2000. 8192 A - Total issued 496 B – Not eligible (ill, dead, 
non-English speaking, not at this address ) 2164 C - Total eligible 2146 D - Total questionnaires 
received 4121 E - non-responses (including non-contact; see note above under “sample type”) 
1411 F - Refusals (including questionnaires less than half filled in) 3975 G - Non-contact 
(included in “E”) 146 H – Other non-response (included in “E”) 
 
Weighting:  
 
According to age, gender, and region. The data for this project was weighted according to the 
most recent 2006 Statistics Canada figures. Weighting was undertaken to adjust the final, in-tab 
sample to reflect the total Canadian population of adults, 18 years of age and older, in terms of 
age within gender within community size within region. 
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Finland [2005] 
 
Title: Finland [2005] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Juhani Pehkonen 
Suomen Gallup Oy 
Italahdenkatu 21 
00210 Helsink, Finland 
phone: 906-9601 
fax: (3580) 6960-287 
phone: EX 125515 SGALL SF 
E-mail: @juhani.pehkonen@gallup.fi  
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
 
 
Survey Period: 28-08-2005-12-10-2005 
 
Sample:  
 
A representative sample of 18 years and older population in Finland excluding Åland 
(Ahvenanmaa). Multi-stage stratified sample, where primary stratification was based on 
municipality data and secondary stratification was based on zip code areas. 
 
The first stage stratification was based on two dimensions: 
1. The North-South dimension grouped the municipalities according to NUTS 2 into three groups: 
South, Central Finland and Northern Finland 
2. Urban-rural dimension was used to form two groups: Urban municipalities and semi-urban and 
rural municipalities  
By linking these two dimensions six primary level strata were obtained. The Capital Region 
(Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Kauniainen) formed an individual stratum. 
 
The second stage stratification grouped zip code areas within the first stage strata in such a way, 
that the second stage strata was as homogeneous as possible in terms of socio-economic 
dimensions. In total there were 16 second stage strata. The mean income in the capital region and 
proportion of apartment buildings in other regions were used as the stratification variables. 
At each first stage stratum the number of starting points was distributed as equally as possible 
amongst the second stage strata. 
Capital region was divided into four second stage strata. Southern Finland was divided into four 
second stage strata. Central Finland was divided into four second stage strata. Northern Finland 
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was divided into four second stage strata.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
The number of sampling points inside each stratum was in a direct relation to the number of 
inhabitants in each stratum. Therefore proportional allocation was used. Inside each stratum, 
clusters (zip code areas) was picked using PPS-sampling and inside each picked cluster the same 
sample size (8 interviews). Inside each sampled cluster a starting point was chosen randomly. 
From randomly drawn address the interviewers moved towards growing address numbers. Within 
the target households the respondents were chosen by sex and age quotas. 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Sample size: 1016 
 
Weighting:  
 
Respondents were chosen by sex and age quotas. 
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France [2006] 
 
Title: France [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Christian Welzel 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
International University of Bremen 
P.O.Box 750 561 
D-28725 Bremen 
Germany 
e-mail: c.welzel@iu-bremen.de 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
GfK CUSTOM RESEARCH France, Rueil-Malmaison Cedex 
 
 
Survey Period: 30-01-2006-24-02-2006 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
Quota relevant questions and questions necessary for statistical 
reasons had been asked at the beginning of the interview. Here the 
actual order: 
Statistical questions: Interview number, date of contact, type of contact, comments, number of 
quota sheet 
Quota relevant questions: Region ZEAT, commune, size of town, v235, v236, v237, v241, 
v241_1 (if people are currently not working, they had been asked, if they had a job in the past), 
v242, 
Then the order of the WVS questions strictly followed the master 
questionnaire. No additional questions had been inserted in the 
programmed questionnaire. 
The wording of v34 to v42 and v198 to v208 had been amended, 
because the original version was likely to offend minorities due to the special situation in France 
(protests in suburban areas etc.). 
After question v256 some additional statistical questions, such as 
duration of the interview, name and address of respondent were 
inserted. 
 
Sample:  
 
Sampling procedure: Quota sample according to the following criteria: 
gender, age, profession of respondent, region, size of town. 
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As in most of the countries involved, quota sampling had been used to select the respondents, a 
brief description of the methodology at the beginning of the methodological report seems to be 
useful. 
The respondent was selected using quota selection. Respondents were only selected if they 
matched the quotas given to the interviewers. Concerning substitution, any respondent fitting an 
appropriate quota profile could be interviewed instead of somebody with the same quotas, but 
who did not want to participate in the survey. 
Concerning stratification factors, region and size of town were used to design the sample and 
select appropriate sampling points.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 15 to 64 years 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face-to-face in-home interviews via CAPI (computer assisted 
personal interviews) 
 
Sample size: 1001 
 
Weighting:  
 
During and after data collection, representativeness of the sample with respect to nationally based 
criteria has been checked. Deviations from the population’s distribution on these criteria were 
observed. These deviations have been corrected by a weighting variable built with the RIM 
weighting procedure – see the RIM weighting theoretical basis paper entitled ‘ON A LEAST 
SQUARES ADJUSTMENT OF A SAMPLED FREQUENCY TABLE WHEN THE EXPECTED 
MARGINAL TOTALS ARE KNOWN’, by W. Edwards Deming and Frederick F. Stephan, in 
volume 11, 1940of the Annals of Mathematical Statistics. It was realised with Quantum software 
of SPSS MR company. 
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Germany [2006] 
 
Title: Germany [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Christian Welzel 
Professor, 
Vice President if WVSA 
P.O.Box 750 561 
D-28725 Bremen 
Germany 
E-mail @c.welzel@iu-bremen.de  
 
Hans D Klingemann 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
Reichpietschufer 50 
10785 Berlin 30, Germany 
E-Mail: Klingem@medea.wz-berlin.de  
Tel (0114930) 254-91320; H: 825-8946 
Fax (0114930) 254-91684 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
infas Institut für angewandte Sozialwissenschaften GmbH 
 
 
Survey Period: 02-05-2006-21-06-2006 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
Country-specific questions added 
 
Sample:  
 
Random sample of the overall population in Germany aged 18 and 
older, sufficiently able to speak German 
Procedure: 400 sampling points; random-route; Kish-Selection Grid 
 
Separate sampling for East and West Germany. 
After the selection of municipalities, the sampling procedure consists of three stages. The 
probability of being selected is proportional to the overall population with principle residence. 
(1) Selection of constituencies: Strictly random selection of stratified constituencies 
(2) Selection of household: Random-Route 
(3) Selection of respondent: Kish-Selection-Grid 
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Separate sampling for East and West Germany: 200 sample points each, randomly selected from 
stratified constituencies (according to federal state, population size)  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 15 to 64 years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
- a slight overrepresentation of women (4 percent points) 
- a slight underrepresentation of those aged 25-39, a slight overrepresentation of those aged 65+ (4 
to 6 percent points) 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face-to-face interviews 
 
Sample size: 2064 
 
Response rate:  
 
4454 Total number of starting names/addresses 97 - addresses established as empty, demolished 
or containing no private dwellings 651 - no contact at selected address 26 - no contact with 
selected person 842 - refusal at selected address 770 - personal refusal by selected respondent 4 - 
other type of unproductive 2064 - full productive interview 
 
Remarks about non-response:  
 
2.064 (total): 988 in West Germany, 1.076 in East Germany 
 
Weighting:  
 
Yes, two different weights (1) Corrects for age, sex, federal state and size of municipality (2) 
Corrects for age, sex, federal state and size of municipality, plus East/West distribution for 
analyzing Germany as a whole 
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Great Britain [2006] 
 
Title: Great Britain [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Christian Welzel 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
International University of Bremen 
P.O.Box 750 561 
D-28725 Bremen 
Germany 
e-mail: c.welzel@iu-bremen.de 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
GfK NOP UK, London 
 
 
Survey Period: 01-12-2005-18-12-2005 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
The order of the questions strictly followed the master questionnaire. No additional questions had 
been inserted in the programmed questionnaire, not even quota relevant questions. Quota had been 
recorded by a separate quota sheet. 
 
WVS question number or description of question: 
V50 to V54 
V57 to V58 
V91 to V94 
V105 to V113 
V115 
V117 
V122 to V124 
V164 to V176 
V178 to V183 
V188 to V191 
V193 to V197 
V210 to V221 
V231 to V233 
V240 
V248 to V252 
 
Reason(s) not included: 
Short questionnaire, GfK survey 
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Sample:  
 
NOP Random Location Approach, which is a quota sample of individuals with randomly selected 
sampling points. The sample design is essentially a 3-stage design, sampling first parliamentary 
constituencies, then enumeration districts within those selected constituencies and finally 
respondents within the enumeration districts: 
(1) Selection of parliamentary constituencies: The 639 parliamentary constituencies of Greta 
Britain are classified into the Register General’s ten Standard Regions. Within each Standard 
Region, constituencies are classified into four urban/rural types. From the file of 639 
constituencies, a sample of 175 must be drawn by random numbers. 
(2) Election of enumeration districts: Within each selected constituency, an enumeration district is 
selected. These EDs are selected at random, but with some stratification control so that the sample 
of EDs drawn is representative of the sample of constituencies and therefore of GB in 
demographic terms. Once the Eds have been selected, the profile of the aggregated set of EDs is 
checked against the national profile to ensure that it is representative. Each ED is a small area, 
containing on average around 150 households. Each ED is therefore homogenous, with the people 
living within it being fairly similar in social grade terms. 
(3) Selection of respondents: For each selected ED, a list of all residential addresses is produced. 
This listing is taken from the Postal Address File, which is a listing of all addresses within Great 
Britain, and is updated monthly. The interviewer uses this list to identify the households at which 
they can interview. 
 
As in most of the countries involved, quota sampling had been used to select the respondents, a 
brief description of the methodology at the beginning of the methodological report seems to be 
useful. 
The respondent was selected using quota selection. Respondents were only selected if they 
matched the quotas given to the interviewers. Concerning substitution, any respondent fitting an 
appropriate quota profile could be interviewed instead of somebody with the same quotas, but 
who did not want to participate in the survey. 
Concerning stratification factors, region and size of town were used to design the sample and 
select appropriate sampling points.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 15 to 64 years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
Quota sample according to the following criteria: gender, age, professional status of respondent. 
 
For practical reasons, two constituencies (Orkney/Shetland and Western Isles) are not included in 
the sampling frame from which constituencies are selected. 
 
From the file of 639 parliamentary constituencies, a sample of 175 must be drawn by random 
numbers. Within each selected constituency, an enumeration district is selected. These EDs are 
selected at random, but with some stratification control so that the sample of EDs drawn is 
representative of the sample of constituencies and therefore of GB in demographic terms. 
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Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face-to-face in-home interviews via CAPI (computer assisted personal interviews) 
 
Sample size: 1041 
 
Weighting:  
 
During and after data collection, representativeness of the sample with respect to nationally based 
criteria has been checked. Deviations from the population’s distribution (criteria: gender, age, 
professional status of respondent, region, size of town) were corrected by a weighting variable 
built with the RIM weighting procedure. The population characteristics were obtained from GB 
mid 2003 population estimates; Office of National Statistics 2003 (class) and 2003 population 
estimates; FRS 2003. 
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Italy [2005] 
 
Title: Italy [2005] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Prof. Dr. Renzo Gubert 
University of Trento 
via Verdi 26 
38100 Trento 
Italy 
FAX: 3946-1881-299 
E rgubert@gelso.unitn.it 
 
Gabriele Pollini 
Email: gabriele.pollini@soc.unitn.it 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
Centro Ricerche Sociali (C.R.S) Milano (Italy) 
 
 
Survey Period: 10-05-2005-20-11-2005 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
WVS question number or description of question: 
V80-v89; v100-v103; v152-v161; v170-v176; v231-v233. 
Reason(s) not included: 
It is a long questionnaire 
 
Sample:  
 
1) Classification of population by region, dimension of municipality (small. Medium, medium to 
large, large), geographical location (mountain or plain; cost or interior); 
2) Selection of 80 municipalities, taking into account their characteristics as point 1);  
3) Selection of a stratified sample of individuals within the 80 municipalities by systematic 
method; for large municipalities a preliminary chance selection of the electoral register was 
performed, stratified by location in center of the city, in the suburb and in the periphery. The 
stratification of the individuals sample was performed according to the nation-state strata 
dimensions. The population aged 18 to 74 was stratified by 20 regions, 2 genders and 3 age 
classes. In total the strata were 120.  
 
Universe:  
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Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
The chance selection of the individuals by systematic method was performed in order to complete 
each of the 120 strata. 
 
No stratification by education was possible; therefore after the interview campaign we realized 
that the people with lower education were under-represented and people with higher education 
were over-represented. 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Our aim in drawing up the sampling design for this national survey was to follow procedures 
which gave the best possible representativeness to the 1000 statistical units to be selected from the 
population aged between 18 and 74. 
 
To this end, we decided to adopt the following criteria: 
− reduce the number of sampling stages to the minimum; 
− stratify the reference population by means of discriminant values and certain values; 
− during the survey phase, reduce as much possible refusals by the subjects initially selected at 
random. 
 
As regards the stages, we discarded the idea of a preliminary sampling of regions and provinces, 
whose only purpose was to facilitate the survey by restricting it to a few areas of the country. 
From the point of view of statistical representativeness this would have meant introducing a 
sampling error already at this first level. In other words, the survey covered all the regions, with a 
quantity of interviews proportional to the population aged 18 to 74 in each region. 
 
In the first stage, we selected 80 municipalities taking account of the distribution of the Italian 
population not only by region but also by degree of urbanization (small, medium, medium-to-
large, and large municipalities). We also sought to select these municipalities so as to replicate the 
socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the geographical macro-areas which divide Italy 
into North-East, 
North-West, Centre, South, and Islands. For this purpose we considered the location of a 
municipality (in a mountainous area or on the plain, on the coast or in the interior, in an area with 
good or poor communications), its socio-cultural characteristics, and its main economic activity. 
 
In the second stage we created a proportional stratified sample of the 80 samplepoints previously 
selected. The cases were extracted from the individual strata using the procedures of the 
systematic method, which involves calculation of a sampling interval in order to obtain a random 
sample. 
 
To be pointed out, however, is that there were three stages for large municipalities: 
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before the subjects to be interviewed were extracted, we selected a number of electoral wards 
which adequately represented the various parts of the city. Generally selected were two wards in 
the centre, three in the suburbs, and two in the periphery. 
We calculated the size of the individual strata with reference to the entire Italian population aged 
18 to 74, after this had been stratified by region (20 classes), gender (2 classes) and age (3 
classes).  
 
These 120 classes represented the main benchmarks for the distribution of the statistical units. 
However, we sought to preserve 
stratification by size of municipality within each region as well. 
These devices connected with stratification are important for reducing sampling error because 
they counteract the negative effect of variance. It is well known, in fact, that sampling error is 
directly proportional to the amount of variance. 
 
In other words, if the variables used for the stratification are discriminatory and their values are 
known and certain, they should be reproduced in the sample consistently with the features of the 
universe. In this way their variance will not affect the sampling error. At the same time, all the 
other questionnaire variables significantly correlated with those used in the stratification of the 
population (gender, age, region, size of municipality of residence) will be more likely to furnish 
estimates which approximate the real datum. 
 
We now give details of the modes and outcomes of this stratification. 
 
To sum up, therefore, we may say that the variables used for the stratification enabled us to keep 
the extraction of the interviewees under control without affecting the randomness essential for 
statistical representativeness. 
 
However, there was no guarantee that also the estimates of the other variables would closely 
approximate the reality. There are various factors that may alter the representativeness of a 
sample, above all the fact that some of the interviewees initially extracted, those whom we call 
‘effectives’, must be substituted by ‘reserves’ 
for various reasons. 
 
In order to reduce this risk as much as possible, we selected the reserves randomly from within the 
same stratum as the ‘effectives’. Moreover, by monitoring the work of the interviewers and giving 
them appropriate advice, we were able greatly to reduce the percentage of subjects who refused 
the face-to-face interview. We were helped in achieving this result by a letter previously sent to 
the persons extracted which explained the importance of the research and urging their 
collaboration. 
 
The result can be considered more than satisfactory, also because only a very small percentage of 
subjects refused to be interviewed (15.3%). These subjects, in fact, were those who could most 
easily have compromised statistical representativeness because the majority of them belonged to 
categories with shared social features.  
 
The effect is that of producing underestimations in that particular social group. This is less likely 
to happen with other types of substitution, because they tend to be distributed among all social 
categories without marked differences for specific groups in the population. 
 
However, even with this certainly positive outcome, the distortionary effect of substitutions 
cannot be entirely excluded, especially on certain characteristics of the real sample, which are 
favoured by other concurrent factors. We refer to the overestimation of graduates which occurs in 
almost all social or scientific surveys, because more highly-educated subjects more easily grasp 
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the importance of this type of research, distinguishing it from numerous other surveys conducted 
for commercial or political purposes. 
 
Our survey, too, was subject to this kind of conditioning. One reason was that it was not possible 
to control for schooling through stratification because this information cannot be obtained from 
electoral registers, these being the usual sources for samples of the national population based on 
random extraction. 
 
Having pointed out these features, which on the one hand reassured us as to the procedures 
followed and the substantial equivalence between the theoretical sample and the real sample, but 
which on the other required caution because of the indubitable presence of overestimations and 
underestimations at the level of 
schooling, we complete the description with information about sampling error. 
 
To be stressed is that this aspect should be set in relation to the others considered, and not taken as 
absolute and indisputable information, because representative can only be regarded as certain for 
those variables where uniformity between the real 
population datum and the sample datum can be verified. The latter is only a preliminary estimate 
and its margin of error is always difficult to calculate. 
 
In this regard, we repeat what has already been said about substitution of ‘effectives’ by 
‘reserves’, while adding that the first sampling stage, the one relative to the selection of 80 
municipalities, was carried out with ‘reasoned’ choice. 
Consequently, we can only presume that the population resident in those samplepoints was 
representative of the Italian population as a whole. 
 
It is with this caveat that we calculate the sampling error. The formula used is the one applied 
when considering the percentage value estimated for a characteristic of the population and its 
opposite, i.e. the absence of that characteristics. This is therefore a formula that can be applied 
even when, as in our case, the variables are non-metric. 
e = k √pq/n 
 
where (e) is the sampling error of the estimates, (k) the width of the confidence interval, to which 
is generally attributed the value of 1.96, i.e. 95 probabilities in 100 that the sample datum does not 
contain error greater than that calculated; (p) is the proportion or percentage of occurrence of the 
feature for which the error is calculated; (q) the proportion in which that feature does not occur; 
and (n) the size of 
the sample. 
 
In this formula, the product (pq) substitutes the variance value, which is not calculable for non-
metric variables. However, it is a value that corresponds to the degree of 
homogeneity/inhomogeneity regarding the proportion in which a particular feature revealed by the 
survey is present or absent. A feature is present with no inhomogeneity when one hundred per 
cent of the statistical units possess that feature. By contrast, there is maximum inhomogeneity 
when the feature is present or absent to a proportion of 50%. In this case, the product (pq) 
corresponds to 0.50x0.50, i.e. 0.25. If this proportion in the population is already known before 
the survey, its maximum value (0.25) is assumed when it is not ruled out that this 
value can be reached. Otherwise, reference is made to the datum furnished by the survey. 
 
For this research, if it is hypothesised that a feature may be present in 50% of the population, i.e. 
if the maximum value of the inhomogeneity index is considered, a sampling error of 3.1% is 
obtained. 
e = 1,96 √0,25/1000= 0,31 
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For features present with proportions above or below 50%, the sampling error is less than 3.1%: 
proportion (in 100) 50 and 50 30 and 70 10 and 90 
error (%) 3.1 2.8 1.9 
 
 
Sample size: 657 
 
Response rate:  
 
1000 Total number of starting names/addresses - addresses which could not be traced at all 17 - 
addresses established as empty, demolished or containing no private dwellings 22 - selected 
respondent too sick/incapacitated to participate 26 - selected respondent away during survey 
period - selected respondent had inadequate understanding of language of survey - no contact at 
selected address 94 - no contact with selected person - refusal at selected address - proxy refusal 
(on behalf of selected respondent) 153 - personal refusal by selected respondent 31 - other type of 
unproductive (please write in full details in the box below) 657 - full productive interview - partial 
productive interview 
 
Weighting:  
 
Yes 
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Netherlands [2006] 
 
Title: Netherlands [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Christian Welzel 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 
International University of Bremen 
P.O.Box 750 561 
D-28725 Bremen 
Germany 
e-mail: c.welzel@iu-bremen.de 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
INTOMART GfK, Hilversum 
 
 
Survey Period: 30-01-2006-10-03-2006 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
The order of the questions strictly followed the master questionnaire. 
No additional questions had been inserted in the programmed 
questionnaire, not even quota relevant questions. Quota had been 
recorded by a separate quota sheet. 
 
WVS question number or description of question: 
V50 to V54 
V57 to V58 
V91 to V94 
V105 to V113 
V115 
V117 
V122 to V124 
V164 to V176 
V178 to V183 
V188 to V191 
V193 to V197 
V210 to V221 
V231 to V233 
V240 
V248 to V252 
Reason(s) not included: 
Short questionnaire, GfK survey 
185 
 
 
Sample:  
 
Region; quota sampling according to the following criteria: gender and age  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
As in most of the countries involved, quota sampling had been used 
to select the respondents, a brief description of the methodology at 
the beginning of the methodological report seems to be useful. 
The respondent was selected using quota selection. Respondents 
were only selected if they matched the quotas given to the 
interviewers. Concerning substitution, any respondent fitting an 
appropriate quota profile could be interviewed instead of somebody 
with the same quotas, but who did not want to participate in the 
survey. 
Concerning stratification factors, region and size of town were used 
to design the sample and select appropriate sampling points. 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face-to-face in-home interviews via CAPI (computer assisted 
personal interviews) 
 
Sample size: 1050 
 
Weighting:  
 
During and after data collection, representativeness of the sample with respect to nationally based 
criteria has been checked. Deviations from the population’s distribution on these criteria were 
observed. These deviations have been corrected by a weighting variable built with the RIM 
weighting procedure – see the RIM weighting theoretical basis paper entitled ‘ON A LEAST 
SQUARES ADJUSTMENT OF A SAMPLED FREQUENCY TABLE WHEN THE EXPECTED 
MARGINAL TOTALS ARE KNOWN’, by W. Edwards Deming and Frederick F. Stephan, in 
volume 11, 1940of the Annals of Mathematical Statistics. It was realised with Quantum software 
of SPSS MR company. Additional criteria used for weighting of the data: size of town 
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Norway [2007] 
 
Title: Norway [2007] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Ola Listhaug 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
Statistics Norway/ Department of IT and Data Collection/ Division for Sample Surveys 
 
 
Survey Period: 05-03-2007-31-05-2007 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
Language: Norwegian. 
 
Deviations from WVS- questionnaire: The following adaptations were made to conduct the 
Norwegian survey: 
 
• V43: Minority chosen was “Muslims”.  
• V99 and V103 were omitted. 
• V185: The Norwegian questionnaire made a distinction between the Church of Norway 
(Lutheran State church) and other protestant denominations. 
• V188-V191: “Churches” was substituted with “The Church of Norway, or the denomination 
you belong to”. 
• V213: The statement was changed into “I see myself as a European”. 
• V222: List of languages consisted of “Norwegian” and “Other”. 
• V233a was omitted. 
• V253: Respondents were asked to estimate household’s gross income in 2006. 
• V256 was omitted. 
 
Sample:  
 
Random sampling. 
 
The sample was drawn using Statistics Norway’s standard sampling frame, which uses random 
sampling in two stages in order to establish a sampling frame for face-to-face interviews. 
 
The standard sampling frame firstly divides the country into a number of primary sampling areas, 
which in turn are divided into 109 subpopulations, called strata. The criteria for stratification of 
primary sampling areas are economic classification3, population density and centrality. The aim is 
to create strata, which are as homogenous as possible, but still geographically concentrated. The 
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primary sampling units are municipalities or aggregates of municipalities. Municipalities with few 
inhabitants are grouped together with other municipalities to ensure that each sampling area 
consists of at least 7 per cent of the total number of inhabitants in the stratum the municipality 
belongs to. All municipalities with more than 30 000 inhabitants and some with 25 000 to 30 000 
inhabitants constitute separate strata. 
 
In the first stage, one primary sampling area from each stratum is selected. Sampling areas which 
constitute separate strata are drawn with a 100 percent probability, while the remaining areas are 
drawn with a probability proportional to the size of the area’s population. 
 
In the second stage, the respondents are randomly drawn from a population register. The persons 
in the population register are arranged by a family number and a personal code within the family. 
This is done to avoid that two or more persons within the same household are selected in the 
sample. 
 
Respondents are drawn with a probability designed to make the sample self-weighting, i.e. all 
persons in the sampling frame have the same probability of selection.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face-to-face interview, telephone interview. 
 
The mode of data collection for the World Values Survey was primarily face-to-face interviewing. 
However, in several sampling areas there’s only one interviewer present, and such areas may be 
too remotely located to send interviewers from other areas. Moreover, in some cases respondents 
refused to participate unless the interview was conducted by telephone. Therefore a small number 
of telephone interviews have been permitted. Altogether, 86.7 percent of the interviews were 
conducted as face-to-face interviews, while 13.3 percent were conducted by telephone. 
 
Measures of coding reliability employed: 
 
Firstly, all selections are done automatically by the programme, thus reducing the risk of errors in 
the selections done by interviewers. Secondly, all numeric variables have absolute limits for data 
entry. 
For example when entering the number of hours worked per week it is impossible to enter 
numbers above 168. Thirdly, and similarly, there are built in checks (hard error), which are 
impossible to override. An obvious example is that year and date of birth is checked against the 
date of the interview. Fourthly, and lastly, there are signals (soft error) which give a warning to 
the interviewer if the answer is either unlikely because it is extreme or because it does not 
correspond to answers given to questions asked earlier. These signals can be overridden if the 
answer in question is confirmed. 
No errors of any importance were detected in the data control posterior to the data-collection 
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period. 
 
Sample size: 1665 
 
Response rate:  
 
1700 A Total issued 35 B Not eligible 1665 C Total eligible 1025 D Total questionnaires received 
640 E Non-responses (including non-contact; see note above under “sample type”) 473 F Refusals 
89 G Non-contact 78 H Other non-response 
 
Weighting:  
 
No weighting. 
 
Other notes:  
 
Publications: Ola Listhaug and Tor Georg Jakobsen: ”Verdiundersøkelsen 2007: Norske meninger 
om miljø - lokalt og globalt”. Samfunnsspeilet nr. 1, 2008. 
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Spain [2007] 
 
Title: Spain [2007] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Juan Díez-Nicolás 
Professor em Complutense University, Madrid, Spain 
WVSA Executive Committe 
c/ Nausica 18  
28220 Majadahonda Madrid 
Spain 
T+ 34 916 380 888 
F+ 34 91 6345327 
E jdieznic@terra.es 
E 100613.2721@compuserve.com 
W www.jdsurvey.net 
 
 
Juan Díez-Medrano 
International University Bremen 
Campus Ring, 1 
28759 Bremen 
Germany 
T+ 49 421 200 3491 
F+: 49 421 200 3303 
E j.medrano@iu-bremen.de 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos and Intercampo (Madrid) 
 
 
Survey Period: 10-07-2007-24-07-2007 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
WVS question number or description of question: 
 
V100 TO V103 WERE EXCLUDED 
V108 TO V110 WERE EXCLUDED 
V166 TO V169 ONE OF THE ANSWER CATEGORIES WAS OMITTED: INADEQUATE 
EDUCATION 
 
Reason(s) not included: 
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To reduce length of questionnaires it was an unfortunate error in editing the questionnaire 
 
Sample:  
 
• Sample stratification: The selection criteria was that of proportional distribution of interviews 
among the 17 Autonomous Regions according to their population and to community size within 
each region. 
 
Those municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants are of compulsory selection; the rest 
come out from a random draw. 
 
The same number of interviews per Autonomous Region is kept in each study. The only 
Autonomous Regions that always have interviews at all levels of community size are: Andalucía, 
Cataluña and País Valenciano. The strata of the other regions are drawn each month. 
 
The number of interviews that proportionally corresponds to each province and type of 
community is also taken into consideration within each Autonomous Region. Moreover, we keep 
track of the population settlements that are selected so that they are not repeated, and in large 
cities we distribute the interviews among the districts. 
 
• Household selection: once the number of interviews to be done has been established (by size of 
community and Autonomous Region), we use a computerised system to randomly extract 
municipalities and electoral sections within them. The number of electoral sections randomly 
selected is related to the total number of interviews to carry out in the municipality. 
 
A random route system is applied for household selection; in all the buildings that the interviewer 
passes by (on either side of the street, depending on the side where the starting point is), one every 
three housings is selected; in case of refusal or non-contact, the interviewer goes to the next 
household. 
 
• Respondents’ selection: age and sex quotas are used for the respondent’s selection. These quotas 
are established in each 
sampling point according to the cross between size of community and age and sex at national 
level and also at regional level in the three regions above mentioned (Cataluña, Andalucía, País 
Valenciano). In the other regions the distribution is proportional.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
At the very end of the selection process, when interviewer is accepted into a household. Some 
sampling experts would not considered this as quota, but as another process of stratification of the 
sample. 
 
Please write in: Distribution according to population in each region, and within the region, 
according to size of place, and at the household level, according to sex/age distribution of 
population in each region. 
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After three attemps to get the interview in a household, and substitution is always made within the 
same building. (Most housing is in apartments buildings). 
 
Given the the sampling design that was used, multiple-stage stratified sampling, with random 
routes, the aim was to obtain 1,200 interviews, but interviewers were given a number of 
interviews higher, 1,300, counting on refusals and non productive contacts and counting also on 
substitution after three attempts. That is why the sum of non-completed interviews and completed 
interviews do no add up to the starting size of 1,300. 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face to face 
 
Sample size: 1200 
 
Response rate:  
 
1300 Total number of starting names/addresses 27 - selected respondent too sick/incapacitated to 
participate 11 - selected respondent away during survey period 13 - selected respondent had 
inadequate understanding of language of survey 139 - no contact at selected address 24 - refusal at 
selected address 57 - personal refusal by selected respondent 1213 - full productive interview 
 
Weighting:  
 
By sex and age (4 categories), Weight includes as variable in data file 
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Sweden [2006] 
 
Title: Sweden [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
PI Bi Puranen 
Associate Professor, 
Senior Research Fellow, Institute for Futures Studies, Stockholm, Sweden, 
mobile: +46 705 721 721, Skype:bi.puranen 
Stockholm: phone +46 8 14 92 44 fax +46 8 14 97 07  
Sophia Antipolis, France - Centre International de Communication Avancée 
Le Castelet, Peymeinade, phone +33 (0)4 93 66 10 06 fax +33 (0) 493 42 58 20 
e-mail: bi@bikupan.se or bi.puranen@worldvaluessurvey.org 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
ARS Research Stockholm 
 
 
Survey Period: 23-11-2005-17-02-2006 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
Swedish 
 
Sample:  
 
Random sample from the Swedish population register 
 
The sample for this research has been drawn with the following criteria’s: 
We divided the number of sampling points by population figures in NUTS 2 areas. 
After that we selected the largest city in each NUTS 2 area, then we randomly (by computer) 
selected the designated number of sampling points in each NUTS 2 area based on the population 
figures provided by SCB. 
Our sampling program assigns random numbers to settlements, than rank orders it by this random 
number and it chooses the i.e. 6 uppermost town and/or village from the complete listing with in 
each area. 
This method has given us 60 sampling points that is spread statistically correct across Sweden. 
The number of conducted interviews is also statistically divided amongst the 60 selected city’s in 
the sample so that the 60 sampling points is representative for whole Sweden. 
The selection of respondents is made by computerised random selection from the Swedish 
population registry, and is stratified according to size of the city. 
The designated number of respondents with in each one of the sampling points is separately 
drawn from this registry. 
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All statistical information is collected from SCB, and are dated 2004. 
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 21 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
Slight skewness if ages groups 45 and above. In a first stage, 60 probabilty sampling units were 
selected. For each of these, a random sample of respondents were then sampled from the 
population register. 
The selection of PSUs was based on a representative stratification over region and population 
size. 
A slight underrepresentation of those aged 46 – 55, a slight overrepresentation of those aged 56-
65, a sligt underrepresentation of those aged 66-75. 
Persons older than 85 were not included 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
Face to face interviews, non-capi 
 
Sample size: 1003 
 
Response rate:  
 
Total number of starting names/addresses 2230 addresses which could not be traced at all 187 
selected respondent too sick/incapacitated to participate 252 selected respondent away during 
survey period 82 selected respondent had inadequate understanding of language of survey 53 no 
contact with selected person 95 personal refusal by selected respondent 558 full productive 
interview 1003 
 
Weighting:  
 
A weight variable which corrects for the deviances in place of living in relation to the sample 
which includes those who refused to participate and those who were not possible to contact at the 
correct address (n = 1.756). The weight variable doesn’t have much effect on the SES variables 
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Switzerland [2007] 
 
Title: Switzerland [2007] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
Prof. Hanspeter Kriesi 
Institute for Political Science 
University of Zurich 
Seitergraben 53 
CH-8038 Zurich 
P: +44 44 634 40 11 
E: hanspeter.kriesi@ipz.uzh.ch  
 
Prof. Simon Hug 
Département de science politique 
Université de Genève 
Uni Mail 
40, bd du Pont d'Arve 
CH-1211 Genève 4 
P: +41 22 379 89 47 
E: Simon.hug@unige.ch  
 
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
LINK Institute, Luzern 
 
 
Survey Period: 15-04-2007-28-08-2007 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
Between v21 and v22: “don’t know” / “no answer” 
Between v90 and v95: “What kind of country would you wish that Switzerland is? Would you 
wish that 
Switzerland is a country with… 
…large income differences or without large income differences? 
…with low emphasis on full employment or with high emphasis on full employment? 
…with equal chances for Swiss and foreigners or with better chances for Swiss? 
…that integrates itself or that preserves its traditions?” 
Between v124 and v125: “Sniderman: I fear that vandalism increases in my neighborhood” / 
“Sniderman: I fear that economic situation worsens in my neighborhood” / “Sniderman: I fear that 
vandalism increases in 
Switzerland” / “Sniderman: I fear that economic situation worsens in Switzerland” / “Sniderman: 
I fear that the 
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Swiss culture is threatened” 
Between v208 and v209: “Are you Swiss citizen or not?” 
Between v209 and v210: “Switzerland was criticized due to its attitude during the Second World 
War. Do you think that this critic was absolutely justified, justified, not justified, not justified at 
all?" 
Between v211 and v212: “I identify myself with my canton.” 
Between v212 and v214: “I identify myself with Europe.” 
Between v216 and v221: “Were you born in Switzerland?” 
Between v216 and v221: “Since how many years do you live in Switzerland?” 
Between v221 and v223: “Requirements for naturalization: 
…have Swiss ancestors. 
…be born in Switzerland. 
…adapt Swiss way of living. 
…observe the law. 
…acquire language of residence. 
…attend school in Switzerland. 
…know Swiss history. 
…be member of an association. 
…abandon old citizenship.” 
Between v221 and v223: “Problem for naturalization: 
…wearing a Muslim scarf. 
…being social beneficiary. 
…being unemployed. 
Between v221 and v223: “Would you agree or disagree that naturalized foreigners loose their 
Swiss citizenship who become delinquent?” 
Between v221 and v223: “Which language do you speak at home? (Swiss)german, French, Italian 
or other?” 
Between v221 and v223: “Which language did you speak at home, when you were between 5 and 
10 years old? 
(Swiss)german, French, Italian or other?” 
Between v230 and v231: “Are you entitled to vote?” 
Between v231 and v234: “How large is the probability to vote the following party: CVP, FDP, 
SP, SVP, Grüne Partei?” 
Between v234 and v235: “Would you vote for or against an entry of Switzerland to the European 
Union?” 
Between v234 and v235: “Would you agree or disagree with the following statements? EU entry 
would bring loss in sovereignty. EU entry would be good for Swiss economics. EU entry would 
cause invasion of migrant workers. 
EU entry would restrain civil rights as initiative and referendum.* 
Between v243 and v244: “Could you tell me in which sector your company is active?” 
Between v247 and v248: “Do you have a partner in life?” 
Between v247 and v248: “What is you partner’s highest education level?” 
Between v247 and v248: “What is your partner’s employment status?” 
Between v247 and v248: “Was your partner employed in past?” 
Between v247 and v248: “What is your partner’s profession?” 
Between v247 and v248: “What is your partner’s institution of occupation?” 
Between v247 and v248: “In which sector is your partner’s company active?” 
Between v248 and v249: “Highest education level of chief wage earner?” 
Between v250 and v251: “Institution of occupation of chief wage earner?” 
Between v250 and v251: “Sector of chief wage earner’s company?” 
 
WVS question number or description of question: 
v76 future changes: less importance placed on work 
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v77 future changes: more emphasis ontechnology 
v78 future changes: greater respect for authority 
v79 future changes: more emphasis on family life 
v91science and technology are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable 
v92 because of science and technology, there will be more opportunities for the next 
v93 science and technology make our way of life change too fast 
v94 we depend too much on science and not enough on faith 
v194 politicians who don´t believe in god are unfit for public office 
v195 religious leaders should not influence how people vote 
v196 better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office 
v197 religious leaders should not influence government 
v217 requirements for citizenship: having ancestors from my country 
v218 requirements for citizenship: being born on my country’s soil 
v219 requirements for citizenship: adopting the customs of my country 
v220 requirements for citizenship: abiding by my country´s laws 
v232 which party would you vote for: second choice 
v233 party that would never vote 
v233a general party preference 
v237 age 
 
Reason(s) not included: 
Due to the fact that some Swiss specific questions had to be included and that the questionnaire 
was already extensive, 
we had to leave out some of the WVS questions to be able to realize the interviews within an hour 
of time. The Swiss research team tried to drop only those questions that are covered with other 
included questions of the survey. 
 
Sample:  
 
All residents in german, italian and french Switzerland aged between 18 and 85 years old, who 
speak and understand one of the three languages of the country. 
 
The amount of the to-be interviews has been first stratificated for the language regions 
(German=600, French=400, Italian=200). On this basis, the amount of sample points has been 
calculated under consideration of their distribution among the language regions. 131 sample 
points have been chosen considering their distribution in the economic regions and their 
community size according the distribution in the main unit. Spatial criteria has been the post code 
of the locality. 
Addresses within the sample points of the master sample were chosen on random from the official 
telephone number 
directory. 5’031 addresses were chosen in total. 
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
• Randomized selection of telephone numbers. 
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• Randomized selection of target person in household with more than one potential target person. 
 
Survey procedure:  
 
Personal Face to Face Interview 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
face-to-face interview 
 
Sample size: 1241 
 
Response rate:  
 
4876 Total number of starting names/addresses 333 - addresses which could not be traced at all 10 
- addresses established as empty, demolished or containing no private dwellings 308 - selected 
respondent too sick/incapacitated to participate 220 - selected respondent away during survey 
period 258 - selected respondent had inadequate understanding of language of survey 529 - no 
contact at selected address 103 - no contact with selected person 1339 - refusal at selected address 
478 - personal refusal by selected respondent 1241 - full productive interview 
 
Weighting:  
 
Weights for language regions: Swiss-German: 0.277984 Swiss-French: 0.708708 Swiss-Italian: 
1.415877 
 
 
  
198 
 
 
United States [2006] 
 
Title: United States [2006] 
Principal investigator(s): 
 
PI:  
Ronald Inglehart 
ISR 4255 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248 
USA 
1-734-936-1767 
E-mail: rfi@umich.edu  
 
Co-advisers: 
Max D. Larsen, Ph.D. 
Partner 
The Gallup Organization 
901 F Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
202 715 3189 
E-mail : Max_Larsen@gallup.com  
 
Jon Miller 
Room 18-142 
303 East Chicago Avenue 
Chicago, Illinois 60611 
312-503-1431 (tel) 
312-503-2521 (fax) 
E-mail: j-miller8@northwestern.edu  
 
Data Collection Organization: 
 
Knowledge Networks - Government & Academic Research 
 
 
Survey Period: 19-09-2006-29-09-2006 
 
Questionnaire:  
 
 
English Questionnaire. 
 
some question(s) not included: 
V254 (how interested was respondent?)  
Reason(s) not included: Because the survey was self-administered and V254 is for the 
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interviewer. 
 
V55 (Marital status) 
V56 (Number of children) 
V235 (Gender) 
V236 (age) 
V237 (age) 
V238 (education level) 
V241 (employment status) 
V256 (Race/ethnicity) 
Reason(s) not included: Knowledge Networks has similar information currently on file for the 
panelists and appended those and other supplemental demographic variables to the data file. 
 
Sample:  
 
Sample was stratified by age (18-29, 20-44, 45-59, 60+), education (less than HS, HS, some 
college, Bachelor’s +), ethnicity (white non-hispanic, black non-hispanic, other non-hispanic, 
Hispanic, 2+ races non-hispanic), and gender 
 
The eight sources of deviation from epsem design are:  
1 Half-sampling of telephone numbers for which we could not find an address,  
2 RDD sampling rates proportional to the number of phone lines in the household,  
3 Minor oversampling of Chicago and Los Angeles due to early pilot surveys in those two cities,  
4 Short-term double-sampling the four largest states (CA, NY, FL, and TX) and central region 
states,  
5 Under-sampling of households not covered by MSN TV,  
6 Oversampling of minority households (Black and Hispanic),  
7 Oversampling of households with PC and Internet access  
8 Selection of one adult per household.  
 
Universe:  
 
Both sexes, 18 and more years 
 
Remarks about sampling:  
 
Once Panel Members are recruited and profiled, they become eligible for selection for specific 
surveys. In most cases, the specific survey sample represents a simple random sample from the 
panel.  
 
The sample is drawn from eligible members using an implicitly stratified systematic sample 
design. Customized stratified random 
sampling based on profile data is also conducted, as required by specific studies. 
 
The primary sampling rule is not to assign more than one survey per week to members. In certain 
cases, a survey sample calls for pre-screening, that is, members are drawn from a sub-sample of 
the panel (e.g., females, Republicans). In such cases, care is taken to ensure that all subsequent 
survey sample drawn that week are 
selected in such a way as to result in a sample that is representative of the panel distributions. 
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Survey procedure:  
 
Self-filled interview 
 
 
Fieldwork:  
 
For client-based surveys, a sample is drawn at random from active panel members who meet the 
screening criteria (if any) for the client’s study. The typical sample size is between 200 and 2000 
persons, depending on the purpose of the study. Once selected, members can be sent an advance 
letter by email several days prior to receiving the questionnaire through their WebTV appliance or 
personal computer to notify them of an important, upcoming survey. 
 
Once assigned to a survey, members receive a notification email on their WebTV or personal 
computer letting them know there is a new survey available for them to take. The email 
notification contains a button to start the survey. No login name or password is required. The field 
period depends on the client’s needs, and can range 
anywhere from a few minutes to two weeks. 
 
Email reminders are sent to uncooperative panel members. If email does not generate a response, 
a phone reminder is initiated. The usual protocol is to wait at least three days and to permit a 
weekend to pass before calling. Knowledge Networks also operates an ongoing incentive program 
to encourage participation and create 
member loyalty. To assist panel members with their survey taking, each individual has a 
personalized “home page” that lists all the surveys that were assigned to that member and have yet 
to be completed. 
 
A few words about each feature:  
1 Once the telephone numbers have been purged and screened, we address match as many of these 
numbers as possible. The success rate so far has been in the 70% range. The telephone numbers 
with addresses are sent a letter. The remaining, unmatched numbers are half-sampled in order to 
reduce costs. Based on previous research we suspect that the reduced field costs resulting from 
this allocation strategy will more than offset increases in the design effect due to the increased 
variance among the weights. We are currently quantifying these balancing features.  
2 As part of the field data collection operation, we collect information on the number of separate 
phone lines in the selected households. We correspondingly down-weight households with 
multiple phone lines.  
3 Two pilot surveys carried out in Chicago and Los An geles increased the relative size of the 
sample from these two cities. The impact of this feature is disappearing as the panel grows.  
4 Since we anticipated additional surveying in the four largest states, we double-sampled these 
states during January-October 2000. Similarly, the central region states were over-sampled for a 
brief period.  
5 Certain areas of the U.S. are not serviced by MSN®. We select a smaller sample of phone 
numbers in those areas and use other Internet Service Providers for Internet access of recruited 
households in those areas.  
6 As of October 2001, we began oversampling minority households (Black and Hispanic) to 
increase panel capacity for those subgroups.  
7 As of August 2002, we began oversampling households with PCs and Internet access to reduce 
the cost of WebTV set-up and maintenance.  
8 Finally, for most of our surveys, we select panel members across the board, regardless of 
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household affiliation. For some surveys, however, we select members in two stages: households in 
the first stage and one adult per household in the second stage. We correct for this feature by 
multiplying the probabilities of selection by 1/ai where ai represents the number of adults (18 and 
over) in the household. 
 
Sample size: 1201 
Response rate:  
 
Total number of starting names/addresses 1710 full productive interview 1201 partial productive 
interview 48 
 
Remarks about non-response:  
 
Knowledge Networks selected 1,710 members of its panel to participate in the survey. While 
1,249 responded to the invitation to participate, forty-eight did not complete the entire self-
administered Web survey. Because Knowledge Networks utilizes a panel methodology, we also 
report a separate panel recruitment response rate (AAPOR RR #3). This measure is the mean 
response rate for all panel recruitment cohorts from which these 1,710 panelists belong. 
 
Weighting:  
 
Whereas in principle the simple design is an equal probability design that is self-weighting, in fact 
there are several known deviations from this guiding principle. Furthermore, despite our efforts to 
correct for known sources of deviation from equal-probability design, there are several other 
sources of survey error that are an inherent part the process. We address these sources of survey 
error globally through the poststratification weights, which we describe below. The primary 
purpose of a post-stratification adjustment to survey weights is to reduce the sampling error for 
characteristics highly correlated with reliable demographic and geographic totals œ called 
population benchmarks. To implement post-stratification, we employed the following weighting 
techniques: 1. Calculate a base design weight for all sampled cases. 2. Modify this base design 
weight for the cases that completed the survey by calculating post-stratification weights against 
CPS population benchmarks for the adult age group. The raking variables are: • age: 18-29, 30-44, 
45-59, 60 and over • gender: male, female • race/ethnicity: white (non-Hispanic), black (non-
Hispanic), other (non-Hispanic), Hispanic • region: northeast, midwest, south, west • education - 
highest level achieved: less than high school, high school, some college, college degree or more. 
In order to calculate final weights, we derive weighted sample distributions along various 
combinations of the above variables. Similar distributions are calculated using the most recent 
U.S. Census Bureau's Current Population Survey data and the Knowledge Networks panel data. 
Cell-by-cell adjustments over the various univariate and bivariate distributions are calculated to 
make the weighted sample cells match those of the U.S. Census and the Knowledge Networks 
panel. This process, known as raking, is repeated iteratively until there is convergence between 
the weighted sample and benchmark distributions (CPS distributions). Occasionally, collapsing of 
post-stratification cells is necessary. This is dependent on the size of the sample and topology of 
the sample universe. Final post-stratification weights are provided. The final weights are censored 
at the extreme tails (1%, 99%). WEIGHT2 is scaled to the number of qualified completes cases. 
 
 
